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ABSTRACT
Development and Validation of a Multidimensional Scale for Measuring Public Confidence
in the Criminal Justice System
By
Jimin Pyo
Advisor: Professor Michael Maxfield
Two studies were conducted with an aim of developing multidimensional measures of public
confidence that are conceptually integrated, psychometrically sound, and useful in predicting
individuals’ law related behaviors. Study 1 involves two-phased construction of scale in which a
preliminary inventory was generated (Phase 1) and then finalized after evaluating psychometric
properties based on 304 US adults recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (Phase
2). As a result, six multidimensional scales were constructed respectively for measuring
efficiency-, finality-, fairness-, strictness-, accuracy-, and transparency-oriented confidence.
Despite more complexity of factor structures than originally expected, results of psychometric
evaluation six scales of confidence can be used as a reliable and valid tool for measuring
different aspects of confidence. Study 2 involves a test of predictive ability of the scale scores for
two types of law related behaviors – cooperation and verdict – based on a second sample of 433
US adults from MTurk. This study finds that people with greater confidence in the system’s
accurate fact-finding and fair treatment are more willing to help institutions, and people with
greater confidence in the system’s conformity with the formal structure of law are more
compliant with the law. Results show that higher accuracy- and lower strictness-oriented
confidence are related to greater guilty verdicts, mainly through preexisting belief in high
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probability of commission for the defendant. Higher efficiency-oriented confidence is related to
greater guilty verdicts, mainly through less stringent reasonable doubt standard. Possible
explanations for those findings, implications, and limitations and future directions are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Chapter one introduces the background of this research including rationales for
understanding and measuring public confidence in the criminal justice system, problems of
existing confidence measures, and a brief overview of two studies conducted to develop
multidimensional measures of confidence.
Importance of understanding public confidence in the criminal justice system
Public confidence is central to the operation of the criminal justice system. There are
several theoretical and empirical rationales for understanding and accurately measuring public
confidence in the criminal justice system. First, public confidence is a sensitive indication of the
perceived legitimacy of law and the justice system, which is closely connected with cooperation
with criminal justice institutions such as police, prosecutors, and courts (Jackson & Bradford,
2010; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Darley, 1999; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).
Second, confidence in the system also reflects individuals’ attitudes and underlying cognitive
structures regarding criminal justice issues, which in turn can affect perceptions and judgments
within a criminal legal setting such as verdict judgments as jurors (Devine, 2012; Devine &
Caughlin, 2014; Lecci & Myers, 2002, 2008; Martin & Cohn, 2004; Pennington, & Hastie,
1992). Both rationales suggest important links between confidence and citizen’s law related
behavioral and attitudinal outcomes.
Problems of existing confidence measures
Despite growing interest in public confidence in the criminal justice system among
social scientists from a variety of disciplines (Hamm, Wylie, & Brank, 2016; Hamm et al., 2011;
Indermaur & Roberts, 2009), robust confidence measures have not yet been established. The
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main problem is a lack of consensus regarding the conceptualization of the construct of
confidence and its dimensions, which in turn has permitted numerous terms and constructs that
relate to confidence to be used interchangeably. These include legal authoritarianism, loyalty,
support, legitimacy, obligation, and dispositional trust (Cook & Gronke, 2005; Hamm et al.,
2011; Indermaur & Roberts, 2009; Tyler, 2001). It has also allowed varying forms of confidence
assessment across different studies such as dispositional, specific, diffuse, political, and
interpersonal measures of confidence in the criminal justice system (Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence,
2003; Newton & Norris, 2000). More generally, many forms of confidence are collapsed under
one label as “confidence in the criminal justice system” creating grounds for misunderstanding
by masking complexity of this construct.
Other problems can be seen in the existing research that seems to view measuring
confidence uncritically. Much of the empirical work that examines confidence in the criminal
justice system relies upon a single measure asking respondents about their confidence in the
system in general or how well they think the system is doing (Indermaur & Roberts, 2009).
Single items are not likely to capture the complexity and different aspects of this latent construct.
Even when using multi-item measure, psychometric properties of measures such as reliability
and validity have not been substantially evaluated. Using psychometrically established measures
is crucial to conducting research that provides clear information, and such measures can be
obtained preliminary by well-defining a construct within established theoretical frameworks
(Furr, 2011; Noar, 2003). Few studies on confidence, however, have developed measures within
such robust frameworks.
Two fundamental issues need to be addressed to clearly conceptualize confidence. First,
it needs to specify the nature of public confidence in the criminal justice system such as what
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confidence stands for. With increasing attention to institutional confidence by scholars,
conceptual perspectives on confidence broadened involving institutional performance-based,
personality-based, and social and cultural explanations. There has been little effort to articulate
the meaning and nature of confidence in the criminal justice system. This in turn has led to a
confusing collection of definitions applied to a host of units and levels of analysis without
arriving at a suitable definition for confidence in the criminal justice system.
Second, there needs to be a clear framework for determining domains of criminal
justice-specific confidence. Although studies often implicitly assume that confidence toward the
criminal justice system is not unidimensional, there has been little agreement about the content
and number of its dimensions (Nannestad, 2008; Newton, 2001). Established theoretical
frameworks can serve as guidance in identifying dimensions of the construct of interest. Without
relying on such frameworks, previous studies have focused more narrowly on different aspects of
confidence in the criminal justice system. Explicit criminal justice theoretical models would
provide better suggestions for defining the dimensions of confidence in the criminal justice
system.
Purpose and overview of the present research
The present research aims to develop a robust multidimensional scale for measuring
public confidence in the criminal justice system, based upon a clear conceptualization of the
construct of confidence and its dimensions. The current study conceptualizes the meaning and
nature of confidence in the criminal justice system based on evaluations of existing perspectives
on sources of institutional confidence. This study also identifies and defines dimensions of
confidence based on theoretical and empirical models of criminal justice ideology that reflect
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different systemic purposes. These include Packer’s (1968) (1) Crime Control, and (2) Due
Process Models, and (3) Findley’s (2008) Reliability Model.
The present research develops and validates multidimensional measures of public
confidence that are conceptually integrated, psychometrically sound, and useful in predicting
individuals’ law related behaviors. Two major studies were conducted to addresses types of
validity evidence outlined by the Standards for Educational and Psychological Measurement
(AERA, 2014). These include (a) evidence based on scale content, (b) evidence based on
response processes, (c) evidence based on internal structure, (d) evidence based on relations to
other variables, and (e) evidence based on consequences of testing. Study 1 addresses the first
three types of evidence, while study 2 focuses on the last two types of evidence.
Study 1 involves generating an initial 72-item confidence scale, followed by
psychometric evaluation of scale responses such as structural aspect of validity and scale
reliability. Study 2 tests predictive ability of scale scores for two types of law related behavioral
and attitudinal outcomes – cooperative behavior and verdict preferences/judgments as jurors.

5
CHAPTER TWO
Conceptual framework and previous research
Chapter two describes how I conceptualize the construct of confidence and its
dimensions based on theoretical considerations, followed by review of existing scales of
confidence and trust in the criminal justice system together with previous research that examines
confidence as a variable of interest. Finally, this chapter reviews theoretical and empirical
models that suggest important relationships between confidence and law related behaviors
including cooperation and verdict as jurors.
Sources of institutional confidence and trust
This section reviews three main perspectives on sources of institutional confidence and
trust including, institutional performance-based, personality-based, and social and cultural
explanations. Core arguments from each of these three conceptual viewpoints are compared.
They have different views on meaning and nature of institutional confidence that would be
basically evaluated by asking individuals about their level of confident feeling about institutions.
With emphasis on different sources of confidence, they require different levels and units of
analysis as well as distinct interpretations of confidence scores.
Institutional performance-based explanation
According to the institutional performance-based explanation, individuals’ confidence is
an index of effectiveness of institutional or systemic structures and processes (e.g., Hardin, 2002;
Newton, 1999; Newton & Norris, 2000). This approach essentially argues that confidence is the
product of actual institutional performance, which in turn provides an important assessment of
how well the institutions/systems are actually doing their job. Institutional performance is
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therefore the key to understanding citizens’ confidence and trust in institutions. The institutional
performance-based perspective treats confidence as an institutional phenomenon and regards it
neither as personality traits nor as the direct products of individual life situations or experiences.
Within this framework, it is expected that institutional confidence is not existent at the individual
level but can be the best understood at the institutional level.
Personality-based explanation
Unlike institutional performance-based explanation, the personality-based explanation
treats institutional confidence as a basic aspect of personality (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Rotter, 1980).
Central to this perspective is that individuals form a basic trust personality through their earlylife socialization experiences, and this dispositional trait to trust or distrust others is fairly stable
throughout their lifetime, manifesting in many different domains including trust in institutions. In
other words, a trusting or distrusting dispositional trait is an ingrained affective orientation. This
predisposition is difficult to change and largely independent of experiences of external
environments. The personality-based explanation therefore regards institutional confidence as
perpetuating predilections without much reference to individuals’ later social experiences and
interactions with the institutions. Within this framework, it is expected that institutional
confidence is not existent at the aggregate level but can be the best understood at the individual
level.
Social and cultural explanation
The social and cultural explanation holds that institutional confidence is a product of
individuals’ social and cultural experiences (e.g., Ardener, 1964; Devine, 2012; Geertz, 1962;
Indermaur & Roberts, 2009; Sherman, 2002; Tyler & Trinker 2017). Unlike the institutional
performance-based explanation, the social and cultural perspective treats institutional confidence
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as an attitudinal variable that reflects what individuals imagine the institution means to them and
how it sits in relation to their interests, rather than a reflection of an actual institutional
performance or more distal contextual factors. Similar with personality-based explanation, the
social and cultural perspective argues that institutional confidence comes from individual
sources. However, this approach essentially posits that individual life situations and experiences,
rather than the fixed dispositional trait, matter in determining individual’s confidence in public
institutions. These include personal early and later life experiences such as education,
interpersonal or social experiences as well as interactions with institutions.
For example, Tyler and Trinker’s (2017) legal socialization models specifically state that
individuals develop their conceptions about law and view about legal authorities such as
legitimacy, based on how they experience and interpret their interactions with the law during
their legal socialization process in the family, in schools, and through contacts with the criminal
justice system. Legal socialization as a subset of larger socialization, begins before adulthood but
evolves over time through the life course. Similarly, the legitimacy model (also known as the
social norms model) states that confidence is a central dimension of individuals’ perceived
legitimacy of the criminal justice system that forms mainly via experiences and interactions with
the law (Beetham, 2013; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Darley, 1999; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Sunshine &
Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Jackson, 2014).
Within the social and cultural framework including models of legal attitudes, it is
expected that institutional confidence is existent at and the best understood at the individual
level.
Conceptualization of confidence in the criminal justice system
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The current research adopts social and cultural perspectives to specify the meaning and
nature of public confidence in the criminal justice system. The rationale is based on empirical
evidence on the components of criminal justice-specific attitudes and confidence.
A number of empirical studies have suggested that there are important links between
individual life situations and experiences, such as income, education, and victimization
experiences, and their confidence in the criminal justice system (e.g., Abramson, 1983; Hibbing
& Theiss-Morse, 1995; Sherman, 2002). It has been found that the direct experiences with
criminal justice institutions have important impact on the levels of confidence in the system (e.g.,
Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Wenzel, Bowler, & Lanoue, 2003). For example, Tyler and
Fagan (2008) demonstrate that individuals’ legitimate or confident feeling toward the police is a
function of personal experiences with procedurally just policing that are separate from
instrumental judgments about police performance. As an another example, Wenzel, Bowler and
Lanoue (2003) found that public confidence toward the courts derives largely from personal
legal experiences with the courts rather than court systemic process and performances.
While the personality-based perspective is skeptical that experiences beyond early life
can function to adjust somewhat initial trust or distrust levels, studies have shown that the
sources of institutional confidence can change over time, and with experiences the dispositional
trust becomes less predictive (e.g., D’amico, 2003; Kramer, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman,
1995). Through repeated measures experimental research, D’amico (2003) demonstrated that
despite a close association between dispositional trust and institutional confidence, this
association become less significant by life experiences and interactions with others.
For the present research, I adopt the following definition and description of confidence
in the criminal justice system as follows.
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•

Definition: Confidence in the criminal justice system can be defined as a
multidimensional construct capturing individuals’ fundamental perceptions or beliefs
about the motives and competence of human elements of the criminal justice system

•

Sources of Confidence: Confidence in the criminal justice system derives from
personal sources – individuals possess diverse backgrounds, life situations, and social
and legal experiences, which in turn are associated with different attitudes and beliefs
regarding the competence of the criminal justice system

•

What is being measured: Confidence is an attitudinal variable that directly represent
how one perceives the system with respect to regulating society, resolving conflicts,
and managing social order. Confidence does not reflect fixed personality traits or the
system’s actual performance, or situational factors such as crime rates and media
publicity

•

Level of unit of measures: Confidence is measured at the individual level rather than
aggregate level

Dimensions of confidence in the criminal justice system
As defined above, measures of confidence should capture people’s perceptions about
“motives and competence of the criminal justice system” which can be the basis for
distinguishing dimensions of confidence. For the purpose of the present research, I identify and
definee the dimensions of confidence within the frameworks of the criminal justice system, what
it strives for or fundamental reasons for its existence. The main dimensions of confidence are
drawn from theoretical and empirical models of criminal justice ideology that reflect different
systemic purposes and value preferences that shape our criminal justice system. These are
Packer’s (1968) (a) Crime Control Model; Packer’s (b) Due Process Model; (c) Findley’s (2008)
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Reliability Model. This section reviews key arguments from each of these three models and then
conceptualizes three main types of confidence along with two key elements for each type based
on the value systems that underlie each model. One must note that the term “reliability” used in
this legal model indicates accuracy which is known as validity in quantitative social science
research. However, when I discuss psychometric properties of scale scores in the later sections,
the term reliability means consistency.
Models of ideology of the criminal justice system
Crime Control Model. Packer (1968) proposes two models to identify the value
preferences that underlie competing ideologies of the criminal justice system, the crime control
and due process models. The crime control model values a suppression of criminal conduct for a
public safety and well-being of society as the most important function to be performed by the
criminal process. This model emphasizes the efficiency and finality with which the criminal
process operates to screen suspects, determine guilt, and secure appropriate dispositions of
persons convicted of crime. According to this model, in order to achieve maximum crime
suppression, the system should strive for apprehending, trying, convicting, and sanctioning a
high proportion of criminal offenders by quickly resolving the question of factual guilt. Within
the crime control framework, the criminal justice process strives for efficiency or maximum
speed, and finality or maximum punishment relying largely on informal investigation processes
and interrogations by police and prosecutors with minimal oversight by formal adjudication.
Necessarily, the crime control model places great faith and confidence in informal administrative
fact-finding and screening processes by police and prosecutors. This model hinges on a
presumption of guilt that permits most cases to be resolved by guilty pleas.
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Due Process Model. The value system that underlies the due process model, by contrast,
is based on protection of individual rights and dignity by treating people fairly under the formal
structure of the law, rather than merely crime suppression. The due process model is skeptical of
the accuracy of quick, informal administrative investigative fact-finding with a minimal judicial
review. This model instead values formal, adjudicative, and adversarial fact-finding through an
impartial tribunal concerned with rules of evidence and standards of proof. The due process
model can be linked to the procedural justice model (Tyler, 2001, 2004) given that the model
includes a concept of procedural fairness. To protect individuals and human rights, due processfocused criminal procedure emphasizes formal adversarial adjudication in which the factual
cases against the accused is evaluated by fair tribunal, and the accused has had a full opportunity
to discredit the case against him. Necessarily, the due process model places great faith and
confidence in formal adversarial adjudication in open court. As its premise, this model relies
upon a presumption of legal innocence with low demand for finality in contrast to the crime
control-focused criminal procedure with high finality.
Reliability Model: Toward a new paradigm of criminal justice. As Packer’s two
models suggest, the criminal justice system mainly strives for two purposes, protection of the
society and protection of individuals. Although elaborate systems of law have been evolved
through history to maintain the balance between the two purposes (e.g., Arenella, supra note 21,
at 187), it is often difficult for these two competing ideologies to be simultaneously achieved.
When the system strives to eradicate crimes from the society, violations of human rights may
follow. When the system strives for the protection of human rights too far, the safety and wellbeing of the society may be compromised. Findley (2008) proposes a new paradigm of criminal
justice called the Reliability model as an alternate that does not heavily skew either to safety or to
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human rights by focusing on a new frame of criminal justice – reliable fact-finding based on
accurate and transparent practices of evidence collection and evaluation practice.
Finley introduced the reliability model claiming that crime control and due process
ideologies did not pay much attention to another important function of the system which is about
‘truth-finding.’ The crime control model emphasizes quick resolution of factual guilt, leading to
a presumption of guilt that can potentially risk wrongful conviction. In contrast, under the due
process frameworks with greater concerns on the protection of defendant’s rights based on a
presumption of legal innocence, some procedural rules serve values other than truth-finding and
therefore may exclude reliable but illegally obtained evidence. In this regard, it can be that the
due process values allow the factually (but not legally) guilty to go free, having a potential risk
of wrongful acquittal. If the system tries to pursue one of the two purposes exclusively, the
chance for particular risk – wrongful conviction or wrongful acquittal – would necessarily
increase.
The reliability model is concerned with reducing false conviction errors without risking
many false acquittals. The core value system that underlies this model is based on truth-finding
function that can accurately sort the guilty and innocent, therefore ultimately protecting the
innocent without sacrificing public safety. To attain this goal, the reliability model places an
emphasis on enhancing accuracy and transparency in fact-finding processes. Increasing attention
has been paid among scholars and practitioners to the reliability perspective that values factfinding precision (Dwyer, Neufeld, & Scheck, 2000; Lillquist, 2008; Simon, 2012). They
emphasize the reliable account of evidence obtained by best practices throughout the criminal
justice process, from the police investigation through to the adjudicative review by the court. As
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its premise, this model places great faith and confidence in the system’s reliable factdetermination function.
Conceptualization of dimensions of confidence
Based on value systems that underlie three models of criminal justice ideology, I identify
three main types of confidence in the criminal justice system along with two key elements for
each confidence type. As a result, six dimensions of confidence can be conceptualized as below:
1. Crime Control Oriented Confidence: trust or belief that the criminal justice system
protects the public and the well-being of society by preventing and suppressing crime.
Two key elements are Efficiency (the system’s capacity to apprehend, try, convict, and
dispose criminal offenders with maximum speed) and Finality (the system’s capacity to
sanction large numbers of criminal offenders with enough severity to suppress crime).
2. Due Process Oriented Confidence: trust or belief that the criminal justice system
protects human rights and dignity. Two key elements are Fairness (the system treats
individuals equally and impartially) and Strictness (the system conforms to formal
structures of the law).
3. Reliability Oriented Confidence: trust or belief that the criminal justice system’s factfinding functions are reliable. Two key elements are Accuracy (the system ensures
reliable fact-finding based on accurate evidence) and Transparency (the actions of legal
authorities are clearly visible in fact-finding processes).
Existing confidence measures
This section reviews existing scales developed for assessing individuals’ confidence and
trust in the criminal justice system. This section also reviews previous empirical studies that
examine confidence as a variable of interest, especially focusing on how they operationalize and
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measure the construct of confidence. In doing so, the problems of existing measures are analyzed
to provide insights and references for the development of confidence scale.
Existing scales of confidence and legal attitudes
Table 1 presents a summary of existing scales of confidence or relevant attitudes
described in detail below. There are a few available scales that measure public confidence or
confidence-relevant attitudes toward the criminal justice system. Hamm, Wylie, and Brank
(2016) developed a scale for measuring older adults’ Confidence in Legal Institution (CLI)
focusing on courts and law enforcement. Although they did not clearly define confidence, they
explicate to some degree their view of confidence by stating that the scale items focus largely on
“how the participant believes that the institutions approach and accomplish their job” (p. 306).
The CLI consists of two separate subscales, one for confidence in courts (CLI-Courts) and
another for confidence in law enforcement (CLI-Law Enforcement). Results of psychometric
evaluations of scale responses from 131 older adults aged 60 to 90, show that each confidence
scale is reliable (w = .91 for both), and achieves unidimensional factor structure after deleting
items with low factor loadings. Scores on both scale items were related to other similar law
related attitudes including cynicism, trust in the governmental institutions, and dispositional
trust.
Martin and Cohn (2004) developed the Attitudes Toward the Criminal Legal System
Scale (ATCLS) to assess three dimensions of legal attitudes – integrity, competence, and fairness
– toward seven different aspects of the criminal legal system including prosecuting and defense
attorneys, judges, police officers, juries, law, and punishment. However, a factor analysis of the
ATCLS found no interpretable separate factors showing the scale items loaded on only one
factor. Five studies demonstrated the reliability of the entire scale (! = .79) but limited
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supports for reliability of each subscale (! = .58, .61 and .65 for integrity, competence, and
fairness, respectively). They also demonstrated convergent and discriminant evidence, showing
that scale scores are related to legal authoritarianism (RLAQ23) and belief in a just world
(BJWS) but unrelated to juror bias (JBS) and right-wing authoritarianism.
The Revised Legal Attitudes Questionnaire 23 (RLAQ 23) developed by Kravitz, Cutler,
and Brock (1993) is one of the most frequently used legal attitude scales intended to predict juror
verdicts. It was designed to measure an authoritarianism, defined by the degree to which one
values clear rules, social order, conventional norms, and strong leadership, particularly in a legal
setting. The RLAQ 23 consists of three subscales or dimensions: authoritarianism,
antiauthoritarianism, and equalitarianism. Two studies demonstrated the internal consistency for
the entire scale (α = .71) but not for subscales showing reliability estimates ranging from ! =.45
to !=.62. Although the confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the RLAQ 23 is nonunidimensional, it failed to identify interpretable distinct factors, therefore leaving the issue of
dimensionality unsolved. Kravitz, Cutler, and Brock (1993)’s study also supported the
convergent and discriminant evidence, showing a positive (negative) correlation of
authoritarianism (equalitarianism) with favorability of death penalty and statistically
nonsignificant correlations with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (1964).
Kassin and Wrightsman (1983) developed the Juror Bias Scale (JBS) designed to capture
an individual’s pre-trial tendency to favor the prosecution or defense in criminal trials. Although
the JBS is developed with a particular intention to measure juror “bias,” this scale seems
fundamentally grounded in an individual’s faith in the competence of legal system operations.
For this reason, the JBS has been used as a measure of general legal attitudes or system
confidence in the empirical literature on jurors (e.g., Chapdelaine & Griffin, 1997; Devine &
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Caughlin, 2014; Tang & Nunez, 2003). The JBS aims to measure two separate but related
constructs – (1) Perceived probability of commission which is the perceived likelihood that the
defendant actually committed the crime and (2) Reasonable doubt which indicates the threshold
of certainty deemed necessary for conviction. Given that two sets of items were inter-correlated
with each other (r = .60), they were combined into one scale to form a single unidimensional
scale. The scale demonstrated split-half reliability of .81 and test-retest reliability of .67.
Convergent evidence was presented based on a strong correlation between JBS and
authoritarianism (Byrne, 1974). The JBS scores were not correlated with the Marlowe-Crowne
Social Desirability Scale (1964) supporting a discriminant evidence. The JBS scores also showed
predictive utility showing that prosecution-biased participants are more prone to guilty verdicts
than defense-biased participants.
Lecci and Myers (2002) found a problem of JBS regarding its structural validity showing
that the items of JBS fail to replicate the expected two-dimensional factors, probability of
commission and reasonable doubt. Later, Lecci and Myers (2008) developed the Pretrial Juror
Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ) which is designed to measure six separate dimensions –
conviction proneness, system confidence, cynicism toward the defense, social justice, racial bias,
and innate criminality. The PJAQ was found to support the structural aspect of validity since the
scale items represent the posited (six) dimensions well. They did not report internal consistency
for each subscale. The convergent evidence was supported based on observed correlations with
JBS and RLAQ 23. The PJAQ scores showed better predictive utility for jurors’ verdict
tendency, when compared to JBS and RLAQ 23.
As examined above, only a small number of scales are available for measuring public
confidence in the criminal justice system. The existing scales show different views on confidence
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and its dimensions. Without a thorough delineation of the construct of confidence, what exactly
is being captured by these measures remains unclear. With an assumption of multidimensionality
of confidence, there have been efforts to measure the different aspects of confidence (e.g.,
ATCLS). The observed poor psychometric properties, however, may indicate problems with
conceptualizations of dimensions that have not been built on clear theoretical frameworks.
Although confidence may share some similarity with other relevant constructs such as
authoritarianism and juror bias, confidence is more concerned with individuals’ perceived
competence of the system operation rather than their value commitment or dispositional
attributes. Better confidence measures are needed to more thoroughly capture the perceived
competence of various aspects of the system.
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Table 1
Summary of existing confidence/trust or legal attitude scales
Authors

Hamm,
Wylie, &
Brank
(2016)

Hamm et
al. (2011)

Martin &
Cohn
(2004)

Kravitz,
Cutler, &
Brock
(1993)

Measure/
conceptualization
Older adult
confidence in legal
institutions (CLI)
“how individual
believes that the
institutions approach
and accomplish their
job”

Dimensions/ subfactors

Psychometric evaluation

1. Confidence in law
enforcement
2. Confidence in courts

Each institution-specific
confidence shows (1)
reliability (w = .91 for
both) and (2) unidimensionality after
erasing items with low
factor loadings

Criterion construct:
Confidence in the
courts with three
types of measure (1)
unspecified, (2)
trustworthiness, and
(3) specific
expectation

Examines four related
constructs
1. dispositional trust
2. trust in institutions
3. obligation to obey
the law
4. cynicism

(1) Distinctiveness of
four constructs was
found through EFA
(each item’s primary
loading of .65 or greater
and cross-loadings of .5
or less)
(2) each scale reliability
– criterion
(trustworthiness: !
= .84, specific
expectation: ! =.69) &
four constructs (! = .68
or greater).

Attitudes toward the
criminal legal
system (ATCLS)

1. Fairness, 2.
Competence, and
3. integrity – about
judges, police, defense
attorneys, prosecuting
attorneys, law,
punishment, juries)

ATCLS shows (1)
reliability (! = .82) and
(2) Uni-dimensionality

Legal attitudes
questionnaire
(revised the original
one) – measuring
legal
authoritarianism
RLAQ 23

1. authoritarian –
endorsed the acts of
constituted authority or
punitive in nature
2. antiauthoritarian –
reject the acts of
constituted authority
3. equalitarian –
endorsed traditional,
liberal, non-extreme
positions

(1) Reliability – RALQ
(! of .63) after erasing
items with low corrected
item-total correlations,
RLAQ 23 (α= .71); each
subscale internal
reliability authoritarian
(! = .58), antiauthoritarian (! = .45),
and equalitarian (!
= .62)
(2) Non-unidimensional
– but failed to reveal

Validation/ Empirical
findings
Convergent validity –
both subscales were
related to single item
confidence measures,
cynicism, trust in the
governmental
institutions, and
dispositional trust
Construct relationships
were tested twice –
mixed results; but
among the four
constructs,
dispositional trust is
consistently related to
various types of
confidence and
cynicism was a
marginally significant
predictor. Obligation to
obey the law and
cynicism were less
robust predictors.
Discriminant validity –
positively related to
legal authoritarianism
(RLAQ23), belief in a
just world (BJWS),
unrelated to juror bias
(pro-defense v. proprosecution; JBS) and
right-wing
authoritarianism
Concurrent validity &
Discriminant validity –
strong positive
(negative) correlation
of authoritarian
(equalitarian) with
attitude toward death
penalty, political
conservatives,
religious, and belief in
a just world
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factors interpretable and
reliable

Lecci &
Myers
(2008)

Kassin
(1983)

Pretrial juror attitude
questionnaire
(PJAQ) – measuring
individual
differences in legally
relevant attitudes

Juror bias scale
(JBS) – measuring
individual
differences in
pretrial bias (beliefs
about crime,
conviction, and
punishment)

1. conviction
proneness, 2. system
confidence, 3.
cynicism toward the
defense, 4. racial bias,
5. social justice, and 6.
innate criminality

1. perceived
probability of
commission (PC):
likelihood that the
defendant actually
committed the crime
2. reasonable doubt
(RD): threshold of
certainty deemed
necessary for
conviction

(1) Qualities of items -among 95 items, select
30 items with the
highest composite score
(ZM – ZD) indicating best
consensus for what
constitutes a good item
(2) multidimensionality:
distinct 6 factors were
found – the two highest
correlations were found
in relation of system
confidence with 1.
innate criminality and
with 2. racial bias

(1) Quality of items -items with varied range
of responses,
statistically significant
correlation with the total
score, and with low
correlation with social
desirability scale were
selected
(2) scale’s split-half
reliability of .81 & testretest reliability of .67
(3) uni-dimensional-two sets of items had
high correlation with
each other and so they
were combined (r = .60);
high scores on this scale
indicate prosecutionbias and lowers indicate
defense bias

Convergent validity –
correlated with JBS
(juror bias scale) and
RLAQ 23
Predictive validity –
five factors except for
social justice were
found to be statistically
significantly correlated
with verdict tendencies
about four types of trial
summaries
Incremental predictive
validity – PJAQ shows
a superior ability in
predicting verdict
tendencies over existing
scales, JBS and RLAQ
23

Predictive validity --JBS can predict the
verdicts of mock jurors
(prosecution biased
individuals showed a
higher verdict of guilt)
: Two validation studies
predicting individuals’
pre-deliberation
judgments of guilt, one
based on trial scenarios
and the other based on
video-taped mock trials
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Existing empirical research on confidence in the criminal justice system
Public confidence in the criminal justice system has received substantial attention from
researchers due to its centrality to legitimate and efficient operation of the system. Researchers
have examined confidence as a dependent or independent variable relying on various ways of
operationalization. Table 2 summarizes existing studies measuring confidence in the criminal
justice system described in detail below.
Much of the empirical research on public confidence in the criminal justice system has
used single-item measures simply asking an individual’s general level of confidence about the
system or how well they think the system is doing. For example, Benesh and Howell (2001)
examined how individuals’ court experiences influence individuals’ confidence in the Louisiana
courts, using a single question: “Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the job the
Louisiana courts are doing?” (p. 207). Kerstetter and Rasinski (1994) investigated the impact of
procedural justice principles on an individual’s confidence in police. They used a single item
asking whether the police review panel improves confidence in police investigation. Tuffin,
Morris, Poole, and Groot Brittannië (2006) examined the effect of the National Reassurance
Policing Programme on public confidence in local police in England. Their measure for
confidence asked, “how good a job do you think the police in your local area are doing?” (p. 49).
Finally, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2003) assessed public confidence in the Supreme court
and its relations with several court legitimacy measures such as institutional loyalty. They
measured confidence with a single item asking general level of confidence.
Other research has examined confidence in the criminal justice system using multiple
items. For example, Brooks and Jeon-Slaughter (2001) investigated the effect of income on
African Americans’ confidence in the court system. They used six-item measure for assessing
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unspecified and specified confidence, but no psychometric properties on these multi-items were
reported. As another examples, Ren, Cao, Lovrich, and Gaffney (2005) conducted a research
aiming to find sources of citizen confidence in police by testing the impacts of participation in
community crime prevention program, informal collective security, victimization, and receiving
traffic tickets. They measured confidence using a seven-item measure to capture different aspects
of confidence such as fair, courteous, and honest. Cronbach alpha for the scale was .68, and no
structural aspects of the measures was reported. Wenzel, Bowler, and Lanoue (2003)
investigated the impacts of types of criminal legal experiences (jury v. defendant) on confidence
in the state courts. This study used a single item asking general confidence in courts along with
eighteen items asking several specific types of confidence ranging from the representativeness of
juries to the honesty of judges. The study reported unidimensionality of 18-item measure of
specific confidence based on confirmatory factor analysis, but no scale reliability was reported.
Finally, Tyler (2001) analyzed the relationship between procedural justice experiences with
courts and police and confidence in the institutions. For example, in the Chicago study,
confidence was conceptualized as people’s general evaluations of the favorability or unfavorability of the police and courts and measured using 10 items asking how good a job the
police and court are doing, whether they respect, support, and feel proud of the police, whether
they think the courts are fair, protect the citizen, etc. These 10 items were then combined to
produce an overall index of institutional confidence, with overall scale reliability of α = .86, but
no report was made concerning dimensionality.
The first set of examples measures the general level of confidence, namely unspecified
confidence using single items. This approach can create produce misunderstanding by masking
the different aspects of the construct of interest (Noar, 2003). The second set of examples of
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studies operationalizes and measures confidence using multiple items. Although multi-item
measures are more likely than single-item measure to capture the complexity of the construct,
studies disregarded the psychometric evaluations of the items or reported incomplete
psychometric properties. Using psychometrically sound measures is essential to conducting
research that provides clear information. Such measures can be obtained with well-defined
constructs guided by established theoretical frameworks (Furr, 2011; Noar, 2003). Few studies
on confidence, however, have developed measures within such robust frameworks.
Table 2
Summary of existing studies measuring confidence in CJ system
Authors

Wenzel
Bowler &
Lanoue
(2003)

Kerstetter &
Rasinski
(1994)

Construct/
conceptualization

Confidence in the
state courts (outcome
variable)

Confidence in the the
review of allegations
of police misconduct
(outcome variable)

Measures (single or
multiple)
Use single &
multiple items
1. general confidence
–single item asking a
confidence on 4point scale
2. specific
confidence – 18
items asking the
agreement with 18
specific
characteristics of
court (e.g., Courts
protect defendants’
constitutional rights)
Single item –whether
confident that your
police department
will thoroughly and
impartially
investigate citizen
complains about its
officers? (3 point
scale: a lot more, a
little more, or less)

Empirical findings
regarding construct

Psychometric
evaluation

Actual experiences with
court have impact on
confidence:
(1) criminal jury
experience is positively
associated with confidence
(2) experience as a
defendant is negatively
associated with confidence
(3) Judicial selection
method and media do not
impact on confidence

Procedural innovation with
the establishment of a
review panel with civilian
participants has positive
impact on confidence

Uni-dimensionality
of 18 items
measuring for
specific confidence
was found
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Ren, Cao,
Lovrich, &
Gaffney
(2005)

Tuffin,
Morris,
Poole,
Groot
Brittannië
(2006)

Confidence in police
(outcome variable)

Confidence in local
police
Defined as how good
a job the local police
are doing (outcome
variable)

Multiple items – how
much you believe
that police officers
are 1. fair, 2.
courteous, 3. honest,
4. not intimidating,
5. working with
citizens together, 6.
treating citizens
equally, and 7.
showing concerns
when asked
questions (5-point
scale)
Single item – how
good a job do you
think the police in
your local area are
doing?

Indermaur
& Roberts
(2009)

Confidence in the
criminal justice
system (police,
criminal courts, and
prison system)

Three sets of
multiple items (4point scale)
measuring
confidence in each
institution – e.g., For
police, how much
confidence they had
in the police to solve
crime, to act fairly,
to respond quickly to
crime, and to prevent
crime.

Gibson,
Caldeira, &
Spence
(2003)

Confidence in the
U.S. Supreme Court
(outcome variable)

Single item asking
level of confidence
(4-point scale)

(1) volunteers involved in
community crime
prevention programs and
(2) informal collective
security are positively
related to confidence
(3) victimization and (4)
traffic tickets reduce
confidence

Positive impact of National
Reassurance Policing
Programme on confidence
The public has greatest
confidence in the police,
followed by courts and the
least confidence in prisons
-- the public is much more
concerned about the
effectiveness of the system
in controlling crime.
The scales measuring
confidence in the police,
prisons and courts are
moderately positively
correlated. There is a
distinct evaporation of
confidence moving through
the criminal justice system
from police through courts
to corrections.
Confidence was compared
with several court
legitimacy measures
(specific support,
institutional loyalty,
general affect) –
confidence reflects both
short-term and long- term
judgments about the court,
with the greater influence
coming from satisfaction
with the court at the
moment.

!= .68
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Brooks &
JeonSlaughter
(2001)

Confidence in the
U.S. court system
(outcome variable)

Multiple items
measuring 1. Court
treatments, 2-3. level
of confidence in
supreme court,
community court
(unspecified), 4-6.
courts handling of
civil cases, criminal
cases, and small
claims

Mixed results about the
effect of income within
race on citizen perception
of the courts – higherincome African Americans
showed low confidence in
courts’ treatment and
handling cases (specified
confidence) than poor
blacks but they showed
higher confidence in the
supreme court and
community courts
(unspecified confidence).

Multiple items

Tyler
(2001)
(Chicago
study)

Confidence in police
and courts defined as
people’s general
evaluations of the
favorability or unfavorability of the
police and courts
(outcome variable)

Overall confidenceten-items asking 1-2.
police and courts do
a good job; 3.
respect, 4. feel proud
of, and 5. support
police; 6. police are
honest; 7. courts
protect citizen rights,
8. judges are honest,
9. court decisions are
fair, 10. court
guarantee a fair trial

Both competence and
quality of treatment have
impact on overall
confidence, with greater
influence of quality of
treatment.
Both ‘obligation to obey
the law’ and ‘help seeking’
are influenced by quality of
treatment, but not by
competence (performance),
regardless of minority or
majority status.

Overall competence
(ten-items)
!= .86

Why does confidence matter?
This study relies mainly on two rationales for understanding and accurately measuring
public confidence in the criminal justice system. Both rationales are related to the predictive
ability of confidence for citizen’s performances and behaviors in the context of criminal justice
processes and outcomes. These include cooperation with legal institutions and verdict
preferences/judgments as jurors. This section reviews the theoretical and empirical models on
which these rationales are based, followed by discussion of implications for the present research.
Legitimacy Model & Procedural Justice Perspective: Confidence and Cooperation
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The current research supposes that confidence toward the criminal justice system is
associated with cooperative behavior based on the legitimacy model (Tyler, 2006; Tyler &
Darley, 1999; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Confidence is not a direct measure
of legitimacy, but the legitimacy model offers a useful insight for how institutional attitudes
including confidence can be linked to citizens’ cooperation with criminal institutions. Central to
the legitimacy model is people’s perception that the actions and decisions of officials responsible
for criminal justice institutions are legitimate, which in turn shapes willingness to help
authorities deal with crime and societal problems as well as obligation to follow the law.
According to this model, confidence as a central dimension of the perceived legitimacy of the
justice system, can be related to people’s inclination to obey the law and to defer to decisions
made by legal authorities. Ultimately, the legitimacy model predicts that high levels of
confidence would encourage citizens’ cooperative behaviors. In contrast, low levels of
confidence would lead to disrespect and dissatisfaction with the institutions, therefore resulting
in less cooperation.
Adding to the legitimacy model, the procedural justice perspective (Tyler, 2001, 2004)
offers an insight on a specific type of confidence that is more related to eliciting cooperation
from the public. According to this perspective, there can be two main aspects of perception of
legal institutions. One is perception of competence of institutional performance such as
institutions’ ability to solve crime problems. The other is perception of the quality of treatment
people receive from the institutions such as fairness and justness in treating citizens. The key to
the procedural justice framework is that primary influence on cooperative behavior comes from
the later type of perception. Under the procedural justice perspective, empirical evidence has
supported that citizens’ positive view about procedurally just aspects of the system is crucial for
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obtaining cooperation from citizens (e.g., Dai, Frank, & Sun, 2011; Kristina, 2009; Mastrofski,
Snipes, & Supina, 1996; Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013; Tyler, 2001; Tyler &
Fagan, 2008).
Elements of the procedural justice perspective can be found to some extent in three main
types confidence outlined in this research. Due process-oriented confidence is the most likely to
be connected with the elements of procedural justice as this type of confidence values fair and
procedurally just treatment of human rights and dignity. Reliability-oriented confidence also
shares some elements of procedural justice although less than Due Process oriented confidence.
The two key elements of reliability-oriented confidence, transparency and accuracy, cannot be
accomplished without objective and egalitarian practice. Crime control-oriented confidence is
the least connected to procedural justice elements. It emphasizes crime suppression through
efficient resolution of criminal cases, over procedurally fair and just treatment of individuals.
Hence, according to the procedural justice arguments, it is expected that the due process-oriented
confidence is the most likely to be related to people’s cooperation with the criminal justice
institutions, while the crime control-oriented confidence has the least impact on cooperation.
Story Model & Director’s Cut Model: Confidence and Juror Verdict
The models of juror decision making also note the significance of understanding
individuals’ confidence in the criminal justice system. According to the story model (Bennett &
Feldman, 1981; Pennington & Hastie, 1992, 1993), jurors are not seen as undifferentiated
automatons who make decisions based on a rational, standardized processing of evidence in
which individual jurors are expected to listen carefully to testimony, but not form impressions or
make judgments about the verdict until all the evidence has been presented. Under the story
model, the disparity between the ideal and real juror performance has been consistently proven
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by a number of empirical studies (e.g., Diamond & Casper, 1992; Glöckner & Engel, 2013;
Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 2013; Simon 2004). In actual trials, jurors bring preconceptions,
existing knowledge and beliefs, expectations or desired conclusions to their tasks and tend to
construct stories, also called mental representations, of a trial case. Juror characteristics such as
beliefs and attitudes regarding the competence of the system, can serve as filter at trial, focusing
jurors’ attention on aspects of evidence that supports the mental representation or stories under
construction.
The Director’s Cut Model (Devine, 2012, 2014) extended the story model and
formulated an integrative model of juror decision making. This model essentially argues that
jurors’ initial mental representations of a trial case are determined by juror and defendant
characteristics along with any information obtained before the trial such as attorneys’ opening
statements. Initial trial representations then interact with incoming trial evidence and serve as the
basis for constructing a story, which is then translated into mental models for evaluating a trial
case. The director’s cut model identifies several focal juror and defendant characteristics in
shaping jurors’ preferred verdicts. Among them, juror trust in the criminal legal system has been
identified as consistent focal participant characteristic that affects verdict. Importantly, jurors’
confidence in the justice system was found to have a stronger impact on verdict than other
individual juror characteristics such as race, gender, and SES, suggesting that its effects are large
enough to have some practical significance. Individuals possess diverse background and life
experiences, which in turn leads to different beliefs and underlying cognitive structures regarding
the competence of the criminal justice system. These preexisting attitudes and beliefs then can be
associated with individuals’ perception of criminal legal issues such as crime and defendant as
well as judgment on a criminal case.
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Consistent relationship between jurors’ trust in the legal system and verdict has been
reported by studies using scales such as Juror Bias Scale (JBS) and Pretrial Juror Attitude
Questionnaire (PJAQ) (e.g., Chapdelaine & Griffin, 1997; Cutler, Moran, & Narby, 1992; De la
Fuente, & Garcia, 2003; Devine 2012, 2014; Dexter, Cutler, & Moran, 1992; Lecci & Meyers,
2008; Tang & Nunez, 2003; Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003). Individuals with high trust in the
criminal legal system were found to favor the verdict of guilty, and such finding has attracted
attention with regard to jury selection. However, it can lead to a misunderstanding of public
confidence, unless the observed relation is based on measures that fully capture the complexity
and dimensions of confidence in the system.
The observed positive relation between system confidence and conviction proneness
actually seems to reflect limited aspects of confidence. The Juror Bias Scale (JBS) was originally
developed to capture individuals’ tendency to systematically favor the prosecution or defense in
criminal trials. The predictive ability of the JBS for juror verdicts has been supported by
evidence that individuals identified as prosecution-biased vote for a guilty verdict more
frequently, while the defense-biased individuals skew toward a not-guilty verdict. Individuals
would be identified as the prosecution-biased, if they agree more on the JBS items expressing
faith in informal administrative screening by police and prosecutors. In other words, the
prosecution-biased individuals are actually those with high confidence and faith in crime control
function of the system. This is apparent in the Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ)
which is a revised version of the JBS to measure several sub-dimensions of legal attitudes such
as system confidence, cynicism, and conviction proneness. In the revised scale, the system
confidence and conviction proneness largely involve prosecution-bias items, and high scores
have been found to be related to a guilty verdict. As Lecci and Meyers (2008) note, attitudes

29
captured by the PJAQ subscales of system confidence and conviction proneness are theoretically
consistent with the notion of Packer (1968)’s crime control orientation. This signals that
individuals with high crime control-oriented confidence about the system tend to favor the guilty
verdict.
To summarize, studies suggest that jurors who favor prosecution more than defense tend
to vote a guilty verdict. In contrast, jurors who favor defense more than prosecution are more
likely to decide a not guilty verdict. Such findings can offer insights for how current confidence
measures can be linked to juror verdict. Crime control-oriented confidence is most likely to be
connected to pro-prosecution attitude, as giving greater faith in the system’s administrative
function of finding guilty for suppressing crime, which in turn leads individuals to easily make
presumption of guilt and be conviction prone. In contrast, due-process oriented confidence is
most likely to be connected to pro-defense attitudes while giving greater faith in the system’s
protection of human rights and dignity. The mental process of evaluating case of these
individuals would be framed with the presumption of innocence and their stringent interpretation
of legal standards for conviction, which in turn leads to acquittal proneness. Reliability-oriented
confidence would be connected to neither pro-prosecution nor pro-defense attitude as giving
greater faith in reliable fact-finding based only on accurate and transparent collections and
evaluations of legal evidence.

30
CHAPTER THREE
Current Research
Overview
Two studies were conducted with an aim of developing multidimensional measures of
public confidence that are conceptually integrated, psychometrically sound, and useful in
predicting individuals’ law related behaviors. Study 1 involves the two-phased construction of
scale in which a preliminary inventory was generated (Phase 1) and then finalized after
evaluating psychometric properties based on 304 US adults recruited through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (Phase 2). Study 2 involves a test of predictive ability of the scale
scores for two types of law related behaviors – cooperation and verdict. Based on a second
sample of 433 US adults from MTurk, study 2 examines how individuals’ confidence scores can
predict their’ cooperation for criminal justice institutions as well as their verdict preferences and
judgments on a criminal case.
Hypotheses: Approach to assessing validity evidence
According to the most recent edition of the Standards for Educational and Psychological
Measurement (AERA, 2014), validity is defined as “the degree to which evidence and theory
support the interpretations of test scores for proposed uses of tests” (p. 11). Validity thus has to
do with the scale’s underlying fundamental assumptions or rationales for what scale scores are
meant to represent as well as uses of scale scores (Bandalos, 2018).
The current study addresses five types of validity evidence as described in the AERA
Standards – (a) evidence based on scale content: the degree to which the content included on a
scale provides an adequate representation of the domain to be measured; (b) evidence based on
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response processes takes into account the cognitive processes or type of considerations used to
produce answers to scale items; (c) evidence based on internal structure: dimensionality of the
construct or the degree to which scale items represent the posited dimensions of confidence,
which also relates to the convergent/discriminant evidence; (d) evidence based on relations to
other variables: the degree to which that the scale scores can be used to predict future
performance or current status on some criterion; and (e) evidence based on consequences of
testing: the degree to which the implementation of the scale satisfies its purpose or shows the
intended positive consequences in practice (e.g., screening conviction prone jurors, selection of
the most cooperative individuals).
Five hypotheses are formulated to address the types of measurement validity described
in AERA Standards:
H1. For validity evidence based on scale content, it is hypothesized that the scale items
adequately represent the domain of confidence to be measured. Specifically, items
are expected to have importance and relevance for the particular domain they
represent.
H2. For validity evidence based on response processes, the study assumes respondents’
attentiveness or motivation for thorough engagement in responding to scale items.
Rationale: According to cognitive theories of responses to affective items,
optimally answering a survey question requires substantial cognitive effort: carefully
interpret the meaning of question, search memories for relevant information,
integrate that information into answers, and correctly map the answer onto the
response options provided (Krosnick, 1991). Inattentive or careless responding can
undermine validity of study measures, raising a doubt about whether the question
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has measured the intended construct (Bandalos, 2018). Respondents’ attentiveness or
effort for item responses is thus considered as valid response process for the purpose
of this research.
H3. For validity evidence based on structural aspect of validity, this study assumes three
main types of confidence and two key elements for each type, therefore considering
six dimensions as an internal structure of scale. The scale items are hypothesized to
form six separable and identifiable dimensions of confidence – efficiency, finality,
fairness, strictness, accuracy, and transparency.
H4. For validity evidence based on relations to other variables, this study assumes
predictive ability of scale scores for individuals’ cooperation with criminal justice
institutions. Scale scores are hypothesized to predict individuals’ willingness to
assist criminal justice institutions as well as their current compliance with the law.
More specifically, (H4a) higher confidence scores would be related to greater
willingness to assist the institutions as well as to greater compliance with the law.
But, the strength of association is expected to vary across types of confidence: (H4b)
both assistance and compliance would be the most influenced by due processoriented confidence, less influenced by reliability-oriented confidence, and the least
influenced by crime control-oriented confidence.
H5. For another validity evidence based on relations to other variables, this study
assumes predictive ability of scale scores for individuals’ general verdict preferences
as well as their actual verdict judgments on a specific criminal trial case. Although
the observed association between confidence and verdict can be better framed as a
validity of relations with external variables, the current research also further assumes
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and explores the potential use of the scale scores to bring the intended consequences
in the courtroom practice. The following assumption is that scale scores can be used
to identify potentially more (less) conviction prone jurors than others.
More specifically, (H5a) individuals with higher crime control-oriented
confidence are expected to prefer conviction perceiving defendants as more
culpable/responsible in general, while (H5b) individuals with higher due processoriented confidence are expected to prefer acquittal perceiving defendants as less
culpable/responsible in general. (H5c) The reliability-oriented confidence would not
be statistically significantly related to either side.
About a given criminal trial case, when controlling for the strength of evidence,
it is expected that (H5d) individuals with higher crime control-oriented confidence
are more likely to decide a guilty verdict, while (H5e) individuals with higher due
process-oriented confidence are more likely to decide a not-guilty verdict. (H5f) The
reliability-oriented confidence would not be related to either side of the verdict,
instead would influence on verdict depending on a strength of evidence.
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CHPATER FOUR
Study 1
Study 1 proceeded through two major phases. The first phase included construction of an
initial item pool, in which items were generated for each of six dimensions of confidence and
then revised based on evaluation of items by both peer reviewers and subject matter experts. The
second phase included a field test of the initial item pool to assess psychometric properties of
measures.
Scale Blueprint
Prior to discussing each phase of study 1, the scale blueprint is described to specify scale
design and content areas for each domain.
Construct and dimensions to be measured
The confidence scale aims to measure multidimensional aspects of confidence, defined
as individuals’ fundamental perceptions or beliefs about the motives and competence of human
elements of the criminal justice system. Scale responses were assumed to represent one’s factual
beliefs towards the system that have been developed during early and later socialization and legal
experiences. More specifically, scale responses are expected to indicate how one perceives the
system as offering or entailing a particular systemic purpose that serves as a dimension for
confidence.
The scale assesses three major types of confidence. Each type involves two focal
elements, therefore forming six dimensions of confidence to be measured – crime controlefficiency, crime control-finality, due process-fairness, due process-strictness, reliabilityaccuracy, and reliability-transparency. Confidence types and their focal elements are
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conceptualized as below based on different value systems that underlie models of criminal
justice ideology.
1. Crime Control (CC) Oriented Confidence: trust or belief that the criminal justice
system protects the public and the well-being of society by preventing and suppressing crime.
Two key elements are Efficiency (the system’s capacity to apprehend, try, convict, and
dispose criminal offenders with maximum speed) and Finality (the system’s capacity to sanction
large numbers of criminal offenders with enough severity to suppress crime).
2. Due Process (DP) Oriented Confidence: trust or belief that the criminal justice
system protects human rights and dignity.
Two key elements are Fairness (the system treats individuals equally and impartially)
and Strictness (the system conforms to formal structures of the law).
3. Reliability Oriented (RE) Confidence: trust or belief that the criminal justice
system’s fact-finding functions are reliable.
Two key elements are Accuracy (the system ensures reliable fact-finding based on
accurate evidence) and Transparency (the actions of legal authorities are clearly visible in factfinding processes).
Content of items
Item content for each of six domains of confidence is described in the third row of Table
3. Items on each dimension were generated toward four different criminal legal institutions
including police, prosecutor, judge, and punishment. For example, items for crime controlefficiency toward police involve content on ‘the police’s crime suppression based on quick
resolution of criminal cases’ – example item: “Police officers can quickly identify the correct
suspect.” As the example item shows, the content of item focuses on cognitive properties (e.g.,
useful and competent) rather than emotional terms (e.g., fear, anger, and disgust) regardless of
the domain. Furthermore, the content addresses information on one’s factual belief about how
the system functions (e.g., Minority defendants receive unfair criminal punishments) rather than
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on value commitment that may ask how much one values particular function of the system (e.g.,
Criminal punishment needs to be fair).
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Table 3
Content of items for six domains of confidence
Type
(Systemic
function)

Crime Control
(crime suppression)

Due Process
(protect rights and dignity)

Reliability
(truth finding)

Element

(a)
Efficiency

(b)
Finality

(c)
Fairness

(d)
Strictness

(e)
Accuracy

(f)
Transparency

Content

Quick
resolution
of
criminal
cases

Large
number of
sanctions
with enough
severity

Impartial
treatment

Conformity
to formal
structure of
law

Accurate
factfinding
practice

Transparent
fact-finding
practice

Institution
Police
Prosecution
Judge
Prison
Total

Efficiency
2
2
2
2
8

Minimum target number of items per each domain
Finality
Fairness
Strictness
Accuracy
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
8
8
8
8

Transparency
2
2
2
2
8

Format of items and response options
Items were written and worded with the intent to reflect particular domain of confidence.
Each item is presented as one simple and clear sentence with complete positively (e.g., Police
officers treat all different groups of people with respect) or negatively oriented thought (e.g.,
Police officers treat wealthy people better than poor people) as to the element (e.g., Fair) of
particular dimension of confidence (e.g., Due Process) to be measured. Each item is measured on
a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 for strongly disagree, 2 for disagree, 3 for somewhat disagree, 4 for
neither agree nor disagree, 5 for somewhat agree, 6 for agree, and 7 for strongly agree. The
negatively oriented items were reverse coded.
Scoring the scale
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Confidence scores are obtained by summing the responses to each item measuring the
same domain of confidence. Overall higher scores would indicate high levels of confidence in
particular function or dimension.
Target scale-takers
The target scale-takers are adult US citizens who are living in US cities and use English
as their primary language. Voting and jury eligible adults aged at least 18 years old are targeted
as the main takers.
Target scale-users
The main scale-users would be researchers, policy makers, social commentators, or
others who are interested in understanding public attitudes toward the criminal justice system
and links to law related behaviors.
First phase
First phase involves initial item-writing followed by revisions or replacements of
problematic items based on item evaluations by external reviewers.
Item writing
As described in Table 3, the minimum target number of items on a final scale is eight for
each of six dimensions of confidence that consist of four sets of two-item measures for four
institutions, ultimately having the entire scale with at least 48 items (8×6). As for an initial item
pool, 1.5 times the targeted minimum number of items were written, therefore generating a 72item pool – for each dimension, 12 items were generated toward four different criminal legal
institutions including police, prosecutor, judge, and punishment (three items per each institution).
Writing many more items provides a chance to replace problematic items as it is unclear which
items function well until the items are analyzed (e.g., DeVellis, 2003; Noar, 2003).

39
Items were written to produce item content appropriate for confidence in each domain
described in a scale blueprint, toward four criminal legal institutions including police,
prosecutor, judge, and prison. These original items are described in Appendix A. Following
some suggestions on writing affective items by Bandalos (2018), each item was written as one
simple clear sentence with only one complete thought, not exceeding 20 words. The initial item
pool includes 44 items with positively oriented thoughts and 28 items with negatively oriented
thoughts. Including both positively and negatively oriented items allows to flag acquiescent
through illogical pattern of responses, that is agreeing or disagreeing with both positively and
negatively oriented items. It also avoided statements with leading words such as “only, just,
merely,” universal words such as “all, always, none and never,” and negatively phrased words
such as “no or not.”
Item review
After initial items were generated, for validity evidence based on scale content, external
reviewers evaluated the degree to which items constitute an adequate representation of the
domain to be measured. The two-staged process of item review included: (1) sorting task and (2)
rating the items’ relevance/importance. Items identified as problematic were revised (See
Appendix B).
Sorting task by peer reviewers. First, the entire 72 items were sent to two doctoral
students in criminal justice who have some knowledge of the area, to primarily evaluate whether
each item matches to the particular domain the item is supposed to represent. After reading a
summary of the scale blueprint including conceptualization of six dimensions of confidence, they
independently indicated the dimension of confidence the item seems to belong to, by selecting
one among six response options: 1= CC – efficiency, 2= CC – finality, 3= DP – fair, 4= DP –
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strict, 5= RE – accuracy, 6= RE – transparency. Two peer reviewers also provided qualitative
comments or suggestions for the items, in terms of clarity, readability, and freedom from bias or
stereotyping. Matching rates were 75.69% and 79.17% for reviewer 1 and 2, respectively, with
an average matching rate of 77.43%. A total 30 items were identified as non-matching to the
intended confidence type/element by either one or both reviewers. After careful review of peer
reviewers’ comments, those items were revised to be further reviewed by subject matter experts
(SME).
Evaluation of importance/relevance by SME. The 30 revised items were evaluated by
two subject matter experts, in terms of its importance and relevance for the posited domain. After
reading a summary of scale blueprint, two professors in criminal justice independently rated how
important and how relevant each item is to the domain the item is supposed to measure. They
evaluated items’ importance and relevance on a 5-point scale, with higher score indicating more
important and more relevant to the domain. The two experts also provided qualitative comments
or suggestions for the items. For each item, the mean rating between two experts along with its
standard deviation were computed to serve an index of item quality. For item importance, the
average mean rating was 3.88 (s = .78) ranging from 3 to 5, and the average standard deviation
was .45 (s = .54) ranging from 0 to 1.41. For item relevance, the average mean rating was 3.87 (s
= .82) ranging from 2.5 to 5, and the average standard deviation was .61 (s = .55) ranging from 0
to 2.12.
Mean ratings (x axis) were scatterplotted by standard deviations (y axis) for importance
(Figure 1) and for relevance (Figure 2). The number above each data point indicates the number
of items that correspond to the data point. As shown in scatterplots, many items were viewed as
important and relevant to the domain by two experts. Six potentially problematic items were
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identified with cut-off values of 3.0 or above for mean rating and 1.0 or less for standard
deviation. After careful review on expert reviewers’ comments, problematic items were revised
for the field test.

Figure 1
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Figure 2
Item’s relevance for the domain: Mean ratings and standard deviations (n = 30)
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Second phase
After the initial 72-item pool was finalized, a field test was conducted to examine
psychometric properties such as factor structures and reliability of scale items. The main purpose
of this second phase was to construct final confidence scale having well-established
psychometric properties.
Participants
For the field test, a sample of 342 U.S. citizens aged at least 18 years old was recruited
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online subject pool more people are joining
everyday are registered as workers to complete computer-based work or Human Intelligence
Tasks (HITs) in return for monetary compensation (Sheehan & Pittman, 2016). MTurk has been
increasingly adopted as a common research platform for social science researchers as MTurk
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facilitates rapid, easy, and inexpensive recruitment and data collection from a large and diverse
pool of participants (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Despite the potential of MTurk as a
participant-recruitment tool, physical isolation of workers and lack of supervision present
substantial concern over quality of responses or inattentive responding among MTurk workers
(Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014).
To ensure participants’ attentiveness or sufficient effort in responding to scale items
(validity evidence on response processes), participation was restricted to MTurk workers who
previously completed 500 or more HITs and demonstrated at least 97% acceptance rate from
their past tasks, adopting the most recent recommendation on ex ante exclusion criteria by
MTurk (Sheehan & Pittman, 2016). Furthermore, the current study used screeners or attention
checks to identify and sort out inattentive participants who provided careless and inconsistent
responses. Screeners are described in more detail in Appendix E. Excluding 38 participants
(11.11%) who failed at least one of screeners, a final sample of 304 MTurk participants were
analyzed. With respect to sample size for large-scale field test of items, Nunnally and Bernstein
(1994) recommend at least twice the size of the number of items or at least 200, and DeVellis
(2003) recommends a sample size of 300. In this regard, the sample size of the current study is
adequate for generalizability to large populations and stability of statistical indices for
psychometric evaluations on measures.
Comparison of attentive participants and those who failed screeners shows that
inattentive participants may adversely affect the psychometric properties across confidence
scales, as expected based on cognitive research on the effects of inattentive responses (Berinsky,
Margolis, & Sances, 2014; Huang et al., 2012; Pyo & Maxfield (2020), Steelman, Hammer, &
Limayem, 2014; Woods, 2006). Screeners used in this study were found to work well in sorting

44
out participants with inattention or insufficient efforts in responding. The effects of inattentive
participants on psychometric qualities of measures are presented more in detail in Appendix J.
The distributions of age, sex, and ethnicity of the sample were fairly matched in ratio
with those of the population in the US (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). Of 304 participants, 138
(44.74%) were female and 268 (55.26%) were male. The mean age was 35.43 (s = 10.10)
ranging from 20 to 71. 78.95% of participants categorized themselves as white, 9.21% were
African-American, 3.62% were Asian, 7.24% were Hispanic or Latino, and 0.99% identified as
other. The mode of education was 4-year college degree (n = 137, 45.21%). 50% (n = 152)
indicated that they were politically more liberal, while about 33% (n = 100) labeled themselves
as politically more conservative. About 16% (n = 50) indicated middle of the road as their
political preference, and less than 1% (n = 2) reported don’t know or declined to answer. Over
half (57%, n = 173) reported no interaction with the criminal justice institutions in the last 12
months.
Each participant identified by worker ID and an internet protocol (IP) address, was able
to participate in the study only once. Reconnection was not allowed, even for the participants
who were unable to complete the survey during their initial connection, and incomplete
responses were discarded.
Measures and procedure
A link for a Web-based study administered by Qualtrics, an online questionnaire
software company, was posted into an MTurk HIT. The sampled MTurk workers were asked to
participate in an online survey to understand opinions of US citizens about the criminal justice
system. When participants clicked the study link, they were first presented with the study’s
informed consent page which provided a description of the study, incentives, risks and benefits,
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and research contact information (see Appendix C for informed consent for the field test of
initial item pool). Participants were then required to indicate that they have read the informed
consent document, were 18 or order, and agreed to participate in the study.
Participants were then asked to complete questions pertaining to demographic and
individual characteristics including age, gender, race, education, political ideology, and criminal
justice experiences (See Appendix D for a copy of the specific questions). Next, participants
completed the initial pool of 72 confidence items. At the end of confidence measures,
participants completed six items asking individuals’ value commitment to ideologies of the
criminal justice system or systemic purposes with reference to a percentage scale (0~100%).
Participants answered three items asking how much they are concerned about crime control, due
process, and reliable fact finding, respectively. Participants also answered three items asking
how important they think it is for the system to strive for crime control, due process, and reliable
fact finding, respectively (see Appendix F for a copy of the specific questions). Finally,
participants evaluated a criminal case designed to be used in Study 2 as a pilot test of
experimental manipulation to calibrate the strength of incriminating evidence. Participants read a
script of criminal trial and five pieces of incriminating evidence and five pieces of exonerating
evidence. They were then asked to decide on a verdict, and rate perceived importance and
reliability of evidence. Results of pilot test are described in more detail in section of Study 2.
Participants took 57.07 minutes on average (s = 452.47) to complete the survey. After
completing the survey and review of their responses, participants had their HIT approved and
compensation ($2) credited to their MTurk account.
Results
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The full initial item pool and results of classical item analysis appear in Appendix G.
The main objective of analysis in phase 2 is to examine psychometric properties of 304
responses to the initial instrument to ultimately construct the final form of the scale that is
psychometrically sound. To maximize internal consistency and structural aspects of validity, the
primary strategy for item selection uses information obtained from factor analysis using all
items, rather than removing problematic items relying only on results of initial item analysis. The
first part of the analysis examines factor structure in a confirmatory manner to see whether scale
items form the hypothesized six meaningful dimensions – efficiency, finality, fairness, strictness,
accuracy, and transparency. Separate one-factor model was fitted for each of the six confidence
scales first to see whether the models are working individually, prior to fitting more complex
models such as six-factor model. As described below, each of six scales was individually nonunidimensional, therefore not supporting the hypothesized six-dimensional structure for the
entire scale. A series of analysis was conducted to determine factor structure for each of six
scales in both exploratory and confirmatory manner. Items that form valid factor structure for
each scale were retained. Item statistics and reliability estimates are reported for final scales.
One must acknowledge the caveat of estimation method of structural equation analysis
for phase 2 data. With a sample size of 304, the study uses default maximum likelihood (ML)
estimation that assumes multivariate normality for the joint population distribution of the
endogenous variables, given the exogenous variables. This is because corrected normal theory
methods such as weighted least squares (WLS) estimation require larger sample sizes –
minimum sizes of 400 ~ 500 cases (Kline, 2016). Treating ordinal categorical variables as
continuous ones can risk a model misspecification, which in turn can adversely affects the model
fit to data. Nevertheless, such issue might be negligible in the current data, as the response
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distributions for confidence items with a 7-point rating approximate normality as shown in item
skewness and kurtosis with values between -1.18 and .84.
Tests of six one-factor models. First, six one-factor measurement models were assessed
through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using structural equation modeling (SEM) to
preliminarily examine structural aspect of validity. Parameters in the models were specified such
that latent variable variance was constrained equal to one, while factor loadings and unique
variances were free parameters. Unique variance or so called ‘uniqueness’ represents residual or
unaccounted variance, which maybe systematic or random variance that is unique to individual
variable. In other words, uniqueness indicates the variance in each variable that is not accounted
for by latent factors. Table 4 presents summary of fit statistics for six one-factor models,
respectively for efficiency-, finality-, fairness-, strictness-, accuracy-, and transparency-oriented
confidence scales. Detailed results of six models are reported in Appendix H. Well-fitting
models should demonstrate (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008; Hu, & Bentler, 2009; Kline,
2016): (a) a small chi-squared relative to the degrees of freedom and one that is not statistically
significant; (b) correlation residuals close to zero – absolute correlation residuals > .10 deserve
special attention as possible evidence for poor local fit; (c) comparative fit index (CFI) ≥ .96;
(d) root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) ≤ .05; (e) standardized root mean
square residual (SRMR) ≤ .05 . Results show that six one-factor models fit poorly. The models
fail the chi-square fit test at the .05 level with substantial proportions of absolute correlation
residuals far from zero, and values of other fit indexes also indicate a glaring problem.
As a strategy for obtaining a good fit, correlation residuals were calculated for each
model, and then covariances for the largest values were added to the model. Table 5 presents the
resulting c2, df, and p value for each model of efficiency scale as a new covariance is added,
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along with the chi-square difference, df, and p value for the comparison to the previous model.
Even after adding 16 correlated uniquenesses (model 17), a well-fitting model was not obtained.
Results of chi-square difference tests show that adding new covariances does not appreciably
improve the fit. This strategy was not helpful for improving the model fits for the other five
scales. Results overall do not support a uni-dimensionality of each subscale of confidence,
indicating that it is not worth pursuing an intended six-factor model for the entire scale.
Table 4
Summary of fit statistics of one-factor models

CFA models

c2

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

min ~ max

%
correlation
residuals
> .10

correlation
residuals

Efficiency

241.38

54

.00

–.19 ~ .39

.26

.80

.11

.09

Finality

670.30

54

.00

–.11 ~ .66

.41

.42

.19

.20

Fairness

457.09

54

.00

–.20 ~ .24

.33

.78

.16

.10

Strictness

412.27

54

.00

–.13 ~ .28

.27

.76

.15

.11

Accuracy

296.50

54

.00

–.12 ~ .26

.20

.83

.12

.10

Transparency

462.18

54

.00

–.11 ~ .39

.33

.74

.16

.13

Note. % of correlation residuals is based on absolute values.
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Table 5
Changes in model fit of efficiency scale by adding covariance parameters associated with the largest correlation
residuals
Adding
Covariances

c2

df

p

Model 1

–

241.38

54

.00

Model 2

e.CC9*e.CC13

189.15

53

Model 3

e.CC2*e.CC20

166.44

Model 4

e.CC13*e.CC20

Model 5

c2D

df

p

.00

52.23

1

.000

52

.00

22.71

1

.000

162.45

51

.00

4.00

1

.046

e.CC19*e.CC20

150.25

50

.00

12.20

1

.001

Model 6

e.CC13*e.CC19

139.77

49

.00

10.48

1

.001

Model 7

e.CC9*e.CC20

135.00

48

.00

4.77

1

.029

Model 8

e.CC2*e.CC9

128.05

47

.00

6.96

1

.008

Model 9

e.CC2*e.CC13

124.29

46

.00

3.75

1

.053

Model 10

e.CC2*e.CC8

115.51

45

.00

8.79

1

.003

Model 11

e.CC1*e.CC2

101.51

44

.00

14.00

1

.003

Model 12

e.CC9*e.CC19

91.64

43

.00

9.87

1

.002

Model 13

e.CC1*e.CC13

87.71

42

.00

3.93

1

.048

Model 14

e.CC2*e.CC3

80.673

41

.0000

7.04

1

.0080

Model 15

e.CC15*e.CC21

75.792

40

.0005

4.88

1

.027

Model 16

e.CC13*e.CC15

71.112

39

.0013

4.68

1

.031

Model 17

e.CC2*e.CC19

69.015

38

.0015

2.10

1

.148

Efficiency

Initial exploratory analysis. Because the hypothesis that scale items form six separate
dimensions is not supported, the next analysis focuses on determining valid factor structure for
each of six confidence scales. Exploratory data-driven methods were used to identify dominating
factors and items that belong to those factors. Figure 3 shows a scree plot of eigenvalues after
principal component analysis (PCS) for each of the six sets of items. The scree plot presents the
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number of principal components on the horizontal axis and the amount of variance accounted for
each component on the vertical axis. A fairly consistent pattern across scree plots is that each
confidence scale has at least two factors and the first two factors are dominant in explaining
variance over all the items.
As a follow-up analysis, an oblique two-factor EFA model was fitted to each group of
scale items to confirm how the items break down between the two dominating factors. Table 6
presents a summary of results of 2-factor EFA models. It shows which items belong to which
factors based on .3 cut-off value of absolute loading. Detailed results of 2-factor EFA including
values of loading, uniqueness, and variance are reported in Appendix I. One consistent pattern
between scales is that items tend to be broken down into two factor groups in relation to
orientation of items – positively oriented items v. negatively oriented items (that require reverse
coding). In other words, two dominating factors are related to questionnaire or the method of
measurement, indicating that participants may respond differently to reverse coded and nonreverse coded items. This suggests that scale scores are contaminated with some degree of
construct-irrelevant variance. The following analysis thus focuses on exploring and confirming
non-method, namely construct-relevant specific factors, while controlling for influence of
method variance.
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Figure 3
Scree plots of eigenvalues for six confidence scale
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Table 6
Summary of 2-factor EFA: items with an absolute loading > .3
Efficiency
Finality
F1
F2
F1
F2
R
CC1
CC9
CC5
CC4R
CC2
CC13R
CC6
CC11R
R
CC3
CC19
CC10 CC18R
CC7
CC20R CC12 CC22R
CC8
CC16 CC24R
CC14
CC17
CC15
CC23
C19R
CC21
Note. R denotes reverse coded

Fairness
F1
F2
DP1
DP1
DP3
DP2R
DP7
DP3
DP8
DP9R
DP13 DP20R
DP15 DP21R
DP19

Strictness
F1
F2
DP5
DP4R
DP10
DP6R
DP16 DP11R
DP17 DP12R
DP18 DP24R
DP22
DP23

Accuracy
F1
F2
RE1
RE3R
RE2
RE8R
RE7
RE13
RE9
RE15R
RE14 RE20R
RE19
RE21

Transparency
F1
F2
RE4
RE5R
RE6
RE11R
RE10
RE12R
RE16
RE17R
RE22
RE18R
RE24R RE23R

CFA model based on a method variance model. A confirmatory factor analytic model
was applied in which method latent variables were included in order to model method biases of
individual respondents. CFA based on a method variance model has long been used for testing
and controlling for construct-irrelevant variance introduced by the method of measurement rather
than the theoretical construct represented by the measures (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &
Podsakoff, 2003; Tehseen, Ramayah, & Sajilan, 2017; Williams, Cote, & Buckley, 1989). Such
strategy has been reported to improve the model fit to data (e.g., Biderman, 2007). For the
present research, I examined a series of CFA models in which orientations of items were treated
as method latent factors. The general strategies of finding well-fitting final models are as
follows:
1. It begins with 2-factor CFA models with two method factors only. Correlation
residuals obtained from resulting models suggest that the sources of ill fit may be more localized,
due in many cases to shared variances among sets of items asking about the same institution,
such as police, prosecutor, judge, and prison.
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2. The next sequence of 6-factor CFA models adds four institution factors to partition
variance into components associated with institution (non-method) and method factors. Such
partitioning can be obtained using factor loadings estimated through CFA. For each measure, the
square of the institution factor loading indicates the percentage of variance due to constructrelevant factor, and square of the method factor loading indicates the amount of variance due to
method bias.
3. Models showing signs of over-factoring were intermediated by collapsing two or
more institution factors into one, guided by factor correlations along with local fit indices such as
correlation residuals and modification indices that reflect shared variance of a particular pair of
measures.
4. For scales with problems of fitting 6-factor CFA models, a bifactor model was
employed that concerns a situation where several correlated specific constructs make up a more
general construct of interest (Chen, West, & Sousa, 2006). To fit a bifactor model, one general
substantive factor is added for all items to the model with method factors. This was an attempt to
break out sets of interrelated items from a general factor into construct-relevant specific factor(s),
guided by correlation residuals and modification indices.
Parameters in the method models were specified such that: (a) latent variable variances
were constrained equal to one; (b) covariances between method and non-method latent factors
were constrained equal to zero; (c) factor loadings, unique variances, and covariances between
non-method factors and between method factors were freely estimated. In case of using a
bifactor model, the general factor was not allowed to covary with other factors. Details of CFA
models for each of six multi-dimensional scales are described more in detail below. Small
number of correlated uniquenesses (0 ~ 4) were added to final models to improve the model fit.
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All values reported here are standardized. From this point, when I use the term ‘significant,’ I
mean ‘statistically significance’ at the significance level of .05 (neither practical nor any form
other forms of significance).
Efficiency scale. Table 7 presents a summary of fit statistics of CFA measurement
models for the efficiency scale. Model 1 has method factors only when reverse coding and nonreverse coding were treated as method latent factors. They were labeled as ‘Forward’ and
‘Backward,’ respectively. This model fits poorly resulting in a significant chi-square statistic, c2
(53, N = 304) = 196.25, p < .001. A substantial proportion of correlation residuals is above .10
(23%), indicating a discrepancy between estimated correlations and values predicted by the
model. Estimates of percentage of method variance in items range from .15 to .50, with the mean
amount of 35%.
Model 2 adds four institution factors – police, prosecutor, judge, and prison. This 6factor CFA model appears in Figure 4. The comparison of Model 1 and Model 2 resulted in a
significant chi-square difference, cD2 (18, N = 304) = 146.33, p < .001, indicating that the
addition of institution factors generally resulted in a better fit. The amount of method variance
reduced after introducing institution factors, ranging from .01 to .48 (M = 22%). The average
amount of institution variance was equivalent to that of method variance (M = 22%), ranging
from .004 to .59. Nevertheless, chi-square statistic of Model 2 is not acceptable, c2 (35, N = 304)
= 49.92, p = .049. Two items, CC8 and CC15 perform poorly: institution factor explains only
0.4% and 2.5% of variance in item CC8 and CC15, respectively, while method factor explains
greater amount of variance for both items: 25% and 7.9% of variance in item CC8 and CC15,
respectively. It seems that both items ask about perceived efficiency of the system’s crime
control in somewhat implicit or indirect way. This may bring confusion to respondents in
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interpreting the items. Another possible explanation is related to legal terms such as a plea of
guilty with which, unlike professionals, novice individuals may not be familiar.
CC8. If a person has been screened as probably guilty by prosecutors, then he might be
the true perpetrator.
CC15. When judges are certain about the defendant’s guilt, it is reasonable to accept a
plea of guilty without trial.

Model 3 (final) is identical with Model 2 with the exception that item CC8
and CC15 were dropped while adding two correlated uniquenesses. The amount of method
variance reduced, ranging from .01 to .39 (M = 16%), while the amount of institution variance
increased, ranging from .03 to .76 (M = 37%). Results indicate that item responses are now better
explained by institution factors than by method biases. A chi-square statistic indicates a good fit
of the model, c2 (16, N = 304) = 9.59, p = .887. Table 8 presents results of the final model for
efficiency scale along with item statistics. All standardized loadings for institution factors were
substantial and significant at the level of .05, except for one prosecutor item CC9 (p = .054).
Correlations between institution factors range from .49 to .87 (p = .000). A correlation between
two method factors is –.42 (p = .010).

Table 7
Summary of fit statistics of CFA models: Efficiency scale
%
correlation
residuals
> .10

CFA models

c2

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

correlatio
n residuals
min ~ max

M1. Method

196.25

53

.000

.84

.09

.08

–.20 ~ .35

.23

M2. Institution +
Method

49.92

35

.049

.98

.04

.03

–.07 ~ .07

.00

M3a. Institution +
Method (drop cc8
& cc15)

9.59

16

.887

1.00

.00

.02

–.06 ~ .03

.00

c2D

df

p

146.33

18

.000

Note. % of correlation residuals is based on absolute values.
a
denotes final model.
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Figure 4
Model 2 for Efficiency scale
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Table 8
Results of final model for efficiency scale
Loadings
Police
CC1. Police officers can quickly identify the
correct suspect. (PL)
CC2. If police officers believe a suspect is
guilty, then that suspect probably committed the
crime. (PL)
CC3. Informal investigation and interrogation in
a police station are effective in criminal fact
findings. (PL)
CC7. Generally, prosecutors handle criminal
cases with speed and efficiency (PRC)
CC9. Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly
holding people accountable when they commit
crimes. (PRC, R)
CC13. Judges lack capacity to ensure swift
administration of justice for crime. (JG, R)
CC14. Judges dispose of criminal cases
quickly and efficiently. (JG)
CC19. Our criminal justice process is competent
in promptly carrying out the sentences of the
courts. (PRN)
CC20. There are often delays in carrying out
sentences. (PRN, R)
CC21. Our current system of criminal
punishment swiftly punishes people who violate
the law. (PRN)

Prosecut
or

Judge

Prison

Forwar
d

Unique
variances

R2

M

SD

Backwar
d

.64***

.39**

.44

.41

3.81

1.52

.50***

.53***

.47

.25

3.76

1.56

.67***

.23

.49

.45

4.36

1.60

.20

.44

.52

4.11

1.51

.62***

.58

.03

4.46

1.30

.55***

.56

.14

3.92

1.61

.55**

.07

.62

3.88

1.43

–.11

.23

.75

4.66

1.53

.75

.21

2.89

1.43

.63

.31

3.95

1.65

.72***
.17
.37***
.79***
.87***
.46***
.56***

.193
.24

Covariances
.76***

Police * Judge

.49***

Police * Prison

.76***

Prosecutor * Judge

.74***
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Police * Prosecutor

Prosecutor * Prison

.87***

Judge * Prison

.77***

Forward*Backward

–.42*

e.CC2 *e.CC14

–.96**

e.CC2*e.CC20
–.20*
Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison
Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Finality scale. Table 9 presents a summary of fit statistics of CFA measurement models
for finality scale. Model 1 with two method factors only fits poorly, resulting in a significant chisquare statistic, c2 (53, N = 304) = 153.06, p < .001, and a substantial proportion of correlation
residuals above .10 (23%). Estimates of percentage of method variance range from .09 to .70,
with the mean amount of variance of 41%.
Model 2 adds four institution factors. Although including institution factors resulted in a
better fit, cD2 (18, N = 304) = 146.33, p < .001, Model 2 does not work well. The fit is poor, c2
(35, N = 304) = 73.40, p < .001, and the proportion of correlation residuals above .10 is nonnegligible (15%). Only prison items have significant factor loadings, ranging from .26 to .51.
The amount of variance due to method biases (M = 36%, range from .10 to .65) is much larger
than that due to institution factors (M = 9.7%, range from .002 to .31). This result indicates that
finality items strongly parallel two method factors that are associated with orientation of items –
positively worded v. negatively worded.
Model 3 is a bifactor model that involves (a) a general substantive factor that directly
affects all indicators except prison items that form (b) a separate specific factor (Prison), along
with (c) two method factors. This bifactor model appears in Figure 5. The resulting model fit is
not acceptable, c2 (41, N = 304) = 86.88, p < .001. The amount of method variance is still
substantial (M = 34%) ranging from .06 to .71, compared to the variance due to prison factor (M
= 17%) and general factor (M = 15%). Four items below did not work well, showing poor factor
loadings ranging from –.11 to .18.
CC10. The cases that prosecutors pursue include a high proportion of offenses against
the public order. (PRC)
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CC11. Generally, prosecutors are too lenient to control crimes and protect the public.
(PRC, R)
CC16. Judges enforce rigorous sentencing upon the offenders who commit crimes
against the public safety. (JG)
CC18. Generally, criminal sentences imposed by judges lack severity to act as a
deterrent to potential offenders. (JG, R)
Model 4 discarded four problematic items. However, the model fit is still not desirable,
c2 (11, N = 304) = 28.47, p = .003. Some parameters were unsatisfactory: item CC5 showed
standardized factor loading above 1 and a negative unique variance. General factor items work
poorly showing nonsignificant factor loadings, ranging from –.26 to .32. Local fit indices suggest
a possible specification error: modification index for an error covariance between cc5 and prison
factor was 19.10, and correlation residuals between CC5 and prison items ranged from .6 to .22.
This suggests an omitted shared variance between CC5 and prison items.
Model 5 (final) is a 3-factor model that contains two method factors and one constructrelevant factor named as ‘Sanction’ on which CC5 and three prison items load together. This
final model appears in Figure 6. When compared to the dropped items, the remaining items
involve contents regarding sanction such as apprehension, conviction, and punishment. However,
only half of items load on this construct; the other half loads only on method factors. The
comparison with the previous model resulted in a significant chi-square difference, cD2 (4, N =
304) = 13.08, p = .011, and the obtained model fit was also satisfactory, c2 (15, N = 304) =
15.39, p = .424. The amount of non-method variance is substantial (M =32%, rang from .07
to .67), although the method variance is still larger (M = 44%, range from .10 to .92). Table 10
presents results of final model for finality scale along with item statistics. All standardized
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loadings for sanction factor were significant, and their values were positive except CC5 (–.26).
Given that the method variance was greater, it could be that methods factors play the role of the
first general factor and the non-method factor plays the role of the second factor with a mix of
positive and negative loadings. Given that the method variance was greater, it could be that
methods factors play the role of the first general factor and the non-method factor plays the role
of the second factor with a mix of positive and negative loadings. A correlation between method
factors is .21 (p = .019).
Overall, results suggest that item responses to finality scale are greatly influenced by
method of measurement – whether items are positively oriented or negatively oriented. Remedies
for producing a better scale are discussed later.

Table 9
Summary of fit statistics of CFA models: Finality scale
%
correlation
residuals
> .10

CFA models

c2

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

correlatio
n residuals
min ~ max

M1. Method

153.06

53

.000

.91

.08

.08

–.21 ~ .21

.23

M2. Institution +
Method

73.40

35

.000

.96

.06

.06

–.20 ~ .17

M3. General +
Prison + Method

86.88

41

.000

.96

.06

.06

M4. General +
Prison + Method
(drop cc10, cc11,
cc16, & cc18)

28.47

11

.003

.97

.07

M5a. Sanction +
Method

15.39

15

.424

1.00

.01

c2D

df

p

.15

79.66

18

.000

–.22 ~ .18

.05

13.48

6

.036

.05

–.22 ~ .08

.04

.03

–.06 ~ .07

.00

13.08

4

.011

Note. % of correlation residuals is based on absolute values.
a
denotes final model.
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Figure 5
Model 3 for Finality scale
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Figure 6
Final model (model 5) for finality scale

Sanction

cc22

cc23

cc24

cc5

ε1

ε2

ε3

ε4

Backward

cc4

cc6

cc12

cc17

ε8

ε5

ε6

ε7

Forward

65

Table 10
Results of final model for finality scale
Unique
variances

R2

M

SD

.08

-

4.01

1.55

.54***

.64

.07

4.64

1.39

.65***

.58

-

4.47

1.40

.80***

.36

-

4.55

1.40

.82***

.33

-

4.75

1.36

.19

.67

4.24

1.73

.62

.07

4.55

1.53

.69

.20

3.74

1.59

Loadings
Sanction
CC4. Police officers lack capacity to control criminal conduct that
threatens public safety. (PL, R)
CC5. Police officers are competent in apprehending a high
proportion of offenders who commit a crime against the public
order. (PL)
CC6. Generally, police activities are effective in getting as many
criminals as possible punished. (PL)
CC12. Prosecutors are doing a good job in getting as many
criminals as possible convicted. (PRC)
CC17. Judges are doing a good job in convicting a large
proportion of offenders. (JG)
CC22. Criminal punishment is too lenient to deter crimes in our
society. (PRN, R)
CC23. Generally, our current system of punishment is harsh
enough in protecting the public from being victimized by crime.
(PRN)
CC24. Many dangerous criminals are released without being fully
punished for committing crimes. (PRN, R)

Forward

Backwar
d
.96**

–.26***

.82***

.38**

.27***

.56***

.45***

.32**

Covariances
Forward*Backward

.21

Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison
Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Fairness scale. Table 11 presents a summary of fit statistics of CFA measurement
models for the fairness scale. Model 1 with two method factors only fits poorly, c2 (53, N = 304)
= 230.26, p < .001, and 24% of correlation residuals are above .10. Almost half of the variance in
items is attributable to method factors (M = 52%, range from .10 to .73).
Model 2 adds four institution factors. Although including institution factors resulted in a
better fit, cD2 (18, N = 304) = 166.33, p < .001, Model 2 was problematic. The model doesn’t fit
well, c2 (35, N = 304) = 63.93, p = .002. The model is not identified. As a result, standard errors
for factor loadings, variances, and covariances are not obtained, and some parameter estimates
have illogical values, such as Heywood Cases (name after the statistician H. B. Heywood). These
cases include standardized factor loading above 1.0, negative variance estimates, and estimated
absolute correlations above 1.0. Problems with this model were most evident for the Judge
factor. Factor loadings of judge items were almost zero (DP13 = –.001, DP14 = .002, DP15
= .002). All problematic factor correlations were related to the judge factor: its correlations with
police, prosecutor, and prison were –131.75, –73.73, and –89.98, respectively.
DP13. Generally, judges treat all different groups of people with dignity and respect.
(JG)
DP14. Judges lack ability to ensure that everyone who comes to court gets a fair trial.
(JG, R)
DP15. Judges are impartial in assessing the arguments of the parties. (JG)
Although problems of judge items themselves are not clear, it seems apparent that how
they relate to other items negatively affects the overall model fit, exaggerating the number of
poorly functioning items. Model 3 without judge items resulted in a satisfactory model fit, c2
(14, N = 304) = 7.90, p = .894. The amount of institution variance was larger (M = 31%, range
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from .12 to .65) than that of method variance (M = 19%, range from .03 to .70). One police item,
DP2 was problematic having a negative unique variance (–.39) with associated standard error of
2.06. Given that the absolute value is small relative to the standard error (2.06), this is probably
attributable to sampling error.
Model 3a (final) fixes the variance of DP2 to zero. Nonsignificant chi-square difference
test for the comparison with Model 3 indicates that parameter estimates are invariant between
two models, cD2 (1, N = 304) = .07, p = .791. The model fit is satisfactory, c2 (15, N = 304) =
7.97, p = .925. The amount of institution variance was greater (M = 30%, range from .12 to .63)
than that of method variance (M = 19%, range from .03 to .70). Table 12 presents results of final
model for fairness scale along with item statistics. All standardized loadings for institution
factors are significant, ranging from .35 to .79 (p < .001). Correlations between institution factors
range from .87 to .96 (p < .001). A correlation between two method factors is .14 (p =.237).
To sum up, the fairness model seemed to work the best without a judge factor, mostly
because judge items are highly related with other institution items. As the judge items
themselves do not seem obviously problematic in terms of content, wording, and results of
classical item analysis, they were retained for the final scale. Given a high correlation between a
sum of all items and a sum of non-judge items, r = .98, p = .000, a sum of full item scores was
used for hypothesis testing in study 2.

Table 11
Summary of fit statistics of CFA models: Fairness scale
%
correlation
residuals
> .10

CFA models

c2

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

correlatio
n residuals
min ~ max

M1. Method

230.26

53

.000

.90

.11

.07

–.17 ~ .14

.24

M2. Institution +
Method

63.93

35

.002

.98

.05

.03

–.11 ~ .10

.04

M3. Institution +
Method (drop Judge)

7.90

14

.894

1.00

.00

.01

–.03 ~ .04

.00

M3a. fix dp2 var to 0

7.97

15

.925

1.00

.00

.01

–.03 ~ .04

.00

c2D

df

p

166.33

18

.000

.07

1

.791

Note. % of correlation residuals is based on absolute values.
a
denotes final model.
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Table 12
Results of final model for fairness scale
Unique
variances

R2

M

SD

.15

.59

3.75

1.87

0 (fixed)

.44

3.20

1.70

.25**

.46

.48

3.55

1.77

.47***

.60***

.41

.22

4.40

1.51

.35***

.59***

.53

.12

4.13

1.62

.30

.62

3.25

1.60

-

-

4.24

1.62

-

-

3.90

1.73

-

-

4.61

1.44

.31

.35

4.01

1.74

Loadings
Police
DP1. Generally, police officers treat all different
groups of people in a fair manner. (PL)
DP2. Police officers treat minority groups
unfairly. (PL, R)
DP3. Generally, police decisions to search and
arrest someone are unaffected by the suspect’s
race and social class. (PL)
DP7. Generally, prosecutors are as fair as
possible in handling cases. (PRC)
DP8. In general, prosecutors are impartial in
deciding to charge a suspect with a crime. (PRC)
DP9. Prosecutors treat underprivileged groups of
people unfairly. (PRC, R)
DP13. Generally, judges treat all different groups
of people with dignity and respect. (JG)
DP14. Judges lack ability to ensure that everyone
who comes to court gets a fair trial. (JG, R)
DP15. Judges are impartial in assessing the
arguments of the parties. (JG)
DP19. Our current system of criminal
punishment is just and fair. (PRN)
DP20. The rich receive a lesser sentence than the
poor for the same charge. (PRN, R)
DP21. Minority defendants receive unfair
criminal punishments. (PRN, R)

Prosecut
or

Prison

.77***

Forwar
d

Backwar
d

.51***

.66***

.75***

.69***

.79***

.26***

.59***

.59***

.65***

.19**

.55

.42

2.62

1.62

.64***

.41***

.43

.41

3.31

1.64

Covariances
Police * Prosecutor

.87***

Police * Prison

.88***
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Prosecutor * Prison

.96***

Forward*Backward

.14

Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison
Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Strictness scale. Table 13 presents a summary of fit statistics of CFA measurement
models for the strictness scale. Model 1 with two method factors only fits poorly, c2 (53, N =
304) = 250.40 p = .000, and 24% of correlation residuals are above .10. Estimates of percentage
of method variance range from .27 to .58, with the mean amount of variance of 47%.
Model 2 adds four institution factors. Although including institution factors resulted in a
better fit, cD2 (19, N = 304) = 195.53, p < .001, the model fit is not acceptable, c2 (34, N = 304) =
54.87, p = .013. The amount of method variance is almost the same as that found in the previous
model that contains method factors only (M = 46%, range from .01 to .81). Less of the variance
is explained by institution factors (M = 13%, range from .01 to .79). Institution items performed
poorly yielding mostly nonsignificant factor loadings with a mix of positive and negative signs
(–.49 to .79).
Model 3 is a bifactor model that involves two method factors along with a substantive
general factor on which all items load. Model 3 appears in Figure 7. Results indicate that model
2 (less restricted with more latent factors) fits better than model 3, cD2 (6, N = 304) = 22.45, p
= .001. The average amount of method variance reduced (M = 38%, range from .002 to .57),
although the amount of non-method variance is still relatively smaller (M = 14%, range from .02
to .52). Despite the poor model fit, c2 (40, N = 304) = 77.32, p = .000, problematic items became
less common. Police items are all significant ranging from .34 to .72. Many of items for other
institutions – prosecutor, judge, and prison – are poorly performing under the general factor,
showing non-significant factor loadings (range from .13 to .54). But local fit indexes suggest that
the problem is due in some part to high correlations between items asking about different
institutions.
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Model 4 (final) that breaks out police items into a separate factor (Police) and other
items into a different factor (Non-police). This final model appears in Figure 8. This model
resulted in a better fit compared to model 3, cD2 (4, N = 304) = 37.65, p < .001. The fit of the
model 4 is reasonable, c2 (36, N = 304) = 39.67, p = .310. Model 4 shows increased non-method
variance (M = 34%, range from .08 to .67), while method variance decreased (M = 20%, range
from .001 to .45). Table 14 presents results of final model for strictness scale along with item
statistics. All standardized loadings for institution factors are significant, ranging from .31 to .80
(p < .001). Correlations between police and non-police factors is .89 (p < .001). A correlation
between two method factors is .03 (p = .789).

Table 13
Summary of fit statistics of CFA models: Strictness scale
%
correlation
residuals
> .10

CFA models

c

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

correlatio
n residuals
min ~ max

M1. Method

250.40

53

.000

.90

.11

.07

–.17 ~ .14

.12

M2. Institution +
Method

54.87

34

.013

.99

.05

.03

–.08 ~ .11

M3. General +
Method

77.32

40

.000

.98

.06

.03

M4a. Police + Nonpolice + Method

39.67

36

.310

1.00

.02

.02

2

c2D

df

p

.02

195.53

18

.000

–.08 ~ .14

.02

22.45

6

.001

–.05 ~ .09

.00

37.65

4

.000

Note. % of correlation residuals is based on absolute values.
a
denotes final model.
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Figure 7
Model 3 for strictness scale
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Figure 8
Final model (model 4) for strictness scale
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Table 14
Results of final model for strictness scale

Loadings
Nonpolice

Police
DP4. Confessions by people in police custody are often
obtained through illegal interrogation techniques. (PL, R)
DP5. Police officers usually arrest people based on legally
sufficient grounds. (PL)
DP6. Police investigation often violates the norms of
privacy protected by the law. (PL, R)
DP10. Prosecutors perform their responsibilities in
accordance with rules of criminal law. (PRC)
DP11. Prosecutors often make legally unjustified decisions
on whether or not to charge an offender. (PRC, R)
DP12. Prosecutors often disregard formal structure of the
law to win a case. (PRC, R)
DP16. Judges are concerned about following constitutional
principles. (JG)
DP17. Judges often ignore the legal rules of procedure and
evidence. (JG, R)
DP18. Judges process cases with consideration for
protecting the procedural due process rights of defendants.
(JG)
DP22. Generally, sentencing decisions strictly follow
formal rules of procedure. (PRN)
DP23. Sentencing and punishment follow the structure of
sentencing laws. (PRN)
DP24. Criminal punishment is sometimes arbitrary rather
than representing the rules of criminal law. (PRN, R)

Forward

.42***
–.08

.49***

.59***
.68***

R2

M

SD

.56

.18

3.67

1.48

.32

.64

4.92

1.40

.41

.24

3.48

1.62

.49

.46

4.91

1.24

Backwar
d
.52***

.80***

Unique
variances

.21*

.34***

.69***

.42

.12

3.69

1.43

.29***

.56***

.61

.08

3.99

1.60

.48

.31

5.03

1.38

.34

.52

4.41

1.62

.56***

.45***

.72***

.03

.72***

.40***

.32

.52

4.75

1.37

.67***

.37***

.42

.45

4.69

1.34

.51***

.42***

.57

.26

5.07

1.26

.57

.10

3.52

1.52

.31***

.58***

Covariances
Police * Non-police

.89***

Forward*Backward

.03
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e.DP11 *e.DP16

.20**

e.DP10 *e.DP12

.27***

e.DP6~~e.DP10

.19**

e.DP5~~e.DP23

.30**

Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison
Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Accuracy scale. Table 15 presents a summary of fit statistics of CFA measurement
models for the accuracy scale. Model 1 with two method factors fits poorly, c2 (53, N = 304) =
123.67, p < .001, and 24% of correlation residuals are above .10. Estimates of percentage of
method variance range from .04 to .66, with the mean amount of variance of 46%. There was a
high modification index (MI = 38.90) for an error covariance between backward factor (reversecoding) and an item RE13 that is originally written for non-reverse coding. Modification index,
expressed as a chi-square statistic with a single df, approximates the amount by which model chisquare statistic would decrease if a particular fixed-to-zero parameter were freely estimated; that
is, a modification index estimates cD2 (1) for adding a single path (Kline, 2016). A high
modification index indicates a possible source of misspecification, and any large modification
index (> 3.84) indicates that freeing the parameter could result in significantly better model fit
(Acock, 2013).
Model 2 adds four institution factors and allows RE13 to load on both forward and
backward method factors, resulting in a better fit, cD2 (19, n = 304) = 90.12, p < .001. The fit of
the model 2 is also reasonable, c2 (34, N = 304) = 33.55, p =.490. Although the average amount
of method variance reduced to 35% (range from .03 to .52), this is about twice as large as that of
institution variance (M = 17%, range from .00 to .37). All items perform well with the exception
of two items: RE15 (judge) and RE20 (prison) had poor loadings for institution factors (–.08
and .01, respectively). It is also noteworthy that two institution factors, prosecutor and prison
factors are highly correlated, r = .93, p < .001.
Model 3 combines prosecutor and prison factors into the same factor. Although the
model fit is satisfactory, c2 (37, N = 304) = 35.53, p =.538, the amount of method variance is
larger (M = 39%, range from .03 to .62) than the non-method variance (M =12%, range from .01
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to .31). Two items, RE15 and RE20, are still problematic showing poor loadings (–.17 and –.10).
Two backward items, RE3 and RE8 are also related to forward factor: MI = 4.95 for error
covariance between RE3 and forward factor; MI = 4.93 for error covariance between RE8 and
forward factor.
Model 4 drops two items, RE15 and RE20, as well as backward factor. Compared to
other items, contents of both items do not seem to directly address accurate fact-finding
functions of the system. For this reason, RE15 can be interpreted as asking about integrity of
judges, and RE20 can be interpreted as asking crime control-finality function of the system.
RE15. Trial judges often admit testimony obtained through flawed investigative
procedures. (JG, R)
RE20. The innocent are often improperly punished while the guilty escape from
punishment. (PRN, R)
Backward factor seems non-necessary as RE15 and RE20 are excluded and the
remaining backward items including RE3, 8, and 15 are highly related to forward factor. The
model fits well, c2 (24, N = 304) = 34.49, p =.076, and non-method factor variance became
larger (M =28%, range from .14 to .63), while method factor variance became smaller (M =30%,
range from .01 to .43). All items demonstrate satisfactory factor loadings for institution factors,
ranging from.38 to .79 (p < .001).
Given a high correlation between prosecutor & prison factor and judge factor, r = .92, p
= .001, in the previous model, Model 5 (final) combines prosecutor, prison, and judge factors
into the same factor (non-police). The resulting model fits well, c2 (26, N = 304) = 35.02, p
=.111, and both non-method factor and method factor variance remained consistent, with a little
larger amount of method variance (M =30%, range from .01 to .43) compared to that of non-
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method variance (M =27%, range from .13 to .64). Table 16 presents results of final model for
accuracy scale along with item statistics. All standardized loadings for institution factors are
significant, ranging from .36 to .80 (p < .001). Correlations between police and non-police
factors is .89 (p < .001).

Table 15
Summary of fit statistics of CFA models: Accuracy scale
%
correlation
residuals
> .10

CFA models

c

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

correlatio
n residuals
min ~ max

M1. Method

123.6
7

53

.000

.95

.07

.07

–.14 ~ .30

.24

M2. Institution + Method

33.55

34

.490

1.00

.00

.02

–.08 ~ .05

M3. Police + Prosecutor & Prison +
Judge + Method

35.53

37

.538

1.00

.00

.02

M4. Police + Prosecutor & Prison +
Judge +Forward (drop re15 & re20)

34.49

24

.076

.99

.04

M5a. Police + Non-police + Forward

35.02

26

.111

.99

.03

2

c2D

df

p

.00

90.12

19

.000

–.08 ~ .05

.00

1.98

3

.577

.03

–.05 ~ .06

.00

.03

–.05 ~ .06

.00

.53

2

.767

Note. % of correlation residuals is based on absolute values.
a
denotes final model.
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Table 16
Results of final model for accuracy scale

Loadings
Police
RE1. Generally, police practice is to focus on ascertaining factual
truth by collecting reliable evidence. (PL)
RE2. Most police officers are motivated to accurately identify and
apprehend the true perpetrator. (PL)
RE3. Police officers often investigate cases in a biased way that
compromises the accuracy of fact-findings. (PL, R)
RE7. Generally, prosecutors make charging decisions based on a
reliable account of the criminal event. (PRC)
RE8. Prosecutors generally care more about getting a conviction
than finding the truth. (PRC, R)
RE9. Prosecutors are open to considering evidence that counters
their own view of a case. (PRC)
RE13. Trial judges value precision in fact-finding above all
things. (JG)
RE14. Judges are sensitive to the possibility of error at factfinding. (JG)
RE19. Criminal punishment is based on an accurate conviction
most of the time. (PRN)
RE21. Criminal punishment is decided upon by an accurate and
complete account of criminal conduct. (PRN)

Nonpolice

Unique
variances

R2

M

SD

Forward

.44***

.59***

.45

.19

4.84

1.47

.50***

.62***

.37

.25

4.77

1.54

.48

.52

3.43

1.60

.43

.16

4.82

1.30

.36

.64

3.06

1.66

.72***
.40***

.64***

.80***
.39***

.46***

.63

.15

3.88

1.62

.45***

–.08

.79

.20

2.92

1.32

.36***

.49***

.63

.13

4.73

1.45

.49***

.65***

.34

.24

4.66

1.47

.47***

.63***

.39

.22

4.47

1.47

Covariances
Police*Non-police

.89***

Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison
Forward = non-reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Transparency scale. Table 17 presents a summary of fit statistics of CFA measurement
models for the transparency scale. Model 1 with two method factors only fits poorly, c2 (53, N =
304) = 165.12, p < .001, and 17% of correlation residuals are above .10. Estimates of percentage
of method variance range from .00 to .54, with the mean amount of variance of 27%.
Model 2 adds four institution factors, resulting in a better fit, cD2 (18, N = 304) = 104.15,
p < .001. But, the fit of the model 2 is not acceptable, c2 (35, N = 304) = 60.97, p = .004. Method
and non-method factors explain the equivalent amount of variance in items – method variance: M
= 27%, range from .27 to .81; non-method variance: M = 27%, range from .08 to .65. Item
loadings for institution factors were all significant ranging from –.29 to .81. This model shows a
Heywood case involving an estimated absolute correlation between judge and prison factors
greater than 1 (r = 1.02). The correlation between police and prosecutor factors is too high (r
= .92).
Model 3 combines police and prosecutor factors into one factor (Police + Prosecutor),
and it also collapses judge and prison factors into another single factor (Judge + Prison). The
model fit is still poor, c2 (40, N = 304) = 71.14, p = .002. However, the amount of non-method
variance is larger (M = 31%, range from .02 to .57) than that of method variance (M = 23%,
range from .00 to .42). All item loadings for institution factors were substantial and significant
ranging from .36 to .76, except RE24 which has a factor loading of .13. The squared loading
is .02 (=.132) indicating that only 2% of variance in RE24 is explained by ‘judge + prison’ factor.
In contrast, RE24 is the only item with significant loading for backward factor (loading = .52).
The squared loading is .23 (=.522), indicating that backward explains 23% of variance in RE24.
This item seems to ask about people’s viewpoint of punishment rather than about the system’s
commitment for transparent punishment practice.
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RE 24. Punishment is a private and concealed matter entrusted to experts, instead of
public spectacle. (PRN, R)
Model 4 drops two RE24 as well as backward factor. Given that all other items except
RE24 have nonsignificant loadings for backward factor, this factor does not seem necessary. The
fit of the model 4 is not acceptable, c2 (38, N = 304) = 73.97, p < .001. The amount of nonmethod variance increased a bit (M = 33%, range from .14 to .59). The amount of method
variance substantially increased (M= 49%, range from .40 to .58) as backward factor drops.
Correlation residuals between RE18 and other items show an evidence of poor local fit, ranging
from –.11 to .13. Problematic pairs between RE18 and others may degrade the model fit. RE18
involves legal terms such as guilty pleas with which, unlike professionals, novice individuals
may not be familiar. It is possible that RE18 may excessively correlate with others as artifacts of
wording or content. Even after adding five correlated uniquenesses associated with largest
correlations, the fit of the model 4 was not acceptable, c2 (33, N = 304) = 48.43, p = .041.
RE 18. Judges are more inclined toward accepting guilty pleas obtained in private
meetings instead of in open court. (JG, R)
Model 5 (final) excludes RE18, resulting in a satisfactory model fit, c2 (27, N = 304) =
33.61, p = .178. The final model appears in Figure 9. No correlation residuals exceed .10 (range
from –.05 to .08). The average amount of non-method variance is 34%, ranging from .14 to .61,
while the average amount of method variance is 49%, ranging from .38 to .61. Table 18 presents
results of final model for the transparency scale along with item statistics. All standardized
loadings for institution factors are significant, ranging from .37 to .78 (p < .001). The correlation
between ‘police + prosecutor’ and ‘judge + prison’ factors is .83 (p < .001).

Table 17
Summary of fit statistics of CFA models: Transparency scale
%
correlation
residuals
> .10

CFA models

c2

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

correlatio
n residuals
min ~ max

M1. Method

165.1
2

53

.000

.93

.08

.08

–.27 ~ .13

.17

M2. Institution + Method

60.97

35

.004

.98

.05

.03

–.06 ~ .09

M3. Police & Prosecutor + Judge &
Prison+ Method

71.14

40

.002

.98

.05

.03

M4. Police & Prosecutor + Judge &
Prison+ Forward (drop re24)

73.97

38

.000

.98

.06

M5a. Police & Prosecutor + Judge &
Prison+ Forward (drop re18)

33.61

27

.178

.99

.03

c2D

df

p

.00

104.15

18

.000

–.07 ~ .08

.00

10.75

5

.057

.04

–.11 ~ .13

.07

.03

–.05 ~ .08

.00

Note. % of correlation residuals is based on absolute values.
a
denotes final model.

86

Figure 9
Final model (model 5) for strictness scale

JGPRS

PLPRC

re4

re5

re6

re10

re11

re12

re16

re17

re22

re23

ε1

ε2

ε3

ε8

ε9

ε10

ε4

ε5

ε6

ε7

Forward

Note: PLPRC = combined police + prosecutor factor; JGPRS = combined judge + prison factor
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Table 18
Results of final model for transparency scale

Loadings
Police &
Prosecutor
RE4. Generally, the overall police investigation process is
transparent. (PL)
RE5. Police officers tend to conceal their investigative mistakes
that matter for trial outcome. (PL, R)
RE6. Police officers provide transparency in their record-keeping
practices. (PL)
RE10. Generally, prosecutorial practice and performance are
transparent. (PRC)
RE11. Prosecutors would not bring into the open evidence
favorable to the defendant case, even if they found it. (PRC, R)
RE12. Prosecutors are reluctant to let their decision-making
process be open to public scrutiny. (PRC, R)
RE16. Generally, a judge's deliberation and decision-making
process is transparent. (JG)
RE17. Judges' decisions are affected by their political and policy
views. (JG, R)
RE22. Generally, our current system of punishment is
transparent. (PRN)
RE23. Our current system of punishment is influenced by
political interests and media coverage. (PRN, R)

Judge &
Prison

.40***

Unique
variances

R2

M

SD

.26

.16

3.63

1.62

.44

.56

2.96

1.54

Forward
.76***

.75***
.42***

.66***

.39

.18

3.90

1.70

.37***

.78***

.25

.14

3.91

1.62

.57***

.68

.32

3.19

1.43

.77***

.41

.59

2.95

1.38

.43

.19

4.28

1.64

.57

.44

3.23

1.56

.31

.25

4.00

1.68

.39

.61

2.83

1.45

.44***

.62***

.66***
.50***
.78***

.67***

Covariances
Police & Prosecutor *Judge & Prison

.83***

e.RE5 *e.RE6

.24**

e.RE11 *e.RE16

–.16*
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Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison
Forward = non-reverse coded

R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Summary of final scales. Table 19 summarizes resulting dimensional aspects for final
versions of confidence scales. Sixty-two items that form valid factor structures were included in
the final scales. Given the complexity of inner structure for each of six confidence scales, all 62
items had to be retained to construct scales having multi-items per dimension. To sum up, using
CFA models that test and control for method variance, variance in item responses for each scale
was partitioned into components associated with construct-relevant factors versus method
factors. After controlling for method variance, construct-relevant specific factors could be
identified. Except for the finality scale, other confidence scales include multi-non-method factors
that are separated based on institutions items ask about. Across scales, a substantial amount of
variance is explained by method factors, suggesting that method effects cannot be ignored.
Table 19
Summary of factor structures of final scales

Confidence scales

Efficiency

Finality

Fairness

Strictness

Accuracy

Transparency

Non-method factors

Method factors

(explained variance - %)

(explained variance - %)

PL + PRS + JG + PRS

Forward + Backward

(37%)

(16%)

Sanction

Forward + Backward

(32%)

(44%)

PL + PRS + PRS

Forward + Backward

(30%)

(19%)

Police + Non-police

Forward + Backward

(34%)

(20%)

Police + Non-police

Forward

(27%)

(30%)

PLPRS + JGPRS

Forward

(34%)

(49%)

Number of items

10

8

12

12

10

10

91
Note. PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, PLPRC = combined police + prosecutor factor,
JGPRS = combined judge + prison factor

Scale score statistics and reliability estimates. Table 20 presents scale score statistics,
reliability estimates, and dispersion matrix. Each confidence scale score was obtained by
summing responses to individual items. Overall higher scores indicate high levels of confidence
in particular functions of the system – efficiency, finality, fairness, strictness, accuracy, and
transparency. Correlation coefficients between six scale scores range from .42 to .82. A single
overall total score is a sum of all six scale scores. Overall higher scores indicate high levels of
confidence in the criminal justice system in general. Scores on six confidence scales show
normality with skewness values ranging from –.45 to –.18 and kurtosis values ranging from .14
to 1.00. Average inter-item correlations were all in acceptable range (.26 ~ .42), denoting that
individual items contribute to the overall assessment of corresponding confidence (Clark &
Watson, 1995). Guttman’s Lambda 2 reliability estimate and Lambda 3 estimate which is
equivalent to Cronbach’s alpha, are all in acceptable range (> .70) for the newly developed
scales, denoting internal consistency of scales (Peterson, 1994).

Table 20
Final scale score statistics, reliability estimates, and dispersion matrix (n = 304)
M

SD

Possible
Min~Max

Min~
Max

Skewness

Kurtosis

Inter-item
correlation

L2

L3
(α)

Efficiency

39.57

8.95

7~70

12~66

–.35

.30

.267

.801

.784

Finality

34.96

6.82

7~56

8~55

–.30

1.00

.256

.740

.718

Fairness

44.98

13.55

7~84

12~83

–.18

.14

.415

.900

.894

Strictness

52.12

11.20

7~84

14~84

–.22

.53

.369

.878

.873

Accuracy

41.56

10.00

7~70

14~70

–.45

.19

.389

.870

.863

Transparency

34.88

10.70

7~70

10~67

–.18

.14

.403

.882

.873

Scales
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Total

248.09

52.69

7~434

93~41
3

–.32

.46

.293

.966

.963

Correlation/Covariance matrix
1

2

3

4

5

6

80.03

36.81

81.99

63.82

61.58

62.06

2. Finality

.60

46.56

39.09

41.78

33.77

30.85

3. Fairness

.68

.42

183.58

116.38

110.14

115.90

4. Strictness

.64

.55

.77

125.32

92.79

87.21

5. Accuracy

.69

.49

.82

.83

100.00

85.88

1. Efficiency

6.
.68
.42
.80
.73
.80
114.41
Transparency
Note. Main diagonal and above correspond to covariances, and below the diagonal correspond to correlations.
Omitted: correlations with itself are 1.
All correlation coefficients are significant at the level of .001.

Links between confidence scores and individual characteristics. Additional analyses
were conducted to understand how individual characteristics are related to confidence scores.
Note that current confidence scales measure individuals’ factual belief about motives and
competence of the criminal justice system. On the other hand, six items of value commitment
presented at the end of confidence items measure individuals’ perceived importance of and
concern with particular systemic function including crime control, due process, and reliable fact
finding. The mean ratings of perceived importance (%) on crime control, due process, and
reliable fact-finding functions are respectively 68.53 (s = 24.02), 83.05 (s = 19.08), and 86.24 (s
= 18.51). The mean ratings of concern (%) with crime control, due process, and reliable factfinding functions are respectively 62.92 (s = 24.47), 78.61 (s = 21.57), and 84.43 (s = 18.03).
Reliable fact-finding function was perceived as more important than due process function, t(303)
= 3.00, p = .003, and crime control functions, t(303) = 16.68, p < .001. Reliable fact-finding
function was also perceived as more concerning than due process function, t(303) = 5.63, p
< .001, and crime control functions, t(303) = 20.80, p < .001.
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Table 21 presents the correlation/covariance matrix for six items of value commitment.
Correlation between the perceived importance of due process and of reliable fact finding was
strong and positive, r = .83, p < .001. Likewise, correlation between concerns with due process
and with reliable fact finding was strong and positive, r = .74, p < .001. The perceived
importance of crime control was weakly positively correlated with the perceived importance of
due process, r = .24, p < .001, and of reliable fact finding, r = .29, p < .001. Concern with crime
control was also weakly positively correlated with concern with due process, r = .24, p < .001,
and with reliable fact finding, r = .29, p < .001.

Table 21
Correlation/Covariance matrix: Value commitment items (n = 304)
1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Important – crime control

576.92

111.88

127.19

287.78

134.39

128.53

2. Important – due process

.24***

364.17

288.46

–4.79

223.40

195.88

3. Important – reliability

.29***

.82***

342.71

16.02

217.94

210.96

4. Concern – crime control

.47***

–.01

.03

678.55

137.03

110.64

5. Concern – due process

.26***

.54***

.55***

.25***

465.28

289.28

6. Concern – reliability

.30***

.57***

.63***

.24***

.74***

324.93

Note. Main diagonal and above correspond to covariances, and below the diagonal correspond to correlations.
Omitted: correlations with itself are 1.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 22 presents linear models predicting each of six confidence scores with perceived
importance of and concern with systemic functions, while also considering other individual
characteristics including age, gender, race, education, interaction with criminal justice
institutions, and political orientation. Several consistent patterns are examined across models: (a)
Perceived greater importance of crime control was related to greater confidence in all of the six
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domains; (b) Greater concerns with crime control were also related to greater confidence in all
domains except for finality; (c) In contrast, greater concerns with reliable fact finding are related
to less confidence in all domains. Such patterns are consistent for model 7 that predicts a single
total confidence score.
However, such results could question the discriminant validity of the scales. If scales are
measuring distinct constructs, it would be expected to have different patterns of association with
predictors for different scales. Using structural equation modeling (ML estimation), the tests of
equality of coefficients were conducted to test three hypotheses that assume equality of
regression weights across the different scales.
(a) H0: Effects of perceived importance of crime control are parallel.
(b) H0: Effects of concern with crime control are parallel.
(c) H0: Effects of concern with reliable fact finding are parallel.
Perceived importance of crime control did not have significantly different associations
with different types of confidence, c2 (5, n = 304) = 7.73, p = .172. Both concern with crime
control, c2 (5, N = 304) = 32.07, p < .001, and concern with reliable fact-finding, c2 (5, N = 304)
= 37.37, p < .001, have significantly different associations with different types of confidence. In
addition, concern with reliable fact-finding was found to have a significantly stronger negative
association with accuracy-oriented confidence than finality-oriented confidence, c2 (1, N = 304)
= 14.88, p < .001. This is somewhat consistent with what is expected from the social and cultural
perspective of institutional confidence that the level of particular type of confidence reflects the
extent to which one is concerned with corresponding systemic function. Overall, results partly
support that different types of confidence are differently associated with value commitment.
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Several individual characteristics are noteworthy in terms of their links to confidence
scores. Older people and males are more confident in the system’s fairness. African-American
are less confident than Whites in the system’s fairness, strictness, and accuracy. Asians are less
confident than Whites in the system’s strictness, accuracy, and transparency. Individuals with
high school degree are more confident than those with bachelor's degree in the system’s
efficiency, finality, fairness, accuracy, and transparency. Individuals with a lot of interactions
with the criminal justice institutions in the last 12 months are more confident than those without
interaction with the institutions in the same reference period, in the system’s efficiency.
Individuals with political orientations away from very liberal are more confident in the system’s
fairness. Moderately liberal and very conservative individuals are more confident than very
liberal individuals in the system’s strictness. For overall confidence in the system, AfricanAmerican and Asians (versus Whites) report less confidence, and individuals with high school
degree (versus bachelor’s degree) and moderately conservative and very conservative individuals
(versus very liberal) report greater confidence. Overall, these findings suggest that individuals’
different life situations and backgrounds can have different associations with their confidence in
the criminal justice system.

Table 22
Linear models predicting confidence scores (n = 298)
M1: Efficiency

M2: Finality

M3: Fairness

M4: Strictness

M5: Accuracy

M6: Transparency

M7: Confidence
(Total)

b (s.e.)

β

b (s.e.)

β

b (s.e.)

β

b (s.e.)

β

b (s.e.)

β

b (s.e.)

β

b (s.e.)

β

.06 (.03)

.16*

.05 (.02)

.18*

.14 (.03)

.24***

.09 (.03)

.20**

.12 (.03)

.29***

.12 (.03)

.27***

.59 (.14)

.27***

.09 (.05)

.20

.04 (.04)

.13

.04 (.06)

.05

.04 (.06)

.08

.05 (.05)

.10

.03 (.05)

.50

.30 (.25)

.11

–.06 (.05)

–.13

–.02 (.04)

–.07

.02 (.07)

.03

.12 (.06)

.20

.05 (.05)

.09

.02 (.06)

.30

.12 (.28)

.04

Concern CC

.05 (.04)

.14*

–.04 (.02)

–.15*

.12 (.03)

.23***

.08 (.03)

.17**

.10 (.02)

.26***

.09 (.03)

.21**

.40 (.13)

.19**

Concern DP

–.02 (.04)

.06

.07 (.03)

.22*

–.05 (.05)

–.08

.03 (.04)

.06

–.01 (.04)

–.02

–.03 (.04)

–.07

.03 (.20)

.01

Concern RE

–.11 (.05)

–.21*

–.07 (.04)

–.18*

–.23 (.06) –.31*** –.22 (.05) –.35*** –.21 (.05) –.37*** –.20 (.05) –.33*** –1.04 (.25)

Age

–.04 (.06)

–.04

.05 (.04)

.07

–.61
(1.06)

–.03

Predictors
Importance
CC
Importance
DP
Importance
RE

Gender
(female)
Race (rf:
white)
AfricanAmerican
Asian
Hispanic or
Latino
Other
Education (rf:
4-year college)
Less than high
school

–3.01
(1.82)
–5.91
(3.04)
–1.36
(2.00)
1.88
(5.08)
8.59
(9.15)

.16 (.07)

–1.74 (.82) –.13* –.37 (1.34)

.12*

.11 (.07)

.10

.04 (.06)

.04

–.01

–.55 (1.25)

–.03

1.38 (1.05)

.07

–.02 (.06)

–.02

–1.17 (1.19) –.05

.30 (.30)

–.35**
*
.06

–3.06 (5.71) –.03

–.10 –1.50 (1.42) –.06 –4.88 (2.33) –.11* –5.37 (2.15) –.14* –3.79 (1.81) –.11* –2.27 (2.05) –.06 –20.82 (9.89) –.12*
–.11 –3.62 (2.36) –.09 –6.74 (3.87)

–.09

–8.07 (3.61) –.12* –7.43 (2.01) –.13* –6.91 (3.41) –.11*

–.04

–.25 (1.56)

–.01

–.81 (2.55)

–.02

–2.04 (2.38) –.05

–.73 (1.99)

.02

2.26 (3.94)

.03

9.98 (.6.47)

.07

8.64 (6.04)

10.18 (5.04) .10*

.06

1.47 (7.10)

.01

–2.34
(11.65)

–.01

1.49 (10.87) .001

.08

2.79 (9.07)

–38.68
(16.43)

–.13*

–.02 –2.10 (2.25) –.05 –7.29 (10.85) –.04

.02

4.29 (5.71)

.04

37.23 (27.50) .07

–4.01
(10.29)

–.02

7.99 (49.51)

.01
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High school
Some college
2-year degree
Professional
degree
Interaction
with CJ
institution (rf:
None)
A little
A moderate
amount
A lot
A great deal
Political
orientation (rf:
Very liberal)
Moderately
liberal
Slightly liberal
Middle of the
road
Slightly
conservative
Moderately
conservative
Very
conservative
Constant

.15*

3.20 (1.13) .18** 3.96 (1.86)

.11*

2.20 (1.73)

.07

3.17 (1.45)

.12*

3.59 (1.64)

.13*

19.63 (7,89) .14*

.07

1.89 (1.09)

.11

1.76 (1.79)

.05

3.12 (1.67)

.11

2.07 (1.40)

.08

2.05 (1.58)

.07

12.62 (7.63)

.09

.89 (1.84)

.03

.85 (1.42)

.04

1.52 (2.34)

.03

.70 (2.18)

.02

–.92 (1.82)

–.03

.17 (2.06)

.00

3.22 (9.93)

.02

2.94
(1.71)

.10

3.04 (1.33)

.14

3.92 (2.18)

.09

4.51 (2.03)

.12

2.37 (1.69)

.07

3.46 (1.92)

.10

20.25 (9.24)

.12

.05

.14 (1.04)

.01

.27 (1.71)

.01

–.32 (1.59)

–.01

.31 (1.33)

.03

1.31 (1.51)

.05

3.00 (7.25)

.02

–1.24 (1.43) –.06

.95 (2.34)

.02

–1.87 (2.19) –.05

–.33 (1.82

–.01

.59 (2.07)

.02

.42 (9.95)

.00

.09

4.33 (3.19)

.07

.02

3.84 (2.48)

.08

.59 (2.07)

.03

20.46 (13.55) .08

1.00
(1.34)
2.31
(1.84)
6.79
(2.50)
3.93
(3.23)

.08

.16** 3.03 (1.94)

1.16
(1.76)
–1.05
(1.88)
.94 (1.86)
–.38
(2.27)
2.94
(2.06)
2.25
(2.05)
36.10
(3.67)
.19 (.11)

.82 (2.98)

.08

.53 (2.51)

.01

5.07 (4.11)

.06

–1.06 (3.84) –.02

2.96 (3.20)

.05

1.30 (3.63)

.02

12.75 (17.48) .04

.05

–.20 (1.37)

–.01

4.63 (2.24)

.14*

4.13 (2.09)

.15*

2.59 (1.75)

.10

2.55 (1.98)

.10

14.86 (9.53)

–.04 –2.00 (1.46) –.10

4.17 (2.39)

.11

34.07 (2.23)

.12

2.33 (1.86)

.08

2.70 (2.11)

.09

10.22 (10.16) .07

.04

–.05

4.63 (2.36)

.13*

3.70 (2.21)

.12

2.00 (1.84)

.07

3.07 (2.09)

.11

13.37 (10.04) .09

–.01 –1.13 (1.76) –.05

8.38 (2.89)

.17**

3.89 (2.70)

.10

1.47 (2.25)

.04

4.20 (2.55)

.11

16.44 (12.27) .09

.11

.79 (1.59)

.04

9.20 (2.62)

.22**

3.86 (2.44)

.11

3.48 (2.04)

.11

2.40 (2.31)

.07

22.67 (11.12) .14*

.08

1.30 (1.59)

.06

12.93 (2.61) .31*** 7.01 (2.44) .20** 3.40 (2.03)

.11

4.36 (2.30)

.13

31.25 (11.09) .19**

–.98 (1.44)

31.25 (2.85)
.16 (.08)

34.44 (4.67)
.44 (.38)

35.33 (4.36)
.28 (.21)

31.61 (3.64)
.37 (.31)

33.87 (4.13)
.30 (.23)

.11

202.60
(19.85)
.32 (.26)
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R2 (Adjusted
R2)

3.50
(1.46)
1.73
(1.41)

F-test

F(27, 270) = 2.41*** F(27, 270) = 1.59** F(27, 270) = 7.74*** F(27, 270) =3.94***

F(27, 270) =
5.86***

F(27, 270) =4.20***

F(27, 270) =
4.80***

Note: Collinearity statistics, mean VIF = 1.69
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CHAPTER FIVE
Study 2
Study 2 tests predictive abilities of confidence scales developed in study 1 for two law
related behavioral/attitudinal outcomes. These include cooperation with criminal justice
institutions and potential jurors’ verdict preferences/judgments on a criminal legal case. Using a
second sample, study 2 examines whether and how each of these two behaviors can be predicted
by responses to final version of 62-item confidence scales.
Participants
For study 2, a sample of 498 U.S. citizens aged at least 18 years old was recruited via
MTurk. Consistent with study 1, participation was restricted to MTurk workers who had
previously completed 500 or more HITs and demonstrated at least 97% acceptance rate from
their past tasks. These criteria were used to enlist participants who would apply sufficient
attentiveness or effort in responding to questionnaire items. Study 2 also placed screeners or
attention checks to identify and sort out inattentive participants. In addition to the two screeners
used in study 1 to measure careless and inconsistent responding, a screener measuring
comprehension of study materials was presented at the end of the study 2 questionnaire. The
third screener measures whether participants correctly remember or comprehend the criminal
trial case with 12 true or false memory questions. Participants who scored less than 50%
correctly on the memory check were identified as having a lack of comprehension of study
materials. A total of 65 participants (13%) failed one or more screeners and were excluded,
producing a final sample of 433 MTurk participants. A sample of 433 participants is adequate
based on power analysis for multiple regression based on an estimated small effect size (delta
= .06) assuming significance level of .05 and a power of .90, up to eleven predictor variables.
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Each participant, identified by worker ID and an IP address for the user computer, was
able to participate in the study only once. Reconnection was not allowed, even for the
participants who were unable to complete the survey during their initial connection, and
incomplete responses were discarded.
Comparison of participants retained after screening questions and all including those who
failed screeners showed that inattentive responses inflate some observed relationships between
substantive variables. This is consistent with existing evidence that inattentive responses in many
cases can serve as a source of common variance that inflates observed relationships between
substantive measures (Huang, Liu & Bowling, 2015). How inattentive participants affect study
results and observed associations between variables, are presented more in detail in Appendix P.
A final sample of 433 U.S. adults shares similar demographic characteristics with study
1 sample. Of 433 participants, 41% (n =179) were female and 59% (n = 254) were male. The
mean age was 37.21 (s = 11.33) ranging from 18 to 74. 72% of participants categorized
themselves as white, 13% was African-American, 7% was Asian, 5% was Hispanic or Latino,
and 3% identified as other. The mode of education was 4-year college degree (n = 199, 46%).
52% (n = 220) indicated that they were politically more liberal, while 31% (n = 134) labeled
themselves as politically more conservative. 18% (n = 77) indicated middle of the road as their
political preference, and 0.46% (n = 2) reported don’t know or decline to answer. 62% (n = 264)
reported no interaction with the criminal justice institutions at all in the last 12 months.
Measures and Procedures
The recruitment method was identical to that used in study 1. A link for a Web-based
study administered by Qualtrics, an online questionnaire software company, was posted into an
MTurk HIT. The sampled MTurk workers were asked to participate in an online survey to
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understand opinions of the US citizens about the criminal justice system. After reading and
agreeing with the informed consent, participants completed questions pertaining to demographic
and individual characteristics including age, gender, race, education, political ideology, and
criminal justice experiences. Participants then completed the final version of 62-item confidence
scales, together with items assessing cooperative behavior, general verdict preferences, and
responses to a criminal court trial vignette.
Cooperative behavior
After completing confidence scales, participant responded to cooperative behavior
questions. Items were mostly drawn from Tyler and Fagan’s (2008) measures of citizen
cooperation that assess two categories including Assistance and Compliance. Participants
completed two 7-item measures that respectively assess (a) willingness to assist criminal legal
institutions and (b) current compliance with the law. Of Tyler and Fagan’s (2008) six assistance
items, three items were chosen for the present study because they address direct assistance for
the police, while other three items focus more on indirect or informal help by working with
community members. Four new assistance items were included to assess willingness to assist or
help other criminal legal institutions such as prosecutors and courts in crime solving –
willingness to (Q4) participate in crime-prevention programs sponsored by prosecutor office to
help them to address problems in neighborhood, (Q5) help the prosecutor’s office investigate
criminal cases, (Q6) help the courts by standing as witness to testify facts about the case, and
(Q7) help the courts by serving as a juror in a criminal legal trial. See Appendix K for a copy of
all items. Each assistance item was measured on a 4-point Likert scale format (1= not likely at
all; 4= very likely), and each compliance item was measured on a 5-point Likert scale format (1=
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none of the time; 5= all the time). Both assistance and compliance were obtained by summing
the responses to individual items.
Verdict
Design. After participants completed cooperation questionnaires, they were told that
they would decide on a verdict after reading a script of a criminal trial. The current study
considers one focal case characteristic which is strength of evidence that has been identified as
having consistent influence on jurors’ verdict (e.g., Devine, 2001, 2012). Participants were
randomly assigned to read one of the two criminal trial scenarios in a one-factor betweensubjects design with two levels of strength of incriminating evidence (strong v. weak). As a
result, 223 participants (51.50%) were assigned to a condition of strong evidence, while 210
participants (48.50%) were assigned to a condition of weak evidence. Although random
assignment was done with constraint to produce equal group size, the final group size was
different between the two conditions because some participants failed screeners of attention
check.
Criminal trial case. The current study slightly modified a criminal case used in research
by Glöckner and Engel (2013) on juror decision making, originally constructed and frequently
used by Simon and others (Simon 2004; Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004). This case is
selected primarily because the case has been found to be prone to neither guilty verdict nor notguilty verdict. Most pieces of arguments or evidence are circumstantial, which makes it
relatively straightforward to experimentally manipulate the strength of evidence without altering
the general facts of the case. The defendant in the trial, accused by his company for having
stolen money from the company safe, has denied accusations maintaining his innocence
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throughout the trial. See Appendix L for the complete criminal trial scenario along with study
instructions.
Evidence. After participants read the summary of case facts, they read five incriminating
arguments from prosecution and five exonerating arguments from defense. Each of prosecution
and defense arguments addresses each of five established facts about the case: (a) the relative
frequency (6%) of certain type of car seen at the crime site and also driven by the defendant; (b)
the defendant has paid off a bank loan one day after the money had disappeared; (c) the
defendant was seen soon after the crime in a place far away from the site of crime; (d) the
defendant has recently conflicted with his boss, and (5) a technician has reported having seen the
defendant at the site of crime.
Prosecution presents incriminating arguments interpreting the first four facts in a way
that favors the defendant’s guilt:
P1. That only 6 % of cars in the area are white XY cars makes it likely that the
defendant actually committed the crime.
P2. He paid off his debts with the money he had stolen from the company safe. It is
doubtful that larger financial transactions in the floral business are conducted in cash.
P3. The defendant could have driven fast in order to be at the school by 8 pm. No matter
how heavy the traffic, if one drives aggressively enough, it is possible to shorten the
journey time.
P4. The defendant was angry about the sanctions unjustly imposed on him by his boss.
In this regard, he can have the motive to do mean things.
Defense also presents exonerating arguments refuting prosecution’s arguments by
interpreting the first four facts in a way that favors the defendant’s innocence:
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D1. Since a high 6% of cars in the area are white XY cars, it is less likely that it was the
defendant who was filmed leaving the parking lot.
D2. The defendant paid back his debts with the money he received from his sister-inlaw. In the floral business, larger financial transactions are indeed sometimes conducted
in cash.
D3. It was virtually impossible for the defendant to drive from the office to the school
by 8 pm. In evening rush hour traffic, it is extremely difficult to shorten one’s journey
time even if one drives aggressively.
D4. The defendant did not want to take revenge on the company for his unfair
treatment. In general, one can assume that people who feel unjustly criticized in their
work tend to work harder in order to prove themselves.
All participants read those four pieces of prosecution arguments and four pieces of
defense arguments. Both sides’ arguments rely on one side-favored projection or interpretation
of the established facts about the case, rather than on irrefutable or probable evidence that
provide a critical story of the case. The first four pieces of prosecution and defense arguments
are enough to leave reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Participants read one more set
of evidence that is about eyewitness testimony. The last pieces of arguments were experimentally
manipulated to have two different conditions of strength of evidence.
Manipulation of strength of evidence. As for the question what makes evidence
“strong,” the amassed research on juror decision making has consistently suggested one
straightforward answer – “Strong evidence is that which makes for a good story” (Devine, 2012,
p. 150). Eyewitness testimony is powerful because it comes in the form of a firsthand narrative
and offers pivotal story-related information about the case. This does not mean that all
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eyewitness evidence is impactful. Only eyewitness testimony that seems highly reliable can
allow jurors to construct a plausible story of the case. Empirical studies suggest that eyewitness
confidence is the potentially strongest factor influencing jurors’ perceived reliability of
eyewitness testimony (e.g., Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Narby & Cutler, 1994). Another factor is
related to the institutional practice used to obtain eyewitness identification, namely the line-up.
Experts’ recommendations for obtaining factually accurate evidence include that: (a) live lineups
should be preferred over photographic arrays; (b) it should be conducted soon after the witnessed
event (e.g., Simon, 2012).
Strength of evidence was thus manipulated by varying the reliability of eyewitness
testimony taking into account eyewitness confidence and line-up practice. All participants were
informed that a technician of company reported having seen the defendant at the site of crime.
However, they read different versions depending on the condition they were assigned to – strong
v. weak incriminating evidence.
In the condition of strong evidence (SE), the prosecution argument includes high
eyewitness confidence and more reliable line-up procedures used for identification, while the
defense relies on only speculation or easily refutable arguments:
PSE: The eyewitness identification has been done one day after the incident, through a
live line-up in which the witness viewed personally six suspects including the
defendant. The witness picked out the defendant with 95% of confidence in his
identification.
DSE: We cannot assume that people correctly identify other people, even though they
have seen them before. At nighttime, it might be too dark to discern people accurately.
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In the condition of weak evidence (WE), although the prosecution argues that the
defendant has been identified by the witness, the defense refutes it by pointing out limitations of
lineup process used for identification along with low eyewitness confidence:
PWE. The witness viewed photos of six suspects and picked out the photo of defendant.
He explained that he had seen Hans once or twice before in the office.
DWE. The eyewitness identification has been done a week after the incident and through
a photographic lineup which might be less accurate compared to live lineups. The
witness said he is only 65% certain in his identification due to that he had seen the
defendant only a few times in the office.
Manipulation check. Participants in study 1 evaluated the criminal case as a pilot test of
experimental manipulation to calibrate the strength of evidence on eyewitness testimony. They
were randomly assigned to either condition of strong evidence or condition of weak evidence,
with constraints to produce equal group sizes. After reading a script of criminal trial and five
pieces of incriminating evidence and five pieces of exonerating evidence, participants decided on
a verdict (1 = guilty, 0 = not guilty), and they rated perceived importance and reliability of each
evidence.
1) Please rate how important you think this argument in making a verdict decision.
Please respond on a percentage term – between 0% and 100%.
2) Please rate how reliable you think this argument. Please respond on a percentage
term – between 0% and 100%.
As shown in Table 23, there is a tendency that participants in study 1 are more likely to
opt for guilty verdict when they read strong incriminating evidence (55.20% v. 44.80%) and opt
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for not-guilty verdict when they read weak incriminating evidence (53.63% v. 46.37%).
However, this tendency was not significant (χ2 (1, N = 304) = 2.30, p = .130).
Table 23
Verdict judgments by strength of incriminating evidence (n = 304)
Weak

Strong

Total

N (%)

N (%)

N (%)

Not guilty

96 (53.63)

83 (46.37)

179

Guilty

56 (44.80)

69 (55.20)

125

Total

152 (50)

152 (50)

304 (100)

Table 24 shows mean ratings of importance of evidence on eyewitness testimony
presented by prosecution and defense. In the strong condition, the prosecution argument was
perceived as more important than the defense argument, t(151) = 4.95, p < .001. In contrast, in
the weak condition, the defense argument was perceived as more important than the prosecution
argument, t(151) = –3.54, p < .001. Table 25 shows mean ratings of reliability of evidence on
eyewitness testimony presented by prosecution and defense. In the strong condition, the
prosecution argument was perceived as more reliable than the defense argument, t(151) = 5.26, p
< .001. In contrast, in the weak condition, the defense argument was perceived as more reliable
than the prosecution argument, t(151) = –2.79, p = .006. Results indicate that manipulation of
strength of the last pieces of evidence was appropriately done. In the strong condition, the mean
ratings of both importance and reliability for prosecution argument on eyewitness testimony have
the highest values among all pieces of arguments from both parties. The mean ratings of
importance and reliability for other evidence are described more in detail in Appendix M.
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Table 24
Mean ratings of importance of evidence on eyewitness testimony
Condition

Evidence

M

SD

N

Strong

Prosecution

65.56

27.66

152

Defense

54.46

26.73

152

Prosecution

57.01

28.15

152

Defense

65.10

22.36

152

t (df): M Prosecution – M Defense
4.95 (151)***

Weak

–3.54 (151)***
Note. *** p < .001

Table 25
Mean ratings of reliability of evidence on eyewitness testimony
Condition

Evidence

M

SD

N

Strong

Prosecution

65.30

25.30

152

Defense

54.51

24.81

152

Prosecution

56.49

26.47

152

Defense

62.49

20.76

152

t (df): M Prosecution – M Defense
5.26 (151)***

Weak

–2.79 (151)**
Note. ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Verdict preference. After reading the trial scenario, participants were given judicial
instruction which was recommended by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) in 1987 (See Appendix
N for Questionnaire presented after the scenario). After that, individuals’ general verdict
preference or conviction proneness was measured with two items: (a) Probability of commission
(PC) that assesses participants’ common sense assessment of guilt or probability of commission
for defendants in the trials given one’s prior beliefs and evidence; (b) individuals’ interpretation
of Reasonable doubt (RD) that assesses a threshold of certainty that the defendant has committed
crime, deemed necessary for conviction. Juror models implicitly assume that individuals’
predispositions as jurors toward guilt or innocence are a function of assessments of PC and RD
(Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Park, Seung, Kim, & Kim, 2016). Both were measured on a
percentage term (0-100%). Verdict preference was then calculated by PC minus RD, with higher
scores indicating more conviction proneness or pro-guilty verdict.
Actual verdict. Next, participants were asked to render a judgment of actual verdict on a
criminal trial case on a binary scale, 1 for guilty and 0 for not guilty.
Confidence in verdict. After verdict decision was made, participants indicated their
confidence in that verdict – “How confident are you that your verdict is correct?” followed by a
scale from 0% to 100%.
Participants took 79.66 minutes on average (s = 599.71) to complete the survey. After
completing the survey and review of their responses, participants had their HIT approved and
compensation ($2) credited to their MTurk account.
Results
Factor structures
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First, confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to see whether factor structures of
scale scores identified in study 1 can be verified based on scale responses from a different
sample obtained for study 2. Table 26 presents a summary of fit statistics for original (study 1)
CFA models fitted to study 2 data, using the default ML estimation method. Factor structure was
adjusted, if needed, without dropping items and then fitted to both study 1 and 2 data. A few
correlated uniquenesses were added to improve the fit. As described below, factor structure was
adjusted only for the efficiency scale. The adjusted factor model fits well to both study 1 and 2
data. All other scale responses follow the original factor structure identified in study 1. With
exception of the finality scale, others demonstrate satisfactory model fit. Results of CFA models
are described in detail in Appendix O.
Efficiency. An original 6-factor CFA model (four institutions and two methods factors)
does not work for the study 2 data, resulting in convergence failure, mostly due to unacceptable
correlations between institution factors (absolute values above 1.0). Adjusted CFA model for
study 2 data combines all institution factors into a single factor, labeled as Efficiency, while still
controlling for two method factors. This 3-factor model fits well to both study 2 data, c2 (21, N =
433) = 25.33, p = .233, and study 1 data, c2 (21, N = 304) = 26.14, p = .201.
Finality. An original 3-factor CFA model (Sanction and two methods factors) does not
work for the study 2 data, resulting in convergence failure with a negative unique variance for
item CC4. After fixing variance of this item to zero, the model did not show convergence failure.
Correlated uniquenesses were added to improve the model fit, but even after adding 6 correlated
uniquenesses, the model fit was not improved, c2 (11, N = 433) = 22.68, p = .020. Adding more
covariance was not helpful to improve the fit.
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Fairness. An original 5-factor CFA model (Police, Prosecutor, Prison and two method
factors) fits well to study 2 data, c2 (13, N = 433) = 17.94, p = .160).
Strictness. An original 4-factor CFA model (Police, Non-police, and two method
factors) fits well to study 2 data, c2 (39, N = 433) = 43.29, p = .293.
Accuracy. An original 3-factor CFA model (Police, Non-police, and Forward factors)
fits well to study 2 data, c2 (24, N = 433) = 29.93, p = .187.
Transparency. An original 3-factor CFA model (Police & Prosecutor, Judge & Prison,
and Forward factors) fits well to study 2 data, c2 (25, N = 433) = 28.59, p = .282.
Table 26
Summary of fit statistics for original (study 1) CFA models fitted to study 2 data
Data

c2

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

correlation
residuals
min ~ max

% correlation
residuals
> .10

Original

Study 2

-

-

-

-

-

-

–.13 ~ .65

.04

Adjusted

Study 2

25.33

21

.233

.10

.02

.02

–.06 ~ .07

.00

Adjusted

Study 1

26.14

21

.201

.99

.03

.02

–.06 ~ .06

.00

Study 2

22.68

11

.020

.99

.05

.03

–.07 ~ .06

.00

Study 2

17.94

13

.160

.10

.03

.02

–.01 ~ .04

.00

Study 2

43.29

39

.293

1.00

.02

.02

–.05 ~ .04

.00

Study 2

29.93

24

.187

1.00

.02

.02

–.05 ~ .05

.00

Study 2

28.59

25

.282

1.00

.02

.02

–.06 ~ .07

.00

CFA models
Efficiency

Finality
Original
Fairness
Original
Strictness
Original
Accuracy
Original
Transparency
Original
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Scale score statistics and reliability estimates
Table 27 presents scale score statistics, reliability estimates, and dispersion matrix based
on 433 participants’ scale responses. Consistent with study 1 data, scores on six confidence
scales show normality with skewness values ranging from –.60 to .08 and kurtosis values ranging
from –.46 to 1.00. Average inter-item correlations were all in acceptable range (.17 ~ .44).
Guttman’s Lambda 2 reliability estimates and Lambda 3 estimates denote internal consistency of
scales (> .70) except for finality scale (Lambda 2 = .666, α = .607). Correlation coefficients
between six scale scores range from .38 to 84.
Table 27
Scale score statistics, reliability estimates, and dispersion matrix (n = 433)

M

SD

Possible
Min~Max

Min~
Max

Skewness

Kurtosis

Inter-item
correlation

L2

L3
(()

Efficiency

38.44

8.84

7~70

11~59

–.28

–.34

.254

.801

.778

Finality

34.27

6.44

7~56

8~56

–.09

1.00

.174

.666

.607

Fairness

41.93

14.31

7~84

12~81

.08

–.46

.435

.909

.903

Strictness

52.21

11.60

7~84

12~83

–.12

.73

.386

.886

.882

Accuracy

43.00

10.44

7~70

10~65

–.60

.34

.423

.884

.879

Transparency

34.00

10.83

7~70

10~69

–.12

–.19

.398

.882

.872

Total

240.31

53.61

7~434

70~39
7

–.04

.23

.296

.966

.963

Scales

Correlation/Covariance matrix
1

2

3

4

5

6

78.15

34.68

82.77

59.01

65.21

65.57

2. Finality

.61

41.47

35.21

37.30

31.10

30.30

3. Fairness

.65

.38

204.71

124.00

121.53

130.24

4. Strictness

.58

.50

.75

134.38

95.19

89.81

1. Efficiency
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5. Accuracy

.71

.46

.81

.79

109.08

92.72

6.
.69
.43
.84
.72
.82
117.22
Transparency
Note. Main diagonal and above correspond to covariances, and below the diagonal correspond to correlations.
Omitted: correlations with itself are 1.
All correlation coefficients are significant at the level of .001.

Cooperative behavior
Next, the study tested predictive abilities of confidence scores for individuals’
cooperative behavior. One must note that this study did not take the reliability of the scales into
consideration in the following multivariate analyses of observed scores that assume no
measurement error. Effect sizes thus likely under-estimate effect sizes at the construct level.
Table 28 presents descriptive statistics of items of cooperative behavior including assistance and
compliance. Both assistance and compliance scores were obtained by summing responses to
individual items. Overall higher scores indicate greater willingness to assist criminal justice
institutions and more compliance with the law. Guttman’s Lambda 2 consistency estimate and
Cronbach’s alpha were .89 and .88 respectively for assistance scale and .84 and .83 respectively
for compliance scale. The sum score of assistance was weakly, positively correlated with the sum
score of compliance, r = .16, p = .001.
Table 29 presents results of a path model using structural equation modeling with the
default ML estimation method that predicts assistance and compliance with six confidence
scores. The model was specified such that two endogenous variables, assistance and compliance,
are allowed to covary and all exogenous variables, six confidence scores, are allowed to covary
as well. The model is just-identified producing a chi-square statistic of 0 (df = 0). Confidence
scores explain 29% and 14% of variance in assistance and compliance, respectively. Figure 10
presents results of the path model with solid lines for statistically significant effect coefficients (p
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< .05) and dotted lines for non-significant effect coefficients. For models described below, p
values apply to the raw regression weights come from z tests.
There was an apparent distinction between assistance and compliance in terms of how
they are related to confidence scores. Results show that different types of confidence contribute
to assistance and compliance. People are more willing to help institutions when they are more
confident in the system’s accurate fact-finding, b = .17, p < .001, b = .36. In contrast, people are
less willing to help institutions when they are more confident in the system’s severity of
sanctions, b = –.10, p = .016, b = –.13. People are more compliant with the law when they are
more confident in the system’s conformity with the formal structure of law, b = .27, p < .001, b
= .53. In contrast, people are less compliant with the law when they are more confident in the
system’s speed resolution of criminal cases, b = –.10, p = .040, b = –.15, and transparent factfinding, b = –.15, p = .003, b = –.28.

Table 28
Descriptive statistics of items of cooperative behavior (n = 433)
M

SD

Possible
Min~Max

Min~Max

Inter-item
correlation

L2

L3 (!)

20.47

4.93

4~28

7~28

.439

.886

.883

help the police by reporting crime and criminals

3.20

.85

1~4

1~4

help the police to find a someone suspected of a crime

2.93

.89

1~4

1~4

help the police by reporting a dangerous or suspicious activity

3.27

.85

1~4

1~4

help prosecutor’s office to address problems in neighborhood

2.50

1.02

1~4

1~4

help the prosecutor’s office to investigate the criminal cases

2.48

1.01

1~4

1~4

help the courts by standing as witness to testify facts

3.01

.88

1~4

1~4

help the courts by serving as a juror in a criminal legal trial

3.08

.92

1~4

1~4

28.44

5.95

5~35

10~35

.417

.841

.829

where you could legally park your car

4.44

.88

1~5

1~5

how to dispose of trash and litter

4.35

.89

1~5

1~5

making too much noise at night

4.05

1.19

1~5

1~5

speeding or breaking other traffic laws

3.49

1.15

1~5

1~5

buying possibly stolen items on the street

4.15

1.43

1~5

1~5

not taking inexpensive items from stores

4.47

1.16

1~5

1~5

using illegal drugs such as marijuana

3.58

1.61

1~5

1~5

Cooperative behavior
Assistance: If the situation arose, how likely you would be to

Compliance: How frequently you follow rules concerning

Note: Both assistance and compliance scores approximate normality. The skewness value was .234 for both assistance and compliance, and the kurtosis values
were .059 and .296 for assistance and compliance, respectively.
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Table 29
Path model predicting cooperative behavior: assistance and compliance (n = 433)
Assistance

Compliance

b (s.e.)

p

b

b (s.e.)

p

b

Efficiency

.00 (.04)

.965

.00

–.10 (.05)

.040

–.15

Finality

–.10 (.04)

.016

–.13

–.03 (.06)

.569

–.03

Fairness

.05 (.03)

.071

.16

–.05 (.04)

.186

–.13

Strictness

.04 (.03)

.190

.10

.27 (.04)

.000

.53

Accuracy

.17 (.04)

.000

.36

.03 (.06)

.656

.04

Transparency

.00 (.04)

.943

.01

–.15 (.05)

.003

–.28

Variance
e.Assistance

17.36 (1.18)

.72

e.Compliance

30.56 (2.08)

.87

Covariance
e.Assistance*e.Compliance
R2

4.08 (1.12)

.000
.29

.18
.14

Figure 10
Path model predicting cooperative behavior: assistance and compliance (n = 433)

Efficiency

Assistance

— .13

ε1

Finality

+ .36

Fairness
.18

—.15

Strictness

+.53

Accuracy
Compliance

ε2

— .28

Transparency

Note. All values are standardized.
Solid lines are for statistically significant path coefficients (p < .05), while dotted lines are for statistically non-significant (p > .05) path coefficients.
Model fit: Just-identified model with a c2= 0, df = 0
R2assistance = .29; R2compliance = .14
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Table 30 presents results of tests of equality of coefficients to compare strengths of
associations. For both assistance and compliance, an omnibus test of all the equality constraints
results in a significant chi-square statistic, indicating that different types of confidence are not
parallel to each other in terms of its association with assistance, c2 (5, N = 433) = 11.34, p
= .045, and with compliance, c2 (5, N = 433) = 89.38, p < .001. Next, significant effect
coefficients are compared to each other. Accuracy-oriented confidence has a stronger
relationship with assistance as compared to finality-oriented confidence, c2 (1, N = 433) = 4.76,
p = .029. Inconsistent with hypothesis 5, such result suggests that beyond the quality of
treatment, perceived competence of the system’s accurate fact finding can have an important
impact on people’s decision on whether to help authorities. As expected from procedural justice
perspective, strictness-oriented confidence has a stronger relationship with compliance than both
efficiency-oriented confidence, c2 (1, N = 433) = 15.1734, p < .001, and transparency-oriented
confidence, c2 (1, N = 433) = 5.81, p = .016.

Table 30
Results of tests of equality of coefficients for effects on assistance and compliance (n = 433)
c2

df

p

H0: all coefficients are parallel to each other

11.34

5

.045

H0: b (finality) = b (accuracy)

4.76

1

.029

H0: all coefficients are parallel to each other

89.38

5

.000

H0: b (efficiency) = b (strictness)

15.17

1

.000

H0: b (efficiency) = b (transparency)

1.21

1

.271

Effects on assistance

Effects on compliance
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H0: b (strictness) = b (transparency)

5.81

1

.016

The study also examined a new path model that is equivalent with the previous model,
except that non-significant effect coefficients are fixed to zero. The resulting model fits well
producing a non-significant chi-square statistic, c2 (7, N = 433) = 12.04, p = .099. This indicates
that those zero coefficient-fixed predictors do not significantly contribute to the model predicting
assistance and compliance. Local fit indices for this model, such as correlation residuals (.07)
and modification index (8.41) suggest a possible omitted association between fairness and
assistance. After allowing the coefficient of fairness-oriented confidence to be estimated, the
model results in a better fit, cD2 (1, N = 433) = 8.52, p = .004, as compared to the previous
model.
Figure 11 presents results of this final model. People are more willing to help institutions
when they are more confident in the system’s fair treatment of individuals, b = .07, p = .003, b
= .20, and accurate fact-finding, b = .18, p < .001, b = .40. In contrast, people are less willing to
help institutions when they are more confident in the severity of sanctions, b = –.09, p = .014, b
= –.11. Such results suggest that fairness- and accuracy-oriented confidence that are better
connected to procedural justice elements can be key to shape assistance. People are more
compliant with the law when they are more confident in the system’s conformity with the formal
structure of law, b = .25, p < .001, b = .50. In contrast, people are less compliant with the law
when they are more confident in the system’s speedy resolution of criminal cases, b = –.11, p
= .006, b = –.17, and transparent fact-finding, b = –.18, p < .001, b = –.32. Findings suggest that
strictness-oriented confidence that is better connected to procedural justice elements can be
important for people’s obligation with the law.

Figure 11
Path model predicting cooperative behavior: assistance and compliance with zero-fixed coefficients for non-significant effects (n = 433)

Efficiency
0

Assistance

— .11

Finality

ε1

.20

0

+ .40

Fairness
0

0

Strictness

.18

—.17

0
+.50

Accuracy

0

Compliance

ε2

— .32

Transparency

Note. All values are standardized.
Solid lines are for statistically significant path coefficients (p < .05), while dotted lines are for statistically non-significant (p > .05) path coefficients.
Model fit: c2 (6, N = 433) = 3.52, p = .742; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .00; SRMR = .01
R2assistance = .28; R2compliance = .13
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Verdict preference/judgment
Finally, the study tested predictive abilities of confidence scores for individuals’ verdict
preferences/judgments. Table 31 presents descriptive statistics of measures of verdict preference
and judgment. With respect to common sense assessment of guilt, participants state a 59.96% (s
= 25.62) of chance that defendants in the trials actually committed the crime. With respect to
interpretation of reasonable doubt (non-case specific), participants state at least 83.51% of
certainty (s = 18.64) that the defendant has committed crime for conviction. Probability
commission (PC) and interpretation of reasonable doubt (RD) are correlated at .09 (p = .074).
42% of participants decided a guilty verdict about the criminal trial case they read with 72.75%
of confidence in their decision (s = 21.48).
Table 31
Descriptive statistics of measures of verdict preference/judgment (n = 433)
M

SD

Min~Max

Skewness

Kurtosis

PC: Probability of commission (%)

59.96

26.62

0~100

–.31

–.95

RD: Threshold of certainty for conviction (%)

83.51

18.64

1~100

–1.85

3.80

PC–RD: Conviction proneness

–23.55

30.36

–100~65

–.30

–.30

.42

.49

0~1

72.75

21.48

0~100

–.86

–.32

Verdict judgment: guilty (1) or not guilty (0)
Confidence in verdict

Table 32 presents results of a path model using structural equation modeling that
predicts assessments of probability of commission (PC) and reasonable doubt (RD) with six
confidence scores. Given that the distribution of RD scores does not approximate normality, the
model used the maximum likelihood estimation, while employing Huber-White sandwich
estimator to calculate standard errors that are robust to deviations from normality. It is not
required that the errors follow a normal distribution, nor is it required that they be identically
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distributed from one observation to the next. Thus, the VCE or variance-covariance matrix
obtained in this way is robust to heteroskedasticity of the errors (Acock, 2013). The model was
specified such that two endogenous variables, PC and RD, are allowed to covary and all
exogenous variables, six confidence scores, are allowed to covary as well. The model is justidentified producing a chi-square statistic of 0 (df = 0). Confidence scores explain 9% and 6% of
variance in PC and RD, respectively. Figure 12 visually presents results of the equivalent path
model with solid lines for statistically significant effect coefficients (p < .05) and dotted lines for
non-significant effect coefficients.
Individuals with higher confidence in the system’s accurate fact-finding state higher
probability of commission for defendants in trials, b = 1.12, p < .001, b = .46. In contrast,
individuals with higher confidence in the system’s conformity with the law state lower
probability of commission, b = –.36, p = .049, b = –.16. Only efficiency-oriented confidence
predicted RD assessment. Individuals with higher confidence in the system’s speedy resolutions
of criminal cases hold less stringent threshold of certainty that the defendant having committed
crime, deemed necessary for conviction, b = –.49, p = .001, b = –.23. Consistent with
expectation, higher crime control-efficiency-oriented confidence linked to pro-prosecution
attitudes may lead to make more lenient interpretation of legal standards for conviction. In
contrast, higher due process-strictness-oriented confidence linked to pro-defense attitudes can
lead to pursue a more stringent reasonable doubt standard. Results also suggest that if individuals
believe that the system’s determination of guilt is accurate, they may also view that
investigations are accurate to believe defendant’s commission of crime.
Table 33 presents results of tests of equality of coefficients to compare strengths of
associations. Different types of confidence are not parallel to each other in terms of its
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association with PC, c2 (5, N = 433) = 31.94, p < .001, and with RD, c2 (5, N = 433) = 13.36, p
= .020. Accuracy-oriented confidence has a significantly stronger relationship with PC as
compared to strictness-oriented confidence, c2 (1, N = 433) = 9.87, p = .001).
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Table 32
Path model predicting assessments of probability of commission (PC) and reasonable doubt (RD) (n = 433)
Probability of commission (PC)

Reasonable doubt (RD)

b (Robust s.e.)

p

b

b (Robust s.e.)

p

b

Efficiency

.08 (.22)

.707

.03

–.49 (.15)

.001

–.23

Finality

.01 (.24)

.982

.00

.19 (.16)

.239

.07

Fairness

.19 (.18)

.296

.10

–.15 (.13)

.243

–.11

Strictness

–.36 (.18)

.049

–.16

.21 (.12)

.089

.13

Accuracy

1.12 (.24)

.000

.46

.29 (.20)

.144

.16

Transparency

–.47 (.24)

.052

–.20

–.26 (.17)

.122

–.15

Variance
e.PC

593.90 (33.69)

.91

e.RD

326.44 (37.95)

.94

Covariance
e.PC*e.RD

51.71 (24.85)

R2

.037

.12

.09

.06

Table 33
Results of tests of equality of coefficients for effects on PC and RD (n = 433)

c2

df

p

H0: all coefficients are parallel to each other

31.94

5

.000

H0: b (strictness) = b (accuracy)

9.87

1

.001

13.36

5

.020

Effects on PC

Effects on RD
H0: all coefficients are the same

Figure 12
Path model predicting assessments of probability of commission and reasonable doubt (n =433)

Efficiency

PC

ε1

Finality
— .16
+ .46

Fairness
.12

Strictness

—.23

Accuracy
RD

ε2

Transparency

Note. All values are standardized.
Solid lines are for statistically significant path coefficients (p < .05), while dotted lines are for statistically non-significant (p > .05) path coefficients.
Model fit: Just-identified model with a c2= 0, df = 0
R2assistance = .09; R2compliance = .06

125

126
The study also fitted a path model that fixes non-significant effect coefficients to zero
(Figure 13). The resulting model fits well, c2 (9, N = 433) = 15.67, p = .074, indicating that those
zero coefficient-fixed predictors do not significantly contribute to the model predicting PC and
RD. Consistent with the original model, individuals with lower strictness-oriented confidence, b
= –.43, p = .015, b = –.18, and greater accuracy-oriented confidence, b = 1.01, p < .001, b = .41,
are associated with higher assessment of PC, while greater efficiency-oriented confidence is
associated with lower assessment of RD, b = –.38, p < .001, b = –.18.
Table 34 presents results of a path model that predicts conviction proneness or verdict
preference that is obtained by PC minus RD. Higher scores indicate greater conviction
proneness. The model used the maximum likelihood estimation combined with Huber-White
sandwich estimator to calculate robust standard errors. The model is just-identified producing a
chi-square statistic of 0 (df = 0). Confidence scores explain 11% of variance in verdict
preference. Figure 14 also presents results of the equivalent path model with solid lines for
statistically significant effect coefficients (p < .05) and dotted lines for non-significant effect
coefficients.
Individuals with higher confidence in the system’s accurate fact-finding, b = .84, p
= .007, b = .29, and speed resolution of criminal cases, b = .58, p = .033, b = .17, are more
conviction prone, while individuals with higher confidence in the system’s commitment to law
are more acquittal prone, b = –.57, p = .007, b = –.22.
Table 35 presents results of tests of equality of coefficients to compare strengths of
associations. Different types of confidence are not parallel to each other, in terms of its
association with PC minus RD, c2 (5, N = 433) = 24.53, p < .001. But efficiency-, strictness-, and
accuracy-oriented confidence have parallel effects on PC minus RD.
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Figure 15 shows results of a path model that fixes non-significant effect coefficients to
zero. The resulting model fits well, c2 (9, N = 433) = 15.67, p = .074, indicating that those zero
coefficient-fixed predictors do not significantly contribute to the model predicting PC minus RD.
Consistent with the original model, individuals with higher efficiency-oriented confidence, b
= .56, p = .011, b = .15, and accuracy-oriented confidence, b = .93, p < .001, b = .33, are more
conviction prone, while individuals with higher strictness-oriented confidence are more acquittal
prone, b = –.55, p = .007, b = –.20.

Figure 13
Path model predicting assessments of probability of commission and reasonable doubt with zero-fixed coefficients for non-significant effects (n =433)

Efficiency
0

PC

0

Finality

ε1

0
—.18
+ .36

Fairness

0
.12

0

Strictness

—.18

0
0

Accuracy

0

RD

ε2

0

Transparency

Note. All values are standardized.
Solid lines are for statistically significant path coefficients (p < .05), while dotted lines are for statistically non-significant (p > .05) path coefficients.
Model fit: c2 (9, N =433) = 15.67, p = .074; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .04; SRMR = .02
R2PC = .08; R2RD = .03
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Table 34
Path model predicting PC minus RD (n = 433)

Conviction proneness: PC minus RD
b (Robust s.e.)

p

b

Efficiency

.58 (.27)

.033

.17

Finality

–.19 (.30)

.536

–.04

Fairness

.33 (.23)

.141

.16

Strictness

–.57 (.21)

.007

–.22

Accuracy

.83 (.31)

.007

.29

Transparency

–.21 (.28)

.455

–.08

Variance
e.PCminusRD

816.92 (55.70)

.89

R2

.11

Table 35
Results of tests of equality of coefficients for effects on PC minus RD
c2

df

p

24.53

5

.000

H0: b (efficiency) = b (strictness)

.16

1

.687

H0: b (efficiency) = b (accuracy)

.62

1

.432

H0: b (strictness) = b (accuracy)

.34

1

.558

Effects on PCminusRD
H0: all coefficients are parallel to each other

Figure 14
Path model predicting PC minus RD (n =433)

Efficiency

Finality
+ .17

Fairness
PCminusRD
—.22

Strictness

ε1

+.29

Accuracy

Transparency

Note. All values are standardized.
Solid lines are for statistically significant path coefficients (p < .05), while dotted lines are for statistically non-significant (p > .05) path coefficients.
Model fit: Just-identified model with a c2= 0, df = 0
R2PCminusRD = .11
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Figure 15
Path model predicting conviction proneness with zero-fixed coefficients for non-significant effects

Efficiency

Finality
+ .15

0

Fairness

0

PCminusRD
—.20

ε1

+.33

Strictness
0

Accuracy

Transparency

Note. All values are standardized.
Solid lines are for statistically significant path coefficients (p < .05), while dotted lines are for statistically non-significant (p > .05) path coefficients.
Model fit: c2 (3, N = 433) = 3.55, p = .315; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .02; SRMR = .01
R2PCminusRD = .10
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Next, the study examined links between confidence scores and individuals’ actual
verdict judgments about the selected criminal trial case, while controlling for the strength of
critical incriminating evidence regarding eyewitness testimony. Table 36 presents results of
logistic regression model predicting verdict with six confidence scores and strength of evidence.
Consistent with findings on how confidence scores are associated with PC and RD, individuals
with greater strictness-oriented confidence are more likely to decide a not-guilty verdict, b =
–.05, p = .002, OR = .95, while individuals with greater accuracy-oriented confidence are more
likely to decide a guilty verdict, b = .07, p = .003, OR = 1.07. Although individuals with greater
efficiency-oriented confidence tend to vote guilty verdict, such tendency is not significant, b
= .03, p = .109, OR = 1.03.
Result of chi-square test for a comparison with the model fixing all non-significant
effect coefficients to zero indicates that those zero coefficient-fixed predictors do not
significantly contribute to the model predicting verdict, c2 (5, N = 433) = 5.20, p = .392.
Table 36
Logistic regression model predicting verdict with six confidence scores (n = 433)
Verdict judgment
b (s.e.)

p

!""# %&'() (!%)

Efficiency

.03 (.20)

.109

1.03

Finality

–.01 (.02)

.558

.99

Fairness

.01 (.02)

.325

1.01

Strictness

–.05 (.02)

.002

.95

Accuracy

.07 (.02)

.003

1.07

Transparency

.00 (.02)

.938

1.00

Strength of evidence (strong)

.03 (.21)

.893

1.03
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Constant

–2.09 (.64)

.001

.12

c2 (7, N = 433) = 46.40, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = .08
Hosmer-Lemeshow c2 (8, N = 433) = 8.97, p = .345
Correctly classified = 63.05%

PC and RD were added to the logistic model (Table 37) to see how they are related to
guilty verdict. As expected, higher perceived probability of commission is related to greater
guilty verdict, b = .11, p < .001, OR = 1.13, while higher reasonable-doubt threshold is related to
greater not-guilty verdict, b = –.05, p < .001, OR = .95. Interestingly, after introducing PC and
RD, both strictness- and accuracy-oriented confidence became non-significant in predicting
guilty verdict. This may suggest that some part of their associations with guilty verdict may be
indirect through the PC and RD assessment.
Table 37
Logistic regression model predicting verdict (n = 433)
Verdict judgment (guilty)
b (s.e.)

p

!""# %&'() (!%)

Efficiency

.03 (.03)

.259

1.03

Finality

–.03 (.03)

.294

.97

Fairness

–.004 (.02)

.873

.99

Strictness

–.03 (.02)

.194

.97

Accuracy

–.02 (.03)

.615

.98

Transparency

.07 (.07)

.033

1.07

PC

.11 (.01)

.000

1.13

RD

–.05 (.01)

.000

.95

Strength of evidence (strong)

–.36 (.31)

.003

.03

Constant

–3.46
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c2 (9, N = 433) = 304.48, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = .52
Hosmer-Lemeshow c2 (8, N = 433) = 10.63, p = .223
Correctly classified = 86.14%

Using a generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM) in logit, the study examined
direct and indirect associations of confidence with guilty verdict through PC and RD
assessments. PC and RD scores were recoded into binary variables via median split to examine
them as exogenous outcomes together with binary guilty verdict at a time (median PC= 63,
median RD = 90). Both PC and RD scores were grouped into two categories, high v. low: n (high
PC) = 218; n (high RD) = 237. Table 38 presents results of path model of direct and indirect
effects of three confidence scores including efficiency, strictness, and accuracy that are related to
PC and RD. Figure 16 also presents results of the equivalent path model with solid lines for
statistically significant effect coefficients (p < .05) and dotted lines for non-significant effect
coefficients.
As a result, all three types of confidence were not directly related to guilty verdict, but
their indirect effects through PC and RD assessments were statistically significant. The amount
of indirect effects ranges from 70 to 88% among the total effects. Higher efficiency-oriented
confidence was indirectly related to greater guilty verdict, b = .10, p = .002, through the
perceived lower reasonable doubt threshold, b = –.05, p < .001. Higher strictness-oriented
confidence was indirectly related to greater not-guilty verdict, b = –.13, p = .011, through the
perceived lower probability of commission, b = –.04, p = .009. Higher accuracy-oriented
confidence was indirectly related to greater guilty verdict, b = .27, p < .001, through the
perceived higher probability of commission, b = .09, p <.001.
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Table 38
Path model: Direct and indirect effects on guilty verdict (n = 433)

Verdict judgment (guilty)
Direct effect

Indirect effect

b (s.e.)

p

b (s.e.)

p

b(indirect)/b(total)

Efficiency

.02 (.02)

.250

.10 (.03)

.002

70%

Strictness

–.02 (.02)

.268

–.13 (.05)

.011

87%

Accuracy

.03 (.03)

.163

.27 (.07)

.000

88%

PC (high)

3.28 (.31)

.000

-

-

-

RD (high)

–1.56 (.30)

.000

-

-

-

Strength of evidence (strong)

–.21 (.27)

.432

-

-

-

PC

RD

Direct effect

Direct effect

b (s.e.)

p

b (s.e.)

p

Efficiency

-

-

–.05 (.01)

.000

Strictness

–.04 (.02)

.009

-

-

Accuracy

.09 (.02)

.000

-

-

Note. GSEM does not provide features provided by SEM such as goodness-of-fit statistics, model fit using
summary-statistic data.

136
Figure 16
Path model: Direct and indirect effects on guilty verdict (n = 433)

ε1

—.04

— .16

PC

Evidence
3.28

Strictness
.09

Guilty

ε2

Accuracy

—1.56

Efficiency

—.05

RD

ε3

Note. Solid lines are for statistically significant path coefficients (p < .05), while dotted lines are for statistically
non-significant (p > .05) path coefficients.
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Conviction prone jurors
In the current study, accuracy-oriented confidence had the strongest positive association
with the perceived probability of commission, which in turn lead participants to decide on a
guilty verdict. This study further examined the potential use of the accuracy-oriented confidence
scores to bring the intended consequences in court room practice, such as sorting out extremely
conviction or acquittal prone jurors. Accuracy-oriented confidence scores were broken into four
groups that contain 25% of the values each, based on quartile cut-points. As shown in Table 39,
greater support for guilty verdict was found in higher quartile groups: 58% of participants in the
group of highest accuracy-oriented confidence voted a guilty verdict, while did 25% of those in
the group of lowest accuracy-oriented confidence. The study also examined the probability of
guilty verdict among participants associated with high and low ends of the distribution of
accuracy scores. Only 12% of participants in the lowest 5% group voted a guilty (n = 25), while
majority of participants (58%) in the highest 5% group (n = 26) voted a guilty verdict. Overall
results suggest that accuracy scores could be used to identify potentially conviction or acquittal
prone individuals based on their preexisting attitudes toward the system.
Table 39
PC assessment and proportion of guilty verdict by accuracy-oriented confidence
Lowest ~ Q1

Q1 ~ Q2

Q2 ~ Q3

Q3 ~ Highest

Mean PC (%)

50

60

64

66

Guilty (%)

25

38

49

58

Note. Lowest = 10, Q1 (1st Quartile) = 36, Q2 (2nd Quartile) = 43, Q3 (3rd Quartile) = 49, Highest = 65

138
CHAPTER SIX
Discussion
The current research aims to develop multidimensional scales of public confidence in the
criminal justice system that are conceptually integrated, psychometrically sound, and useful in
predicting law related behaviors. Two studies were conducted to examine five hypotheses that
address the types of measurement validity described by AERA (2014). Results are summarized
below, followed by more detailed discussion of results and implications. Limitations and future
directions are also discussed.
Summary
H1. For validity evidence based on scale content, scale items are assumed to adequately
represent the domain of confidence to be measured. Item reviews by both peer reviewers and
subject matter experts validate scale contents.
H2. For validity evidence based on response processes, the study assumes respondents’
attentiveness or motivation for thorough engagement in responding to scale items. Several
screening practices throughout the survey that sorted out participants without sufficient attention
or efforts in responding to scale items support valid response.
H3. For validity evidence based on structural aspect of validity, scale items are assumed
to form six separable dimensions of confidence. Results do not support the hypothesized sixdimensional structure for the entire scale items. However, for each six confidence scales, the
study could identify meaningful factor structures through exploratory and confirmatory analyses.
H4. For validity evidence based on relations to other variables, confidence scores are
hypothesized to predict individuals’ willingness to assist criminal justice institutions and their
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current compliance with the law. Results show that not all, but some confidence scores have
predictive abilities for cooperative behavior, therefor partly supporting the hypothesis.
H5. For additional validity evidence based on relations to other variables, confidence
scores are hypothesized to predict verdict preferences and judgments as jurors. Results show that
not all, but some confidence scores have predictive abilities for verdict preferences and
judgments, therefor partly supporting the hypothesis. Results also support for the potential use of
the scale scores to identify conviction prone jurors than others.
Content validity
For validity evidence based on scale content, items were evaluated and revised through a
two-staged process of review – a sorting task by peer reviewers followed by evaluation of
importance and relevance by subject matter experts. Through such a review process, the study
ensures that items match to the particular domain they are supposed to belong to and that items
are important and relevant for the posited domain. In other words, scale items adequately
represent the domain of confidence to be measured. Validity evidence based on scale content
ultimately suggests that scale scores can be interpreted and used as representative measures of
six different aspects of confidence in the criminal justice system.
Response processes
Respondents’ attentiveness for item responses is considered as valid response process for
the purpose of this research. Inattentive or careless responses engender doubt about whether the
scale has measured the intended construct. Consistent with recent recommendations (Berinsky,
Margolis, & Sances, 2014; Thomas & Clifford, 2017), this study employed multiple screeners
that are unobtrusive and tailored to study measures throughout survey, as external to the scales

140
and as providing evidence regarding the response processes elicited by the scales. Participants
who failed screeners had an adverse impact on psychometric properties of measures and inflated
observed relationships between several substantive variables. Such findings are consistent with
existing evidence that (a) inattentive responses compromise psychometric quality of measures
such as reducing measurement reliability (Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, 2014; Huang et al.,
2012) and disturbing factor structures of measures (Steelman, Hammer, & Limayem, 2014;
Woods, 2006), and that (b) inattentive responses in many cases serve as a source of common
variance that artificially inflate associations, thus increasing Type 1 error rates (Huang, Liu, &
Bowling, 2015). This suggests that screeners used in this study work well in identifying attention
problems among participants, ensuring that findings are based on participants who are relatively
more careful and consistent in responding while better comprehending study materials.
Structural aspect of validity
For validity evidence based on internal structure, this study assumed a six- dimensional
structure of confidence scale. However, initial confirmatory factor analysis reveals that each of
the six sets of confidence items including efficiency-, finality-, fairness-, strictness-, accuracy-,
and transparency-oriented confidence, is individually not unidimensional. This indicates that the
entire confidence scale involves more than six factors, suggesting a more complex factor
structure than initially expected. The main reason is related to effects of construct-irrelevant
variance regarding questionnaire method that contaminates scale scores. Results of the initial
exploratory factor analysis uncover two dominating factors for each of the six scales. These two
factors are related to orientation of items – whether items are positively (non-reverse coded) or
negative oriented (reverse coded). Researchers often include positively as well as negatively
oriented items to identify aberrant response patterns such as responding “strongly agree” to items
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that are both favorable and unfavorable to the referent. However, the problem with this strategy
is that some respondents have difficulty in responding to negatively oriented items (Bandalos,
2018). This in some part can be related to that participants respond differently to two different
types of items. As a statistical remedy to control for method bias, the present research examines
CFA models that include positive and negative orientations of items as latent method factors.
This approach identified, for each confidence scale, construct-relevant or non-method factor(s)
and then separated out variance due to method factors from variance due to non-method factors.
Another reason that contributes to a complexity of factor structure is related to shared
variances among sets of items asking about the same institution. With the exception of the
finality scale, all other scales were found to comprise institution relevant factors that
substantially explain variance in item responses and are independent of method bias.
It was found that: (a) the efficiency scale has four separate institution factors including
police, prosecutor, judge, and prison; (b) Fairness scale responses tap into three institution
factors excluding a judge factor, but this seems mostly because judge items are highly correlated
with other institution items, not because judge items are problematic; Responses from both (c)
strictness and (d) accuracy confidence scales tap into police and non-police factors; (e) For the
transparency-oriented confidence scale, police and prosecutor factors are merged into a single
factor while judge and prison factors are merged into another single factor; (f) The finality scale
is problematic showing that item responses strongly parallel two method factors.
For the finality scale, the amount of variance in item responses due to method factors
much outweighed that due to non-method factors. This is undesirable because it suggests that
scores are tied to methods of measurement, and this narrows the interpretation of the construct.
One possible explanation is that the contents of some finality items such as mass incarceration
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and severe punishment may conflict with values for many people. The problem is that those
items also give an impression that they are interpreted as asking about people’s values rather
than their belief about how the system actually functions (e.g., CC11: Generally, prosecutors are
too lenient to control crimes and protect the public). Responses can be influenced by unintended
sources such as social desirability. Finality is also conceptually less clear than other dimensions.
Items ask about two concepts under the same dimension including sanctioning a large number of
offenders and exerting a harsh punishment. Respondents may neither clearly understand nor be
able to distinguish these two concepts.
A question can arise as to how to interpret the finality scale scores. The final factor model
for the finality scale involves a single construct-relevant factor (Sanction) that contains four
items. Three items among them (CC22, CC23, CC24) are asking about whether punishment is
severe enough to suppress crime, and one other item (CC5) is asking about police capacity to
apprehend a high proportion of offenders. Although they tap into the same dimension, CC5 item
shows negative factor loading as well as negative correlations with CC22 and CC24. At the very
least, items developed to measure the same dimension should have some level of positive
correlation. Such a finding indicates that higher finality scale scores can be interpreted as having
greater confidence that the system exerts sanctions that are severe enough to suppress crime but
relies less on mass apprehension.
Interpretations of other scale scores are more straightforward. Despite separate multiple
institution factors, the current study can justify making a sum score from each multi-dimensional
scale given high correlations between institution factors. As described in the scale blueprint,
efficiency scale scores reflect confidence in speedy resolution of criminal cases; fairness scale
scores reflect confidence in fair treatment of people; strictness scale scores reflect the system’s
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conformity to formal structure of law; accuracy scale scores reflect confidence in accurate factfinding process; transparency scale scores reflect confidence in transparent fact-finding process.
To summarize, the internal factor structure of the current confidence scales is more
complex than initially expected, largely due to method bias and institution relevant variance. The
factor analysis for each scale separates out method bias and helps to determine specific
construct-relevant factors, which in turn makes what scales measure clearer. Six finalized scales
demonstrate a good reliability while being discriminant with each other in terms of how they
relate to individuals’ law-related behaviors. Scale scores follow normality of distributional
properties indicating that the current confidence scales differentiate among respondents with a
wide range of attitudes regarding each dimension of confidence in the criminal justice.
Data from the second sample mostly confirms psychometric properties of confidence
scales found in study 1. The factor model for the efficiency scale had to be adjusted to fit well to
study 2 data by merging all institution factors into a single factor, but the revised model fits well
to study 1 data as well. Such a discrepancy may be due to sampling error or it may be in some
part due to the difference in how the study sampled the two data sets. Given more complexity of
the task required to participants in study 2, an additional screening measure (memory check) was
added. In study 2, a slightly higher proportion of participants (13.05%) failed at screening than in
study 1 (11.11%). More rigorous screening used for study 2 may have some impact on the
sample. Although item responses for finality scale apparently form the equivalent factor structure
as in study 1, the model fit is not satisfactory. Poor internal consistency for the finality scale (L2
and L3 below .70) also signals the need of better construction of finality scale.
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Cooperative behavior
For validity evidence based on relations to other variables, the current study tested
predictive ability of scale scores for two types of cooperative behavior, willingness to assist
institutions and compliance with the law. Consistent with existing evidence (e.g., Tyler, 2008),
findings of this study show an apparent distinction between assistance and compliance in terms
of how they are related to confidence, although they are conceptually interrelated under the
legitimacy framework. Results show that people are more willing to help institutions when they
are more confident in the system’s fair treatment of individuals and accurate fact-finding. In
contrast, people are less willing to help institutions when they are more confident in the severity
of sanctions. Such results are somewhat consistent with what is expected by the procedural
perspective. Fairness- and accuracy-oriented confidence are better connected to procedural
elements than finality-oriented confidence, which in turn positively relates to assistance.
Findings also show that accuracy-oriented confidence has a strongest association with assistance.
This highlights that beyond the quality of treatment, perceived competence of the system’s
accurate fact finding can have an important impact on people’s decision on whether to help
authorities.
Results show that people are more compliant with the law when they are more confident
in the system’s obligation to follow the formal structure of law. In contrast, people are less
compliant with the law when they are more confident in the system’s speedy resolution of
criminal cases and transparent fact-finding. Results show that strictness-oriented confidence is
the strongest predictor for compliance than any other confidence types. This is consistent with
what is expected by the procedural justice perspective as strictness-oriented confidence shares
procedural elements.
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Why are particular types of confidence more related to assistance or compliance? Given
that confidence is one marker for perceived legitimacy, the idea of normative alignment or moral
alignment (Jackson et al., 2012) under the legitimacy perspective offers an insight for a possible
underlying mechanism. Moral alignment means that legitimacy reflects essential values people
share with the law, and people are strongly influenced by values and goals legitimate authorities
pursue. Confidence in the system’s competence and motivation for accurate fact-finding may
reflect the shared values and intrinsic motivations individuals have for truth-finding via helping
legal authorities, testifying facts as a witness, serving as jurors, etc. Confidence in the system’s
competence and motivation for following the formal structure of the law may relate to shared
values and intrinsic motivations for complying with the law. However, it is unclear about how
much legal authorities engage with those values and motivations. Two models of legal
socialization, coercive and consensual models (Tyler & Trinkner, 2017) also suggest a possibility
that the observed associations between confidence and assistance/compliance can be a function
of individuals’ socialized values together with risk assessments of punishment when they defy
the law. Although further studies are needed for understanding specific mechanisms, the present
study shows how different types of confidence are related to different types of cooperative
behavior.
Verdict
For additional validity evidence based on relations to other variables, the study tested the
predictive ability of scale scores for general verdict preferences as well as judgments on a
criminal trial case. Results show that individuals with higher confidence in the system’s accurate
fact-finding generally perceive higher probability of commission for defendants in trials while
being more conviction prone. In contrast, individuals with higher confidence in the system’s

146
conformity to the law perceive lower probability of commission, and also pursue more stringent
standard of proof, while being more acquittal prone. Individuals with higher confidence in the
system’s speedy resolutions of criminal cases tend to set less stringent standard of proof, while
being more conviction prone.
Such results partly support hypothesis 5. Crime control-efficiency-oriented confidence is
more linked to pro-prosecution attitudes giving greater faith in the system’s administrative
function of finding guilty, which in turn leads individuals to more easily make presumption of
guilt about defendants in trials. In contrast, due process-strictness-oriented confidence is more
linked to pro-defense attitudes giving greater faith in the system’s protection of individual rights
and dignity. This in turn aligns them with presumption of innocence and stringent interpretation
of legal standard for conviction.
The observed positive relationship between accuracy-oriented confidence and assessment
of probability commission suggests that if individuals believe that the system is competent in
accurately sorting out the guilt from the innocence, they can also believe that defendants are
called to stand in the courtroom based upon accurate investigation processes. While efficiencyoriented confidence reflects faith in the administrative and informal fact-finding, accuracyoriented confidence reflects faith in evidence-based fact finding. Although either type ultimately
relates to greater faith in guilt of the defendant, results of the test of equality of coefficients
indicate greater association of accuracy-oriented confidence with assessment of probability
commission.
Consistent patterns are observed when participants evaluate and decide a verdict about a
selected criminal trial scenario when controlling for the strength of evidence. Individuals with
higher accuracy-oriented confidence and lower strictness-oriented confidence were more likely
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to decide on a guilty verdict, mainly through their preexisting belief in high probability of
commission for the defendant. Individuals with higher efficiency-oriented confidence were more
likely to decide on a guilty verdict, mainly through their commitment for more lenient reasonable
doubt standard. Such findings indicate that the relationship between confidence and verdict can
be largely explained by how individuals view and understand crime, guilt, and defendant, in
ways shared with the system. In this regard, the idea of normative alignment can have some
connections here. Some dimensions of confidence may reflect the ideologies or value systems
individuals share with the authorities such as crime control- and due process-oriented systems.
Finally, findings also suggest the potential of scores on accuracy-oriented confidence in
practice for sorting out extremely conviction or acquittal prone jurors based on their preexisting
attitudes that will not directly relate to case characteristics. Overall results support predictive
abilities of some types of confidence scores for verdict preferences and judgments as jurors.
Implications
Public confidence in the criminal justice system has been the focus of political, academic,
and more general attention. There is no doubt that understanding public confidence and
measuring it accurately are important steps toward efficient operation of justice processes that
largely depends on the participation of members of public. However, our understanding about
confidence in the criminal justice system is limited and partial. This is partly due to a lack of
robust measures of confidence based upon a clear conceptualization. Acknowledging limitations
of existing scales, the current research has paid attention to conceptualizing the construct of
confidence and its dimensions based on established theoretical and empirical frameworks. As a
result, scales developed here are more explicit measures at both conceptual and empirical levels.
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The present research overall improves our understanding and assessment of public
confidence in the criminal justice system, together with how confidence is related to two law
related behaviors: cooperation and decisions in a criminal trial. This in turn can offer important
insights and implications for scholars, policy makers, social commentators, and others who are
concerned with public confidence in the criminal justice system and with enhancing effective
functions of the system. It also contributes to improving theories of confidence in the criminal
justice system by offering an expanded perspective on dimensions of confidence. Six domains of
confidence are framed within comprehensive sets of theories on ideology in criminal justice. Few
studies have framed their measures and dimensions of confidence by different ideologies or
purposes of the criminal justice system. Scales also contain domains that have been neglected in
the context of legal attitudes despite its centrality, such as confidence in the system’s reliable
fact-finding. It also demonstrates how important this domain is for understanding important lawrelated behavioral and attitudinal outcomes.
Aside from construct-irrelevant factors or method bias, the multidimensional factor
structures of six confidence scales generally suggest an inherent complexity of confidence in the
criminal justice system. This warns the risk of common practice that relies on single items to
capture public confidence in the criminal justice system. A single-item or other simpler approach
limits our understanding of unobserved, latent attributes such as confidence in the criminal
justice system. Researchers should be aware of this and the need of ongoing effort to better
assess complexity and possible of confidence. The current research also suggests that some part
of the over-complexity can be reduced with a consideration of confidence differently depending
on types of criminal justice institutions.
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The present research also devoted substantial attention to validating the proposed
confidence scale. Analysis of validity considers not only interpretation in isolation, but a
comprehensive relationship between scale scores, scale interpretation, and the scale use. This
was done by considering validity evidence based on both relations with external variables and
consequences of taking scales. Scholars stress an importance of including investigation of
consequences in validity research as it allows to identify sources of scale invalidity such as
construct-irrelevant variance (e.g., Markus, 2014, 2018). Overall, the current research supports
the validity of interpreting scores as well as the potential use of scale scores in practice.
Findings enhance our knowledge of relationships between confidence and pivotal public
behaviors. This research points to the importance of perception of the system’s reliable fact
finding for both cooperation and juror verdict. Adding to a procedural perspective that
emphasizes the quality of treatment, this research highlights a crucial role of perceived
competence of truth finding for eliciting cooperation from public. Results also suggest predictive
ability of accuracy-oriented confidence for juror conviction proneness as well as their actual
verdict decisions. This study improves our knowledge of relationships of confidence with citizen
cooperation and juror judgments. As some jury scholars have noted, the ability to account for
even small proportions of variability in guilt judgments can have a substantial impact on
attorneys’ likelihood of identifying a juror favorable to them (e.g., Lecci & Myers, 2010). More
importantly, the effective assessment of individual differences in conviction proneness and guilt
judgments enhances our ability to understand jurors’ decision-making process.
The current multidimensional confidence scales can be used to illuminate many other
important research questions involving public perceptions of the system and its relations with
law-related behaviors and attitudes other than cooperation and verdict. The current confidence
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scales are expected to be useful to address questions such that what types of system confidence
can be promoted through jury experiences and what types of confidence are related to people’s
support or opposition for particular policy such as marijuana legalization.
Analysis reveals that individual life situations, backgrounds, and experiences matter for
how they view the competence and motivation of legal authorities as expected by social and
cultural perspective on institutional confidence. Results suggest that people value the system’s
reliable fact-finding more than crime control and due process function. Such value commitment
to reliable fact-finding consistently predicted confidence scores. Such findings underscore
“reliable fact-finding” as an important dimension of institutional attitudes. People apparently
care whether authorities actually are competent with and motivated for finding truth, and how
they view the system’s commitment to such value system has important links to law related
behaviors.
Finally, unlike extensive research on developing attitudinal measures based on responses
of traditional subjects such as students, the current research used MTurk workers. MTurk offers a
much broader and more diverse pool of participants (Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, 2014).
Findings of current research using MTurk participants thus reflect legal attitudes and behaviors
of a more general population. Although absence of direct oversight of MTurk participants
presents concerns about internal and external validity, such concerns are manageable under
effective screening (Pyo & Maxfield, 2020; Thomas & Clifford, 2017). This research used more
rigorous screening for high-quality of data than traditional research using MTurk such as
Instructional Manipulation Checks (IMC) (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2012; Oppenheimer,
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). In doing so, the study efficiently sorted out participants without
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sufficient attention or efforts in responding to questionnaire items. This in turn allows us to better
ensure the quality of current data.
Limitations and future directions
Future research should aim at improving the scale before it is adopted for widespread
use. Initial confirmatory factor analyses failed to support a priori or intended models that assume
a six-dimensional structure of confidence scale. The present research thus did not achieve an
original purpose for producing a six-dimensional scale of public confidence in the criminal
justice system. Accordingly, the study reports the final models for each of the six scales with the
caveat that they are exploratory and thus the p values may not be valid. Even after controlling for
method bias, the scale items still form complex dimensions mostly depending on the type of
institution they ask about. Although confidence in different criminal justice institutions are
highly correlated with each other under the same domain, the resulting complex scales reveal
that individuals may respond differently to items asking different institutions – police,
prosecution, courts, and prison.
A logical next step can be a fundamental redesign of item specifications. The main goal
would be to create more standardized and homogeneous items across scales. Future research can
be more structured about item writing, for example using item templates in which "police",
"prosecutors", "judges" and “prisons” can be substituted in otherwise identical items. Future
research might also structure the questionnaire as a matrix for each dimension with item stems
on the rows and the four institutions across the columns such that the respondent provides four
answers in each row. Such strategies would be helpful for developing measures that more clearly
distinguish individuals’ confidence in the particular domain for different institutions.

152
Although six scale items paralleled two method factors regarding orientation of items,
there can be another possible explanation with respect to how two factor groups are formed.
Fairness scale items seem to be grouped into fairness in general versus fair treatment for
underprivileged groups of people. Accuracy items seem to be grouped into accuracy in assessing
the case versus practices towards accurate fact-finding. Transparency scale items seem to be
grouped into level of transparency versus level of concealment in practice. Transparency items
may not clearly assess the intended contents on transparency focusing on practices of fact
finding. Again, future research may adopt a multi-stage process of producing standardized item
writing based on better conceptualizations of dimensions. Given the inherent complexity of
confidence itself, additional suggestions for item writing in future research might be expanding
the scale to have more items of each dimension and modeling item responses based on a number
of item characteristics. Future research should also consider larger sample size. The current
sample size may be not enough for complex latent variable models, given that the recommended
sample size to parameters ratio is 20:1 (Kline, 2016).
There are other lessons on future revisions of the items and scales to be drawn from
problematic items for the current confidence scales. It may be best to avoid items testing
respondents’ attitudes on the intended domain in indirect or implicit ways (e.g., item CC8 “If a
person has been screened as probably guilty by prosecutors, then he might be the true
perpetrator”). Future research needs to ensure that the scale has only direct items. Items also
need to avoid legal terms that may not be clear to respondents (e.g., CC15 “When judges are
certain about the defendant’s guilt, it is reasonable to accept a plea of guilty without trial” and
RE18 “Judges are more inclined toward accepting guilty pleas obtained in private meetings
instead of in open court”). Research also needs to be careful that items are not overlapping with
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items from a different domain (e.g., RE20 “The innocent are often improperly punished while
the guilty escape from punishment”). Items should not require individuals’ value commitment
rather than their factual belief (e.g., RE 24 “Punishment is a private and concealed matter
entrusted to experts, instead of public spectacle”).
Future research also needs to better conceptualize the construct of finality. One lesson
from the finality scale is that responses to scale items with a complex mix of issues regarding
contents and conceptualization can be more influenced by construct-irrelevant variance such as
measurement method or item format. Method bias due to orientations of items is fairly well
known for personality and attitudinal measures and might arise in future research. However,
using both positively and negatively oriented items can produce problems. Reversing the
wording of some items may alter their content, and reversed items may be confusing for some
respondents (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001; Weijters, Geuens, & Schillewaert, 2010). To
minimize or control for bias due to item orientations, some strategies might be informative
including cognitive interviews, think-aloud protocols, or asking participants to write explanations
for why they answered each item the way that they did. Such strategies would provide insights
for reasoning processes and/or cognitive schema underlying individuals’ responses to items
(Bandalos, 2018). Because scales with both oriented items are not completely free from biases, it
should be used in conjunction with the statistical method of control (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, &
Podsakoff, 2012).
After improving the scales, future research can test hypotheses regarding relationships
between confidence and cooperation and verdict. There are several recommendations for testing
predictive ability of scale scores. First, given that current research largely adopts ideas of the
legitimacy perspective, future research needs to include measures of legitimacy and then
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examine how different domains of confidence are related to different domains of legitimacy
including bounded authority – acting within the limits of one’s rightful authority (Trinkner,
Jackson, & Tyler, 2018). This might facilitate evaluating convergent and discriminant evidence
of confidence scales based on external construct (legitimacy).
It might be informative to study why different types of confidence are related to different
types of cooperative behavior, assistance and compliance. Although possible explanations are
discussed above, more detailed analyses with additional variables and covariates are required. An
idea of normative alignment and two legal socialization models including consensual and
coercive models can be tested to see how differently and how much each of them contributes to
the relationships between confidence and cooperative behavior.
Future research also needs to focus on mechanisms specific to confidence and verdict,
using a variety of trial scenarios that consider important characteristics of defendants and victims
such as race. As noted previously (e.g., Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Myers & Lecci, 1998),
existing measures showed different predictive abilities across different criminal scenarios. Future
research could examine the predictive ability of the confidence scales across a variety of other
trial scenarios such as murder, rape, armed robbery, drug possession, etc. In this study, people
perceive importance and reliability of evidence differently depending on the strength of
evidence, but strength of evidence did not have a significant effect on verdict outcome. More
sophisticated manipulation of evidence will be needed.
Political ideology needs to be better operationalized. future research should consider a
less emotionally charged synonym for 'ideology' such as 'orientation'. Finally, besides
cooperation and verdict, there must be a variety of law related behaviors targeting different
population groups for future research.
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Conclusion
Apart from these limitations, the research reported here has added to the important body
of literature on public confidence in the criminal justice system. Despite the rise of political,
societal, and scholarly interest in public confidence, few efforts were made to understand public
confidence thoroughly. Although a large volume of studies has addressed public confidence, less
is known about its meaning, nature, and dimensions. As a result, how we conceptualize and
operationalize confidence has been obscured. This is an important gap that must be filled
because confidence in the criminal justice system has important impacts, at both societal and
individual levels. Public confidence can shape not only criminal justice policy but also how
individuals behave in the context of criminal justice system. In this regard, the current research
contributes to enrichment and advancement of our understanding and measurement of
confidence. Importantly, this study demonstrates how public perceptions of criminal justice
authorities can be understood within the framework of core ideologies of the criminal justice
system. Such a theory driven approach enables more comprehensive understanding of how
public behaviors such as cooperation and jurors’ verdict are linked to confidence.
Hopefully other researchers will build on this study in order to expand the understanding
and application of public confidence in the criminal justice system for a greater variety of public
law-related behaviors and important criminal justice policies.
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Appendix A:
Initial item pool (72 items) - Original

Note. R = reverse code

1. Items for Crime Control Oriented Confidence

Police: Efficiency
CC 1. Police officers can quickly identify the correct suspect.
CC 2. If police officers have a strong belief in the suspect’s guilt early in their investigation, then that suspect
probably committed the crime.
CC 3. Informal investigation and interrogation in a police station are effective in criminal fact findings.
Police: Finality
CC 4. Police officers lack capacity to ensure tight control over criminal conduct viewed as threats to public
safety. (R)
CC 5. Police officers are competent in apprehending a high proportion of offenders who commit a crime against
the public order.
CC 6. Generally, police activities are effective in getting as many criminals as possible punished.
Prosecutor: Efficiency
CC 7. Generally, prosecutors handle criminal cases with speed and efficiency
CC 8. If a man has been investigated and screened as probably guilty by prosecutors, then he might be the true
perpetrator.
CC 9. Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly holding people accountable when they create problems. (R)
Prosecutor: Finality
CC 10. Prosecutors are competent in prosecuting a high proportion of offenders who commit a crime against
the public order.
CC 11. Generally, prosecutors are too lenient to control crimes and protect the public. (R)
CC 12. Prosecutors are doing well in getting as many criminals as possible convicted.
Judge: Efficiency
CC 13. Judges lack capacity to ensure swift administration of justice for crime. (R)
CC 14. Judges resolve criminal cases quickly and efficiently.
CC 15. When judges are certain about the defendant’s guilt before trial, it is reasonable to terminate criminal
proceedings by accepting a plea of guilty.
Judge: Finality
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CC 16. Judges enforce rigorous sentencing upon the offenders who commit crimes against the public safety.
CC 17. Judges are doing a good job in convicting a large proportion of offenders.
CC 18. Generally, criminal sentences imposed by judges lack severity to act as a deterrent to potential
offenders. (R)
Prison: Efficiency
CC 19. Our criminal justice process is doing well in carrying out the sentences of the courts speedily.
CC 20. There are often delays in carrying out sentences. (R)
CC 21. Our current system of criminal punishment swiftly punishes people who violate the law.
Prison: Finality
CC 22. Criminal punishment is too lenient to deter crimes in our society. (R)
CC 23. Generally, our current system of punishment is harsh enough in protecting the public from being
victimized by crime.
CC 24. Many dangerous criminals are released without being fully punished for committing crimes. (R)

2. Items for Due Process Oriented Confidence

Police: Fairness
DP 1. Generally, police officers treat all different groups of people in a fair manner.
DP 2. Police officers treat minority groups unfairly. (R)
DP 3. Police officers arrest and search a suspect, regardless of his race and class, when there is probable cause
to think that he has committed a crime.
Police: Strictness
DP 4. Confessions and admissions by persons in police custody are often induced by the use of illegal
interrogation techniques. R)
DP 5. Generally, police officers arrest a person based on legally sufficient grounds.
DP 6. Police officers often gather evidence using methods that violate the norms of privacy protected by the
law. (R)
Prosecutor: Fairness
DP 7. Generally, prosecutors use fair procedures when handling cases.
DP 8. In general, a prosecutor’s decision to charge a suspect with a crime is impartial.
DP 9. Prosecutors treat underprivileged groups of people unfairly. (R)
Prosecutor: Strictness
DP 10. Prosecutors perform their responsibilities in accordance with rules of criminal law.
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DP 11. Prosecutors are arbitrary in deciding to charge an offender. (R)
DP 12. Prosecutors often use illegal means to win a case. (R)
Judge: Fairness
DP 13. Generally, judges treat all different groups of people with dignity and respect.
DP 14. Judges are unfair in deciding cases. (R)
DP 15. Judges impartially assess the arguments of the parties in deciding cases.
Judge: Strictness
DP 16. Judges are concerned about following constitutional principles.
DP 17. Judges often ignore the legal rules of procedure and evidence. (R)
DP 18. Judges process cases with consideration for protecting the procedural due process rights of defendants.
Prison: Fairness
DP 19. Our current system of criminal punishment is just and fair.
DP 20. The rich receive a lesser sentence than the poor for the same charge. (R)
DP 21. Minority defendants receive unfair criminal punishments. (R)
Prison: Strictness
DP 22. Generally, sentencing decisions strictly follow formal rules of procedure.
DP 23. Sentencing and punishment follow the structure of sentencing laws.
DP 24. Criminal punishment is sometimes arbitrary rather than representing the formal criminal justice process.
(R)

3. Items for Reliability Oriented Confidence

Police: Accuracy
RE 1. Generally, police practice is to focus on ascertaining factual truth by collecting reliable evidence.
RE 2. Most police officers are motivated to accurately identify and apprehend the true perpetrator.
RE 3. Police officers often investigate cases in a biased way that compromises the accuracy of fact-findings.
(R)
Police: Transparency
RE 4. Generally, the overall police investigation process is transparent.
RE 5. Police officers tend to conceal their investigative mistakes that matter for trial outcome. (R)
RE 6. Police officers provide transparency in their record-keeping practices.
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Prosecutor: Accuracy
RE 7. Generally, prosecutors make charging decisions based on a reliable account of the criminal event.
RE 8. Most prosecutors care more about getting a conviction than accurate truth-finding. (R)
RE 9. Prosecutors are open to hearing evidence that contradicts their preferred conclusion.
Prosecutor: Transparency
RE 10. Generally, prosecutorial practice and performance are transparent.
RE 11. Prosecutors would not bring into the open evidence favorable to the defendant case, even if they found
it. (R)
RE 12. Prosecutors are reluctant to let their decision-making process be open to public scrutiny. (R)
Judge: Accuracy
RE 13. Judges value fact-finding precision based on the most accurate account of the criminal event.
RE 14. Judges are sensitive to the possibility of error at fact-finding.
RE 15. A judge’s decision may be affected by emotions or personal bias instead of facts. (R)
Judge: Transparency
RE 16. Generally, a judge's deliberation and decision-making process is transparent.
RE 17. Judges are easily swayed by their personal political goals in doing justice. (R)
RE 18. Judges are more inclined toward accepting guilty pleas in private places instead of formal adversarial
adjudication in open court. (R)
Prison: Accuracy
RE 19. Criminal punishment assumes a reliable conviction.
RE 20. There are high risks that the innocent are improperly punished while the guilty escape from punishment.
(R)
RE 21. Criminal punishment is decided upon by an accurate and complete account of criminal conduct.
Prison: Transparency
RE 22. Generally, our current system of punishment is transparent.
RE 23. Our current system of punishment is being influenced by external factors such as political pressures and
media. (PRN, TR, R)
RE 24. Punishment is a private and concealed matter entrusted to experts, instead of public spectacle. (PRN,
TR, R)
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Appendix B:
Item revisions
Revised 1 = item revised after peer review
Revised 2 = item revised after expert review
Rewriting crime control items (10 items)
CC2. efficiency
Original: If police officers have a strong belief in the suspect’s guilt early in their investigation, then that suspect
probably committed the crime.
Revised 1: If police officers believe a suspect is guilty, then that suspect probably committed the crime.
CC4. finality (Reversed)
Original: Police officers lack capacity to ensure tight control over criminal conduct viewed as threats to public
safety.
Revised 1: Police officers lack capacity to control criminal conduct that threatens public safety.

CC8. efficiency
Original: If a man has been investigated and screened as probably guilty by prosecutors, then he might be the true
perpetrator.
Revised 1: If a person has been screened as probably guilty by prosecutors, then he might be the true perpetrator.
CC9. efficiency (Reversed)
Original: Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly holding people accountable when they create problems.
Revised 1: Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly holding people accountable when they commit crimes.
CC10. finality
Original: Prosecutors are competent in prosecuting a high proportion of offenders who commit a crime against the
public order.
Revised 1: Prosecutors are competent in prosecuting a high proportion of offenders against the public order.
Revised 2: The cases that prosecutors pursue include a high proportion of offenses against the public order.
CC12. finality
Original: Prosecutors are doing well in getting as many criminals as possible convicted.
Revised 1: Prosecutors are doing a good job in getting as many criminals as possible convicted.
CC14. efficiency (Reversed)
Original: Judges resolve criminal cases quickly and efficiently.
Revised 1: Judges dispose of criminal cases quickly and efficiently.

161

CC15. efficiency
Original: When judges are certain about the defendant’s guilt before trial, it is reasonable to terminate criminal
proceedings by accepting a plea of guilty.
Revised 1: When judges are certain about the defendant’s guilt, it is reasonable to accept a plea of guilty without
trial.
CC19. efficiency
Original: Our criminal justice process is doing well in carrying out the sentences of the courts speedily.
Revised 1: Our criminal justice process is competent in promptly carrying out the sentences of the courts.
CC21. efficiency
Original: Our current system of criminal punishment swiftly and certainly punishes people who violate the law.
Revised 1: Our current system of criminal punishment swiftly and efficiently punishes people who violate the law.
Revised 2: Our current system of criminal punishment swiftly punishes people who violate the law.
Rewriting due process items (11 items)
DP3. fairness
Original: Police officers arrest and search a suspect, regardless of his race and class, when there is probable cause to
think that he has committed a crime.
Revised 1: Generally, police decisions to search and arrest someone are unaffected by the suspect’s race and social
class.
DP4. strictness (Reversed)
Original: Confessions and admissions by persons in police custody are often induced by the use of illegal
interrogation techniques.
Revised 1: Confessions by people in police custody are often obtained through illegal interrogation techniques.
DP5. strictness
Original: Generally, police officers arrest a person based on legally sufficient grounds.
Revised 1: Police officers usually arrest people based on legally sufficient grounds.
DP6. strictness (Reversed)
Original: Police officers often gather evidence using methods that violate the norms of privacy protected by the law.
Revised 1: Police investigation often violates the norms of privacy protected by the law.
DP7. fairness
Original: Generally, prosecutors use fair procedures when handling cases.
Revised 1: Generally, prosecutors are as fair as possible in handling cases.
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DP8. fairness
Original: In general, a prosecutor’s decision to charge a suspect with a crime is impartial.
Revised 1: In general, prosecutors are impartial in deciding to charge a suspect with a crime.
DP11. strictness (Reversed)
Original: Prosecutors are arbitrary in deciding to charge an offender.
Revised 1: Prosecutors often make legally unjustified decisions on whether or not to charge an offender.
DP12. strictness (Reversed)
Original: Prosecutors often use illegal means to win a case.
Revised 1: Prosecutors often disregard formal structural of the law to win a case.
DP14. fairness (Reversed)
Original: Judges are unfair in deciding cases.
Revised 1: Judges lack ability to ensure that everyone who comes to court gets a fair trial.
DP15. fairness
Original: Judges impartially assess the arguments of the parties in deciding cases.
Revised 1: Judges are impartial in assessing the arguments of the parties.
DP24. strictness (Reversed)
Original: Criminal punishment is sometimes arbitrary rather than representing the formal criminal justice process.
Revised 1: Criminal punishment is sometimes arbitrary rather than representing the rules of criminal law.
Rewriting reliability items (9 items)
RE8. accuracy (Reversed)
Original: Most prosecutors care more about getting a conviction than accurate truth-finding.
Revised 1: Prosecutors generally care more about getting a conviction than finding the truth.
RE9. accuracy
Original: Prosecutors are open to hearing evidence that contradicts their preferred conclusion.
Revised 1: Prosecutors are open to hearing evidence that counters their own view of a case.
Revised 2: Prosecutors are open to considering evidence that counters their own view of a case.
RE13. accuracy
Original: Judges value fact-finding precision based on the most accurate account of the criminal event.
Revised 1: Trial judges value precision in fact-finding above all things.
RE15. accuracy (Reversed)
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Original: A judge’s decision may be affected by emotions or personal bias instead of facts.
Revised 1: Trial judges admit testimony obtained through flawed investigative procedures.
Revised 2: Trial judges often admit testimony obtained through flawed investigative procedures.
RE17. transparency (Reversed)
Original: Judges are easily swayed by their personal political goals in doing justice.
Revised 1: Judges' decisions are affected by their political and policy views.
RE18. transparency (Reversed)
Original: Judges are more inclined toward accepting guilty pleas in private places instead of formal adversarial
adjudication in open court.
Revised 1: Judges are more inclined toward accepting guilty pleas obtained in private meetings instead of adversarial
adjudication in open court.
Revised 2: Judges are more inclined toward accepting guilty pleas obtained in private meetings instead of in open
court.
RE19. accuracy
Original: Criminal punishment assumes a reliable conviction.
Revised 1: Criminal punishment is based on a reliable conviction most of the time.
RE20. accuracy (Reversed)
Original: There are high risks that the innocent are improperly punished while the guilty escape from punishment.
Revised 1: The innocent are often improperly punished while the guilty escape from punishment.
RE23. transparency (Reversed)
Original: Our current system of punishment is being influenced by external factors such as
political pressures and media.
Revised 1: Our current system of punishment is being influenced by political interests and media
coverage.
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Appendix C
Informed consent for the field test of initial item pool

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
John Jay College of Criminal Justice/The Graduate Center
Criminal Justice

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Title of Research Study:

Public Opinion about the Criminal Justice System

Principal Investigator:

Jimin Pyo
Doctoral Candidate

Faculty Advisor:

Mike Maxfield, Ph.D.
Professor

You are being asked to participate in a research study because you are a US citizen who is 18 years of age or older.

Purpose:
The purpose of this research study is to understand how people think about crime and more generally, the criminal
justice system. Your participation will help us to better understand public perceptions about motives and
competence of human elements of the criminal justice system. Please read this form about what participation entails
before agreeing to be in the study.
Procedures:
By clicking the "Yes, I am a US citizen aged at 18 years old or above and agree to participate in this study” your
participation in this research study is voluntary. If you volunteer to participate in this research study, you will be
asked to complete one session, using your computer and this survey website, which will take approximately one
hour. First, you will be asked to respond to a series of questions including demographic questions about yourself and
questions about your personal opinions and stances on performance of criminal legal institutions as well as crimes.
After then, we will ask you to read a summary of a trial transcript. Following this, you will be asked to respond to
questions about your opinion on the trial proceedings that you read.
Time Commitment:
Your participation in this research study is expected to last for approximately 1 hour.
Potential Risks or Discomforts:
No physical risks are involved in this study. The risks posed to you are no greater than you would likely encounter
reading a newspaper or magazine article. It is possible that you will experience some psychological discomfort as a
result of thinking about crime. Considering some of these topics may cause you to feel unpleasant emotions or
remind you of negative information. If you become uncomfortable with any aspect of the tasks you are asked to
engage in, you may discontinue participation at any time.
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Potential Benefits:
You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research study. This project is part of a larger research
effort to understand how people think about the criminal justice system in this country. Your participation will help
us, and the broader scientific community, to increase our understanding.
Payment for Participation:
You will be paid $2.00 for participating in this study. Once you complete your survey, the researcher will review
your work and approve payment. In order to be paid, you must complete the entire study.
Compensation process:
At the end of the survey, you will enter a completion code to receive your $2.00 payment. The researcher must
approve your satisfactory completion. After completion has been approved, it may be as many as three days before
you receive payment. Payment will not be approved if: (1) you do not complete the survey; (2) you do not correctly
answer attention-check questions; and (3) you have completed the same HIT previously.”
Confidentiality:
All records and data resulting from your participation will be kept confidential. The results of your participation in
this study may be used for publication or for scientific purposes, but neither your name nor your identity will be
disclosed, and in any sort of report that we publish, we will not include any information that may make it possible to
identify a participant. Responses will be coded for statistical analysis after removing all identifying information and
secured using a password protected electronic file. Identifying information will be kept separately from your
responses in a way that will not allow them to be linked to your responses. Access to the records will be limited to
the researchers; however, please note that the Institutional Review Board and internal City University of New York
auditors may review the research records. The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that
oversee this type of research may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the research. Research
records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain identifiable information about you.
Please be aware that any work performed on Amazon MTurk can potentially be linked to information about you on
your Amazon public profile page. We will not be accessing any personally identifying information about you that
you may have put on your Amazon public profile page. We will store your MTurk Worker ID separately from the
other information you provide to us.
Privacy and confidentiality policy of MTurk:
https://www.mturk.com/worker/privacy-notice
Participants’ Rights:
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate, there will be no
penalty to you, and you may discontinue participation without penalty at any time. If you decide to participate, you
are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue at any time, for any reason.
Questions, Comments or Concerns:
This study has been reviewed the City University of New York Institutional Review Board. The researcher
conducting this study is Jimin Pyo. For questions or additional information concerning this research, you may
contact the principal investigator or the faculty chair listed below.
Jimin Pyo, MA
Doctoral Candidate
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
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Dept. of Criminal Justice
jpyo@jjay.cuny.edu
524 West 59 street New York, NY 10019

Mike Maxfield, Ph.D.
Professor
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Dept. of Criminal Justice
mmaxfield@jjay.cuny.edu
524 West 59 street New York, NY 10019
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or concerns that you would
like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please contact the CUNY Research Compliance
Administrator (phone: 646-664-8918, email: hrpp@cuny.edu). Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
nd
205 East 42 Street
New York, NY 10017
Yes, I am a US citizen aged at 18 years old or above and agree to participate in this study
No, I do not meet the eligibility criteria, or I do not agree to participate
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Appendix D
Questionnaire on demographic and individual characteristics
1. What is your age?
(
)
2. What is your gender?
1= Female
2 = Male
3. What is your race or ethnicity?”
1 = White
2 = African-American
3 = Asian
4 = Hispanic or Latino
5 = Other
4. What was the highest grade of formal education you completed?
1 = 8th grade or less
2 = Some high school
3 = High school graduate or GED
4 = Trade/vocational school after high school
5 = Some college
6 = College graduate
7 = Graduate school/professional school
5. What is your political ideology?
1 = Very liberal
2 = Moderately liberal
3 = Slightly liberal
4 = Middle of the road
5 = Slightly conservative
6 = Moderately conservative
7 = Very conservative
8 = Don’t know or decline to answer
6. How much interaction have you had with the criminal justice institutions in the last 12 months?
1 = None at all
2 = A little
3 = A moderate amount
4 = A lot
5 = A great deal
6 = Don’t know or decline to answer
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Appendix E
Attention checks
The first screener that assesses carelessness or lack of effort in reading instructions was placed at the initial stage of
the survey in which demographic and individual characteristics were asked. At the end of questionnaire on
demographic/individual characteristics, participants were asked to complete two screening items regarding
involvement in criminal courts.
Q1. Have you or a member of your household had any personal involvement in the criminal courts in the last 12
months as the plaintiff-the person who brought the lawsuit, a defendant-the one being sued or charged, serving as a
member of a jury, being a witness in court, or something else?
1 = No, have had neither personal nor household member involvement
2 = Have had household member involvement, but not personal involvement
3 = Yes, have had personal involvement
4 = Don’t know or decline to answer
Q2. In this case, you/a member of your household were/was. . . (READ LIST)
1 = The defendant in a criminal case
2 = The person being sued
3 = The person filing the lawsuit
4 = A juror
5 = A witness
6 = Something else
7 = Don’t know or not applicable
Inconsistency between responses to two questions were examined to identify participants’ careless responding. If
participants chose either ‘neither personal nor household member involvement’ or ‘don’t know/decline to answer’
for the prior question, they must indicate ‘don’t know/not applicable’ for the second question – Otherwise, they were
considered as careless in reading instruction.
The second screener that assesses consistency or reliability in responding was placed at the middle stage of the
survey in which participants completed 72-item confidence scale, after the items measuring individual
characteristics. The second screener used a repeated measure of political ideology. After participants completed
confidence scales, they were asked to indicate their political ideology again. At the initial stage of the survey,
individuals’ political ideology was asked on a 7-point scale with 1 for very liberal and 7 for very conservative so
that higher score can reflect more politically conservative ideology.
What is your political ideology?
1 = Very liberal
2 = Moderately liberal
3 = Slightly liberal
4 = Middle of the road
5 = Slightly conservative
6 = Moderately conservative
7 = Very conservative
8 = Don’t know or decline to answer
When participants received the item again, the responding options were reversed with 1 for very conservative and 7
for very liberal so that higher scores reflect more politically liberal ideology as below.
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What is your political ideology?
1 = Very conservative
2 = Moderately conservative
3 = Slightly conservative
4 = Middle of the road
5 = Slightly liberal
6 = Moderately liberal
7 = Very liberal
8 = Don’t know or decline to answer
If participants chose different ideology option for the later question in terms of orientation (i.e., liberal or
conservative), they were considered as inconsistent in responding.
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Appendix F
Value commitment questionnaire

Please respond to six questions below on a percentage term – between 0% and 100%
(1) Importance- CC
“How important do you think it is for the criminal justice system to strive for crime control with maximum
speed and finality?”
%
(2) Concern- CC
“How much are you concerned about crime control?”
%
(3) Importance- DP
“How important do you think it is for the criminal justice system to strive for protecting individuals’ rights
and dignity under fair and formal structure of law?”
%
(4) Concern- DP
“How much are you concerned about due process?”
%
(5) Importance- RE
“How important do you think it is for the criminal justice system to strive for accurate and reliable truthfinding in criminal cases?”
%
(6) Concern- RE
“How much are you concerned about accuracy of truth-finding in criminal cases?”
%

Appendix G:
Finalized initial item pool (72 items)
PL = police, PRC = prosecutor, JG = judge, PRN = prison, R = reverse code, * = items kept for the final version
Table G1
Efficiency items and statistics

Efficiency items
*CC1. Police officers can quickly identify the
correct suspect. (PL)
*CC2. If police officers believe a suspect is guilty,
then that suspect probably committed the crime.
(PL)
*CC3. Informal investigation and interrogation in a
police station are effective in criminal fact findings.
(PL)
*CC7. Generally, prosecutors handle criminal cases
with speed and efficiency (PRC)
CC8. If a person has been screened as probably
guilty by prosecutors, then he might be the true
perpetrator. (PRC)
*CC9. Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly
holding people accountable when they commit
crimes. (PRC, R)
*CC13. Judges lack capacity to ensure swift
administration of justice for crime. (JG, R)
*CC14. Judges dispose of criminal cases quickly
and efficiently. (JG)
CC15. When judges are certain about the
defendant’s guilt, it is reasonable to accept a plea of
guilty without trial. (JG)

M

SD

Skewness

Kurtosis

Corrected
item-total
correlation

Multiple
correlation

Squared
multiple
correlation

Alpha if
item
deleted

3.81

1.52

-0.01

-0.86

.58

.68

.46

.75

3.76

1.56

-0.10

-0.75

.45

.64

.41

.77

4.36

1.60

-0.26

-0.67

.55

.63

.40

.76

4.11

1.51

-0.02

-0.69

.61

.66

.43

.75

4.46

1.30

-0.38

-0.07

.31

.44

.19

.78

4.24

1.50

-0.22

-0.74

.10

.45

.20

.80

3.92

1.61

-0.07

-0.99

.20

.49

.24

.79

3.88

1.43

.02

-0.66

.61

.68

.46

.75

4.43

1.71

-0.38

-0.79

.27

.35

.12

.79
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*CC 19. Our criminal justice process is competent
in promptly carrying out the sentences of the courts.
4.66
1.53
-0.61
(PRN)
*CC 20. There are often delays in carrying out
2.89
1.43
.71
sentences. (PRN, R)
*CC 21. Our current system of criminal punishment
3.95
1.65
.00
swiftly punishes people who violate the law. (PRN)
Note. Scale reliability estimates: Guttman’s Lambda 2 = .80, Lambda 3 (!) = .78

-0.46

.65

.69

.47

.75

-0.04

.34

.48

.23

.78

-1.13

.49

.59

.35

.76
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Table G2
Finality items and statistics

Finality items

M

SD

Kurtosis

Corrected
item-total
correlation

Multiple
correlation

Squared
multiple
correlation

Alpha if
item
deleted

.01

-0.98

.37

.51

.26

.71

-0.59

-0.12

.22

.57

.32

.73

-0.34

-0.55

.39

.61

.37

.71

-0.33

-0.18

.09

.39

.15

.74

-0.32

-0.82

.29

.67

.45

.72

-0.47

-0.05

.47

.71

.51

.70

-0.58

.15

.42

.51

.26

.71

-0.61

.16

.50

.73

.54

.70

-0.03

-0.92

.32

.65

.42

.72

-0.06

-1.02

.44

.75

.57

.70

-0.49

-0.58

.46

.61

.37

.70

.07

-0.81

.38

.56

.31

.71
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*CC4. Police officers lack capacity to control
criminal conduct that threatens public safety. (PL,
4.01
1.55
R)
*CC5. Police officers are competent in
apprehending a high proportion of offenders who
4.64
1.39
commit a crime against the public order. (PL)
*CC6. Generally, police activities are effective in
getting as many criminals as possible punished.
4.47
1.40
(PL)
CC10. The cases that prosecutors pursue include a
high proportion of offenses against the public order.
4.69
1.22
(PRC)
CC11. Generally, prosecutors are too lenient to
4.62
1.56
control crimes and protect the public. (PRC, R)
*CC12. Prosecutors are doing a good job in getting
4.55
1.40
as many criminals as possible convicted. (PRC)
CC16. Judges enforce rigorous sentencing upon the
offenders who commit crimes against the public
4.87
1.26
safety. (JG)
*CC17. Judges are doing a good job in convicting a
4.75
1.36
large proportion of offenders. (JG)
CC18. Generally, criminal sentences imposed by
judges lack severity to act as a deterrent to potential
4.01
1.65
offenders. (JG, R)
*CC22. Criminal punishment is too lenient to deter
4.24
1.73
crimes in our society. (PRN, R)
*CC23. Generally, our current system of
punishment is harsh enough in protecting the public
4.55
1.53
from being victimized by crime. (PRN)
*CC24. Many dangerous criminals are released
without being fully punished for committing crimes.
3.74
1.59
(PRN, R)
Note. Scale reliability estimates: Guttman’s Lambda 2 = .77, Lambda 3 (!) = .73

Skewness

Table G3
Fairness items and statistics

Fairness items

M

SD

*DP1. Generally, police officers treat all different
3.75
1.87
groups of people in a fair manner. (PL)
*DP2. Police officers treat minority groups unfairly.
3.20
1.70
(PL, R)
*DP3. Generally, police decisions to search and
arrest someone are unaffected by the suspect’s race
3.55
1.77
and social class. (PL)
*DP7. Generally, prosecutors are as fair as possible
4.40
1.51
in handling cases. (PRC)
*DP8. In general, prosecutors are impartial in
4.13
1.62
deciding to charge a suspect with a crime. (PRC)
*DP9. Prosecutors treat underprivileged groups of
3.25
1.60
people unfairly. (PRC, R)
*DP13. Generally, judges treat all different groups
4.24
1.62
of people with dignity and respect. (JG)
*DP14. Judges lack ability to ensure that everyone
3.90
1.73
who comes to court gets a fair trial. (JG, R)
*DP15. Judges are impartial in assessing the
4.61
1.44
arguments of the parties. (JG)
*DP19. Our current system of criminal punishment
4.01
1.74
is just and fair. (PRN)
*DP20. The rich receive a lesser sentence than the
2.62
1.62
poor for the same charge. (PRN, R)
*DP21. Minority defendants receive unfair criminal
3.31
1.64
punishments. (PRN, R)
Note. Scale reliability estimates: Guttman’s Lambda 2 = .90, Lambda 3 (!) = .89

Skewness

Kurtosis

Corrected
item-total
correlation

Multiple
correlation

Squared
multiple
correlation

Alpha if
item
deleted

-0.01

-1.30

.78

.84

.71

.88

.46

-0.74

.60

.78

.61

.89

.20

-1.17

.63

.70

.49

.89

-0.36

-0.67

.67

.74

.55

.88

-0.24

-0.90

.54

.66

.44

.89

.49

-0.67

.67

.75

.57

.88

-0.32

-0.87

.64

.73

.54

.88

.04

-1.10

.30

.50

.24

.90

-0.61

-0.20

.59

.73

.53

.89

-0.25

-1.08

.74

.78

.61

.88

.83

-0.20

.56

.62

.39

.89

.42

-0.74

.60

.73

.54

.89
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Table G4
Strictness items and statistics

Strictness items

M

SD

*DP4. Confessions by people in police custody are
often obtained through illegal interrogation
3.67
1.48
techniques. (PL, R)
*DP5. Police officers usually arrest people based on
4.92
1.40
legally sufficient grounds. (PL)
*DP6. Police investigation often violates the norms
3.48
1.62
of privacy protected by the law. (PL, R)
*DP10. Prosecutors perform their responsibilities in
4.91
1.24
accordance with rules of criminal law. (PRC)
*DP11. Prosecutors often make legally unjustified
decisions on whether or not to charge an offender.
3.69
1.43
(PRC, R)
*DP12. Prosecutors often disregard formal structure
3.99
1.60
of the law to win a case. (PRC, R)
*DP16. Judges are concerned about following
5.03
1.38
constitutional principles. (JG)
*DP17. Judges often ignore the legal rules of
4.41
1.62
procedure and evidence. (JG, R)
*DP18. Judges process cases with consideration for
protecting the procedural due process rights of
4.75
1.37
defendants. (JG)
*DP22. Generally, sentencing decisions strictly
4.69
1.34
follow formal rules of procedure. (PRN)
*DP23. Sentencing and punishment follow the
5.07
1.26
structure of sentencing laws. (PRN)
*DP24. Criminal punishment is sometimes arbitrary
rather than representing the rules of criminal law.
3.52
1.52
(PRN, R)
Note. Scale reliability estimates: Guttman’s Lambda 2 = .88, Lambda 3 (!) = .87

Skewness

Kurtosis

Corrected
item-total
correlation

Multiple
correlation

Squared
multiple
correlation

Alpha if
item
deleted

.20

-0.58

.51

.62

.38

.87

-0.67

-0.08

.59

.68

.46

.86

.28

-0.83

.60

.69

.48

.86

-0.74

.43

.63

.64

.41

.86

.21

-0.66

.54

.69

.47

.87

-0.09

-1.01

.48

.62

.38

.87

-1.03

.83

.56

.68

.46

.86

-0.51

-0.67

.64

.73

.53

.86

-0.70

.27

.63

.77

.59

.86

-0.59

-0.14

.65

.72

.52

.86

-0.94

.41

.49

.63

.40

.87

.27

-0.61

.46

.60

.36

.87
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Table G5
Accuracy items and statistics

Accuracy items

M

SD

Kurtosis

Corrected
item-total
correlation

Multiple
correlation

Squared
multiple
correlation

Alpha if
item
deleted

-0.75

-0.03

.60

.70

.49

.85

-0.53

-0.45

.67

.74

.55

.84

.39

-0.76

.55

.62

.39

.85

-0.69

.39

.62

.71

.50

.85

.57

-0.56

.58

.67

.45

.85

.05

-0.88

.49

.61

.37

.86

.84

.42

.31

.45

.20

.87

-0.59

-0.32

.52

.59

.35

.85

.02

-0.93

.38

.56

.31

.86

-0.64

-0.11

.70

.77

.59

.84

.16

-0.92

.45

.62

.38

.86

-0.39

-0.50

.67

.74

.55

.85

Skewness

*RE1. Generally, police practice is to focus on
ascertaining factual truth by collecting reliable
4.84
1.47
evidence. (PL)
*RE2. Most police officers are motivated to
accurately identify and apprehend the true
4.77
1.54
perpetrator. (PL)
*RE3. Police officers often investigate cases in a
biased way that compromises the accuracy of fact3.43
1.60
findings. (PL, R)
*RE7. Generally, prosecutors make charging
decisions based on a reliable account of the criminal
4.82
1.30
event. (PRC)
*RE8. Prosecutors generally care more about
3.06
1.66
getting a conviction than finding the truth. (PRC, R)
*RE9. Prosecutors are open to considering evidence
3.88
1.62
that counters their own view of a case. (PRC)
*RE13. Trial judges value precision in fact-finding
2.92
1.32
above all things. (JG)
*RE14. Judges are sensitive to the possibility of
4.73
1.45
error at fact-finding. (JG)
RE15. Trial judges often admit testimony obtained
3.82
1.56
through flawed investigative procedures. (JG, R)
*RE19. Criminal punishment is based on an
4.66
1.47
accurate conviction most of the time. (PRN)
RE20. The innocent are often improperly punished
3.72
1.61
while the guilty escape from punishment. (PRN, R)
*RE21. Criminal punishment is decided upon by an
accurate and complete account of criminal conduct.
4.47
1.47
(PRN)
Note. Scale reliability estimates: Guttman’s Lambda 2 = .87, Lambda 3 (!) = .86

176

Table G6
Transparency items and statistics

Transparency items

M

SD

Skewness

*RE4. Generally, the overall police investigation
3.63
1.62
.09
process is transparent. (PL)
*RE5. Police officers tend to conceal their
investigative mistakes that matter for trial outcome.
2.96
1.54
.55
(PL, R)
*RE6. Police officers provide transparency in their
3.90
1.70
-0.14
record-keeping practices. (PL)
*RE10. Generally, prosecutorial practice and
3.91
1.62
-0.13
performance are transparent. (PRC)
*RE11. Prosecutors would not bring into the open
evidence favorable to the defendant case, even if
3.19
1.43
.37
they found it. (PRC, R)
*RE12. Prosecutors are reluctant to let their
decision-making process be open to public scrutiny.
2.95
1.38
.69
(PRC, R)
*RE16. Generally, a judge's deliberation and
4.28
1.64
-0.25
decision-making process is transparent. (JG)
*RE17. Judges' decisions are affected by their
3.23
1.56
.44
political and policy views. (JG, R)
RE18. Judges are more inclined toward accepting
guilty pleas obtained in private meetings instead of
3.36
1.39
.19
in open court. (JG, R)
*RE22. Generally, our current system of
4.00
1.68
-0.23
punishment is transparent. (PRN)
*RE23. Our current system of punishment is
influenced by political interests and media
2.83
1.45
.58
coverage. (PRN, R)
RE24. Punishment is a private and concealed matter
entrusted to experts, instead of public spectacle.
3.94
1.58
-0.43
(PRN, R)
Note. Scale reliability estimates: Guttman’s Lambda 2 = .86, Lambda 3 (!) = .84

Kurtosis

Corrected
item-total
correlation

Multiple
correlation

Squared
multiple
correlation

Alpha if
item
deleted

-1.07

.61

.82

.68

.82

-0.52

.61

.69

.48

.82

-1.18

.62

.77

.60

.82

-0.97

.62

.82

.67

.82

-0.51

.42

.57

.32

.83

.05

.60

.69

.47

.82

-1.01

.60

.73

.54

.82

-0.67

.50

.61

.37

.83

-0.42

.25

.42

.18

.84

-0.97

.67

.79

.62

.81

-0.45

.55

.67

.45

.82

-0.90

-0.04

.39

.15

.86
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Appendix H
Results of six one-factor CFA models
Table H1

One-factor CFA: Efficiency

CC1. Police officers can quickly identify the correct suspect.
(PL)
CC2. If police officers believe a suspect is guilty, then that
suspect probably committed the crime. (PL)
CC3. Informal investigation and interrogation in a police
station are effective in criminal fact findings. (PL)
CC7. Generally, prosecutors handle criminal cases with speed
and efficiency (PRC)
CC8. If a person has been screened as probably guilty by
prosecutors, then he might be the true perpetrator. (PRC)
CC9. Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly holding people
accountable when they commit crimes. (PRC, R)
CC13. Judges lack capacity to ensure swift administration of
justice for crime. (JG, R)
CC14. Judges dispose of criminal cases quickly and
efficiently. (JG)
CC15. When judges are certain about the defendant’s guilt, it
is reasonable to accept a plea of guilty without trial. (JG)
CC19. Our criminal justice process is competent in promptly
carrying out the sentences of the courts. (PRN)
CC20. There are often delays in carrying out sentences.
(PRN, R)
CC21. Our current system of criminal punishment swiftly
punishes people who violate the law. (PRN)

Loadings

Unique
variances

R2

.68***

.54

.46

.57***

.68

.32

.64***

.59

.41

.70***

.51

.50

.38***

.86

.14

.04

.10

.00

.17**

.97

.03

.70***

.51

.49

.31***

.90

.10

.68***

.54

.46

.35***

.88

.12

.59**

.65

.35

Efficiency
Note. All values are standardized.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

1 (fixed)
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Table H2

One-factor CFA: Finality

CC4. Police officers lack capacity to control criminal conduct
that threatens public safety. (PL, R)
CC5. Police officers are competent in apprehending a high
proportion of offenders who commit a crime against the
public order. (PL)
CC6. Generally, police activities are effective in getting as
many criminals as possible punished. (PL)
CC10. The cases that prosecutors pursue include a high
proportion of offenses against the public order. (PRC)
CC11. Generally, prosecutors are too lenient to control crimes
and protect the public. (PRC, R)
CC12. Prosecutors are doing a good job in getting as many
criminals as possible convicted. (PRC)
CC16. Judges enforce rigorous sentencing upon the offenders
who commit crimes against the public safety. (JG)
CC17. Judges are doing a good job in convicting a large
proportion of offenders. (JG)
CC18. Generally, criminal sentences imposed by judges lack
severity to act as a deterrent to potential offenders. (JG, R)
CC22. Criminal punishment is too lenient to deter crimes in
our society. (PRN, R)
CC23. Generally, our current system of punishment is harsh
enough in protecting the public from being victimized by
crime. (PRN)
CC24. Many dangerous criminals are released without being
fully punished for committing crimes. (PRN, R)

Loadings

Unique
variances

R2

.45***

.80

.21

–.16*

.98

.02

.00

1.00

.00

–.13*

.98

.02

.69***

.52

.48

.04

.10

.00

.17**

.97

.03

.07

.10

.01

.69***

.52

.48

.86***

.27

.73

.20**

.96

.04

.58***

.67

.33

Finality
Note. All values are standardized.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

1 (fixed)
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Table H3

One-factor CFA: Fairness

Loadings

Unique
variances

R2

DP1. Generally, police officers treat all different groups of
people in a fair manner. (PL)

.86***

.27

.74

DP2. Police officers treat minority groups unfairly. (PL, R)

.61***

.62

.38

.69***

.53

.48

.72***

.48

.52

.60***

.64

.36

.66***

.56

.44

.70***

.51

.49

.29***

.92

.08

.64***

.60

.40

.80***

.36

.64

.56***

.69

.31

.58***

.66

.34

DP3. Generally, police decisions to search and arrest someone
are unaffected by the suspect’s race and social class. (PL)
DP7. Generally, prosecutors are as fair as possible in handling
cases. (PR)
DP8. In general, prosecutors are impartial in deciding to
charge a suspect with a crime. (PR)
DP9. Prosecutors treat underprivileged groups of people
unfairly. (PR, R)
DP13. Generally, judges treat all different groups of people
with dignity and respect. (JG)
DP14. Judges lack ability to ensure that everyone who comes
to court gets a fair trial. (JG, R)
DP15. Judges are impartial in assessing the arguments of the
parties. (JG)
DP19. Our current system of criminal punishment is just and
fair. (PN)
DP20. The rich receive a lesser sentence than the poor for the
same charge. (PN, R)
DP21. Minority defendants receive unfair criminal
punishments. (PN, R)
Fairness
Note. All values are standardized.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

1 (fixed)
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Table H4

One-factor CFA: Strictness

DP4. Confessions by people in police custody are often
obtained through illegal interrogation techniques. (PL, R)
DP5. Police officers usually arrest people based on legally
sufficient grounds. (PL)
DP6. Police investigation often violates the norms of privacy
protected by the law. (PL, R)
DP10. Prosecutors perform their responsibilities in
accordance with rules of criminal law. (PRC)
DP11. Prosecutors often make legally unjustified decisions on
whether or not to charge an offender. (PRC, R)
DP12. Prosecutors often disregard formal structure of the law
to win a case. (PRC, R)
DP16. Judges are concerned about following constitutional
principles. (JG)
DP17. Judges often ignore the legal rules of procedure and
evidence. (JG, R)
DP18. Judges process cases with consideration for protecting
the procedural due process rights of defendants. (JG)
DP22. Generally, sentencing decisions strictly follow formal
rules of procedure. (PRN)
DP23. Sentencing and punishment follow the structure of
sentencing laws. (PRN)
DP24. Criminal punishment is sometimes arbitrary rather than
representing the rules of criminal law. (PRN, R)

Loadings

Unique
variances

R2

.46***

.79

.21

.67***

.55

.45

.54***

.71

.29

.72***

.48

.52

.46***

.79

.21

.42***

.82

.18

.99***

.56

.44

.74***

.45

.55

.76***

.42

.58

.75***

.44

.56

.60***

.64

.37

.40***

.84

.16

Strictness
Note. All values are standardized.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

1 (fixed)
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Table H5
One-factor CFA: Accuracy

RE1. Generally, police practice is to focus on ascertaining
factual truth by collecting reliable evidence. (PL)
RE2. Most police officers are motivated to accurately identify
and apprehend the true perpetrator. (PL)
RE3. Police officers often investigate cases in a biased way
that compromises the accuracy of fact-findings. (PL, R)
RE7. Generally, prosecutors make charging decisions based
on a reliable account of the criminal event. (PRC)
RE8. Prosecutors generally care more about getting a
conviction than finding the truth. (PRC, R)
RE9. Prosecutors are open to considering evidence that
counters their own view of a case. (PRC)
RE13. Trial judges value precision in fact-finding above all
things. (JG)
RE14. Judges are sensitive to the possibility of error at factfinding. (JG)
RE15. Trial judges often admit testimony obtained through
flawed investigative procedures. (JG, R)
RE19. Criminal punishment is based on an accurate
conviction most of the time. (PRN)
RE20. The innocent are often improperly punished while the
guilty escape from punishment. (PRN, R)
RE21. Criminal punishment is decided upon by an accurate
and complete account of criminal conduct. (PRN)

Loadings

Unique
variances

R2

.71***

.49

.69

.77***

.40

.26

.50***

.75

.64

.74***

.46

.69

.50***

.75

.08

.59***

.66

.20

.43***

.94

.57

.60***

.64

.15

.31***

.91

.02

.81***

.35

.66

.38***

.86

.18

.77***

.41

.03

Accuracy
Note. All values are standardized.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

1 (fixed)
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Table H6
One-factor CFA: Transparency

RE4. Generally, the overall police investigation process is
transparent. (PL)
RE5. Police officers tend to conceal their investigative
mistakes that matter for trial outcome. (PL, R)
RE6. Police officers provide transparency in their recordkeeping practices. (PL)
RE10. Generally, prosecutorial practice and performance are
transparent. (PR)
RE11. Prosecutors would not bring into the open evidence
favorable to the defendant case, even if they found it. (PR, R)
RE12. Prosecutors are reluctant to let their decision-making
process be open to public scrutiny. (PR, R)
RE16. Generally, a judge's deliberation and decision-making
process is transparent. (JG)
RE17. Judges' decisions are affected by their political and
policy views. (JG, R)
RE18. Judges are more inclined toward accepting guilty pleas
obtained in private meetings instead of in open court. (JG, R)
RE22. Generally, our current system of punishment is
transparent. (PN)
RE23. Our current system of punishment is influenced by
political interests and media
coverage. (PN, R)
RE24. Punishment is a private and concealed matter entrusted
to experts, instead of public spectacle. (PN, R)

Loadings

Unique
variances

R2

.83***

.31

.69

.51***

.74

.26

.80***

.36

.64

.83***

.31

.69

.28***

.92

.78

.45***

.80

.20

.75***

.44

.56

.39***

.86

15

.13***

.98

.02

.81***

.34

.66

.43***

.82

.18

–.16***

.98

.03

Transparency
Note. All values are standardized.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

1 (fixed)
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Appendix I
Results of 2-factor EFA
Table I1
Results of 2-factor EFA: Efficiency scale
Efficiency items
CC1. Police officers can quickly identify the correct suspect. (PL)
CC2. If police officers believe a suspect is guilty, then that
suspect probably committed the crime. (PL)
CC3. Informal investigation and interrogation in a police station
are effective in criminal fact findings. (PL)
CC7. Generally, prosecutors handle criminal cases with speed and
efficiency (PRC)
CC8. If a person has been screened as probably guilty by
prosecutors, then he might be the true perpetrator. (PRC)
CC9. Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly holding people
accountable when they commit crimes. (PRC, R)
CC13. Judges lack capacity to ensure swift administration of
justice for crime. (JG, R)
CC14. Judges dispose of criminal cases quickly and efficiently.
(JG)
CC15. When judges are certain about the defendant’s guilt, it is
reasonable to accept a plea of guilty without trial. (JG)
CC19. Our criminal justice process is competent in promptly
carrying out the sentences of the courts. (PRN)
CC20. There are often delays in carrying out sentences. (PRN,
R)
CC21. Our current system of criminal punishment swiftly
punishes people who violate the law. (PRN)
Variance
Proportion
Note. Loadings above .3 are bolded.

F1
.72

F2
-.05

Uniqueness
.50

.68

-.24

.53

.67

-.03

.56

.62

.23

.52

.45

-.18

.79

-.12

.49

.76

-.01

.55

.69

.64

.20

.52

.33

-.02

.89

.55

.43

.45

.20

.45

.73

.53

.20

.65

3.27
.83

1.31
.33

PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded
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Table I2
Results of 2-factor EFA: Finality scale
Finality items
CC4. Police officers lack capacity to control criminal conduct that
threatens public safety. (PL, R)
CC5. Police officers are competent in apprehending a high
proportion of offenders who commit a crime against the public
order. (PL)
CC6. Generally, police activities are effective in getting as many
criminals as possible punished. (PL)
CC10. The cases that prosecutors pursue include a high proportion
of offenses against the public order. (PRC)
CC11. Generally, prosecutors are too lenient to control crimes and
protect the public. (PRC, R)
CC12. Prosecutors are doing a good job in getting as many
criminals as possible convicted. (PRC)
CC16. Judges enforce rigorous sentencing upon the offenders who
commit crimes against the public safety. (JG)
CC17. Judges are doing a good job in convicting a large
proportion of offenders. (JG)
CC18. Generally, criminal sentences imposed by judges lack
severity to act as a deterrent to potential offenders. (JG, R)
CC22. Criminal punishment is too lenient to deter crimes in our
society. (PRN, R)
CC23. Generally, our current system of punishment is harsh
enough in protecting the public from being victimized by crime.
(PRN)
CC24. Many dangerous criminals are released without being fully
punished for committing crimes. (PRN, R)
Variance
Proportion
Note. Loadings above .3 are bolded.
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

F1

F2

Uniqueness

.15

.48

.73

.55

-.16

.68

.65

-.02

.57

.32

-.16

.87

-.13

.69

.51

.75

.03

.43

.50

.15

.73

.78

.05

.39

-.08

.69

.51

.01

.81

.34

.58

.18

.63

.06

.58

.65

2.64
.58

2.29
.51
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Table I3
Results of 2-factor EFA: Fairness scale
Fairness items
DP1. Generally, police officers treat all different groups of people in
a fair manner. (PL)
DP2. Police officers treat minority groups unfairly. (PL, R)
DP3. Generally, police decisions to search and arrest someone are
unaffected by the suspect’s race and social class. (PL)
DP7. Generally, prosecutors are as fair as possible in handling cases.
(PRC)
DP8. In general, prosecutors are impartial in deciding to charge a
suspect with a crime. (PRC)
DP9. Prosecutors treat underprivileged groups of people unfairly.
(PRC, R)
DP13. Generally, judges treat all different groups of people with
dignity and respect. (JG)
DP14. Judges lack ability to ensure that everyone who comes to court
gets a fair trial. (JG, R)
DP15. Judges are impartial in assessing the arguments of the parties.
(JG)
DP19. Our current system of criminal punishment is just and fair.
(PRN)
DP20. The rich receive a lesser sentence than the poor for the same
charge. (PRN, R)
DP21. Minority defendants receive unfair criminal punishments.
(PRN, R)
Variance
Proportion
Note. Loadings above .3 are bolded.
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

F1

F2

Uniqueness

.60

.34

.29

-.09

.87

.33

.36

.40

.54

.79

-.01

.39

.68

-.04

.57

.08

.74

.38

.69

.07

.46

.22

.14

.90

.83

-.15

.43

.71

.15

.35

.08

.60

.58

-.02

.77

.43

4.59
.74

4.10
.66
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Table I4
Results of 2-factor EFA: Strictness scale
Strictness items
DP4. Confessions by people in police custody are often obtained
through illegal interrogation techniques. (PL, R)
DP5. Police officers usually arrest people based on legally sufficient
grounds. (PL)
DP6. Police investigation often violates the norms of privacy
protected by the law. (PL, R)
DP10. Prosecutors perform their responsibilities in accordance with
rules of criminal law. (PRC)
DP 1. Prosecutors often make legally unjustified decisions on
whether or not to charge an offender. (PRC, R)
DP12. Prosecutors often disregard formal structure of the law to win
a case. (PRC, R)
DP16. Judges are concerned about following constitutional
principles. (JG)
DP17. Judges often ignore the legal rules of procedure and evidence.
(JG, R)
DP18. Judges process cases with consideration for protecting the
procedural due process rights of defendants. (JG)
DP22. Generally, sentencing decisions strictly follow formal rules of
procedure. (PRN)
DP23. Sentencing and punishment follow the structure of sentencing
laws. (PRN)
DP24. Criminal punishment is sometimes arbitrary rather than
representing the rules of criminal law. (PRN, R)
Variance
Proportion
Note. Loadings above .3 are bolded.
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

F1

F2

Uniqueness

.05

.62

.58

.61

.11

.54

.09

.69

.46

.67

.09

.48

-.02

.73

.48

.01

.63

.59

.68

-.01

.54

.68

.10

.46

.84

-.08

.35

.72

.05

.44

.70

-.12

.57

-.05

.67

.58

4.18
.76

3.27
.59
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Table I5
Results of 2-factor EFA: Accuracy scale
Accuracy items
RE1. Generally, police practice is to focus on ascertaining factual
truth by collecting reliable evidence. (PL)
RE2. Most police officers are motivated to accurately identify and
apprehend the true perpetrator. (PL)
RE3. Police officers often investigate cases in a biased way that
compromises the accuracy of fact-findings. (PL, R)
RE7. Generally, prosecutors make charging decisions based on a
reliable account of the criminal event. (PRC)
RE8. Prosecutors generally care more about getting a conviction than
finding the truth. (PRC, R)
RE9. Prosecutors are open to considering evidence that counters their
own view of a case. (PRC)
RE13. Trial judges value precision in fact-finding above all things.
(JG)
RE14. Judges are sensitive to the possibility of error at fact-finding.
(JG)
RE15. Trial judges often admit testimony obtained through flawed
investigative procedures. (JG, R)
RE19. Criminal punishment is based on an accurate conviction most
of the time. (PRN)
RE20. The innocent are often improperly punished while the guilty
escape from punishment. (PRN, R)
RE21. Criminal punishment is decided upon by an accurate and
complete account of criminal conduct. (PRN)
Variance
Proportion
Note. Loadings above .3 are bolded.
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

F1

F2

Uniqueness

.73

-.02

.48

.73

.08

.41

.19

.55

.57

.74

-.01

.45

.154

.64

.49

.64

-.06

.62

-.03

.47

.79

.61

.01

.63

-.08

.65

.62

.77

.06

.36

-.03

.70

.53

.76

.02

.40

4.18
.72

2.76
.54
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Table I6
Results of 2-factor EFA: Transparency scale
Transparency items
RE4. Generally, the overall police investigation process is
transparent. (PL)
RE5. Police officers tend to conceal their investigative mistakes that
matter for trial outcome. (PL, R)
RE6. Police officers provide transparency in their record-keeping
practices. (PL)
RE10. Generally, prosecutorial practice and performance are
transparent. (PRC)
RE11. Prosecutors would not bring into the open evidence favorable
to the defendant case, even if they found it. (PRC, R)
RE12. Prosecutors are reluctant to let their decision-making process
be open to public scrutiny. (PRC, R)
RE16. Generally, a judge's deliberation and decision-making process
is transparent. (JG)
RE17. Judges' decisions are affected by their political and policy
views. (JG, R)
RE18. Judges are more inclined toward accepting guilty pleas
obtained in private meetings instead of in open court. (JG, R)
RE22. Generally, our current system of punishment is transparent.
(PRN)
RE23. Our current system of punishment is influenced by political
interests and media
coverage. (PRN, R)
RE24. Punishment is a private and concealed matter entrusted to
experts, instead of public spectacle. (PRN, R)
Variance
Proportion
Note. Loadings above .3 are bolded.
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, R= reverse coded

F1

F2

Uniqueness

.84

.04

.28

.26

.61

.50

.77

.12

.36

.83

.05

.29

-.00

.59

.65

.16

.67

.47

.71

.13

.44

.14

.56

.63

-.08

.45

.80

.74

.18

.35

.15

.64

.52

-.31

.30

.86

3.7
.67

2.7
.50

Appendix J
Impacts of inattentive respondents (Study 1)
Table J1
Summary of fit statistics of final CFA models: Before and after including inattentive participants

c2

df

c2/df

p

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

correlation
residuals min
~ max

% correlation
residuals > .01

N = 304

9.59

16

.60

.887

1.00

.00

.02

–.06 ~ .03

.44

N = 342

13.624

16

.85

.627

1.000

.00

.02

–.07 ~ .04

.40

N = 304

15.39

15

1.02

.42

.998

.01

.03

–.06 ~ .07

.64

N = 342

17.01

15

1.13

.32

.997

.02

.03

–.07 ~ .06

.71

N = 304

7.97

15

.53

.925

1.00

.00

.01

–.03 ~ .04

.36

N = 342

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

–.06 ~ .07

.47

N = 304

39.67

36

1.10

.31

1.00

.02

.02

–.05 ~ .09

.52

N = 342

47.80

36

1.33

.20

1.00

.02

.02

–.05 ~ .08

.64

N = 304

35.02

26

1.35

.111

.99

.03

.03

–.05 ~ .06

.76

N = 342

35.65

26

1.37

.053

.99

.04

.03

–.05 ~ .06

.71

N = 304

33.61

27

1.24

.178

.99

.03

.03

–.05 ~ .08

.71

N = 342

42.05

28

1.50

.033

.99

.04

.03

–.07 ~ .08

.73

Issues after including
inattentive participants

Efficiency

Finality
Neg unique variance
estimate (heywood)

Fairness
Non-convergence problem

Strictness

Accuracy

Transparency
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Table J2
Scale score statistics and reliability estimates: Before and after including inattentive participants
M

SD

Possible
Min~Max

Min~
Max

Skewness

Kurtosis

Inter-item
correlation

L2

L3
(α)

N = 304

39.57

8.95

7~70

12~66

–.35

.30

.267

.801

.784

N = 342

40.07

8.86

7~70

12~66

–.41

.30

.258

.797

.776

N = 304

34.96

6.82

7~56

8~55

–.30

1.00

.256

.740

.718

N = 342

35.06

6.63

7~56

8~55

–.27

1.11

.237

.724

.694

N = 304

44.98

13.55

7~84

12~83

–.18

.14

.415

.900

.894

N = 342

45.44

13.40

7~84

12~83

–.27

–.32

.400

.895

.889

N = 304

52.12

11.20

7~84

14~84

–.22

.53

.369

.878

.873

N = 342

52.24

11.02

7~84

14~84

–.27

.66

.352

.871

.865

N = 304

41.56

10.00

7~70

14~70

–.45

.19

.389

.870

.863

N = 342

41.77

9.93

7~70

14~70

–.53

.28

.381

.866

.860

N = 304

34.88

10.70

7~70

10~67

–.18

.14

.403

.882

.873

N = 342

35.42

10.69

7~70

10~67

–.21

.13

.395

.880

.869

N = 304

248.09

52.69

7~434

–.32

.46

.297

.966

.963

N = 342

250.02

52.16

7~434

–.37

.53

.289

.965

.961

Efficiency

Finality

Fairness

Strictness

Accuracy

Transparency

Total
93~41
3
93~41
3
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Appendix K
Cooperative behavior
Assistance
Read seven items below carefully and using the 1-4 scale below, indicate how you personally feel about each item
by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item (4 = very likely, 3 = somewhat likely, 2 = not too
likely, and 1 = not likely at all). Please be open and honest in your responding.
1

2

3

4

Not likely at
all

Not too likely

Somewhat
likely

Very likely

If the situation arose, how likely you would be to
(1) help the police by reporting crime and criminals
(2) help the police to find a someone suspected of a crime
(3) help the police by reporting a dangerous or suspicious activity
(4) participate in crime-prevention program sponsored by the prosecutor’s office to help them
address problems in neighborhood (e.g., prostitution, panhandling, drinking, trespassing)
(5) help the prosecutor’s office to investigate the criminal cases
(6) help the courts by standing as witness to testify facts you know about the case
(7) help the courts by serving as a juror in a criminal legal trial.
Compliance
Read seven items below carefully and using the 1-5 scale below, indicate the degree to which each item describes
yourself by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item – 5 = all of the time, 4 = almost all of the
time, 3 = most of the time, 2 = some of the time, and 1 = none of the time. Please be open and honest in your
responding.
1

2

3

4

5

None of the
time

Some of the
time

Most of the
time

Almost all of
the time

All the time

How frequently you follow rules concerning:
(1) where you could legally park your car
(2) how to dispose of trash and litter
(3) making too much noise at night
(4) speeding or breaking other traffic laws
(5) buying possibly stolen items on the street
(6) not taking inexpensive items from stores
(7) using illegal drugs such as marijuana
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Appendix L
Criminal trial scenario

Initial instruction
Read the following description of criminal trial in which the defendant is accused of taking cash from the company
safe. This task is to examine general patterns of verdict decisions by potential jurors for criminal trials. Evaluate the
case after reading the description of the case with arguments presented by company’s lawyer as well as those
presented by the defendant’s lawyer. Please read carefully the following description of the case and evidence.
Take as much time to do this as you deem necessary.
Facts
Hans H. is thirty-four years old. He lives with his wife and two children. Hans works for a large construction firm.
After having worked as a foreman for more than two years, he complained to his superior that the job was
contributing to his back trouble. His boss then assigned Hans to a position as a construction manager in the
company’s administration offices. Hans’ task was to supervise the progress made on the various building projects
and to coordinate the different groups.
At the end of each day, the company’s accountant places all the company cash in the safe. This safe is located at the
rear of the account’s office. The safe is also used to store other sensitive documents, including bids and project
reports.
The company recently purchased a new safe Apart from the accountant and her assistant, the construction managers,
sales managers, and managers also have access to the safe. All in all, eight people, including Hans, can access the
safe. The safe has a time mechanism that records when the safe is opened and closed. One morning, the accountant
noticed that $ 6,300 in cash was missing. The time mechanism showed that the safe had last been opened at 7:14 pm
the previous evening. After an investigation by a private detective, the firm instituted criminal proceedings against
Hans H.
* You will now be given the arguments presented by the company’s lawyer as well as those presented by Hans’
lawyer. In light of these arguments, you will be asked to evaluate evidence in the case.

Synopsis of evidence: Prosecution and defense arguments
(P= prosecution arguments; D= defense arguments)
1. Frequency of certain type of car: A CCTV camera, installed at the entrance of the office building, shows a car
rapidly leaving a parking space in front of the building at 19:17 pm on the evening in question. However, the picture
was out of focus and the detective was unable to read the license plate. The video shows a white XY car. The make
of Hans H.’s car is XY, it is white, and he was seen driving it to work that morning. According to the detective, 6 %
of all cars in the area are white XY cars.
P 1. That only 6 % of cars in the area are white XY cars makes it likely that it was Hans who was filmed leaving the
parking lot.
D 1. Since a high percent (6%) of cars in the area are white XY cars, it is less likely that it was Hans who was filmed
leaving the parking lot. The detective was even unable to read the license plate.
2. The defendant’s pay-off bank loan: The detective also found out that Hans paid off a bank loan of $ 5,800 one
day after the money had disappeared. The debts had accumulated in the last three months, and the bank had already
threatened to take legal action. Hans testified that he took out the loan to help his sister-in-law, who runs a flower
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shop in Aachen. She returned the money in cash and he used it to pay back the loan. Hans explained that he couldn’t
prove this cash transfer with receipts since larger financial transactions in the floral business are sometimes
conducted in cash.
P 2. It is no coincidence that Hans paid back his loan exactly one day after the burglary. He paid off his debts with
the money he had stolen from the company safe. It is doubtful that larger financial transactions in the floral business
are conducted in cash.
D 2. Hans paid back his debts with the money he received from his sister-in-law. In the floral business, larger
financial transactions are indeed sometimes conducted in cash.
3. The defendant was seen soon after the crime in a place far away from the site of crime: Silvia, the company
manager, testified that she saw Hans at 8 pm on the evening in question when they both picked up their children
from an event at school. Hans was wearing elegant trousers and a jacket he had not worn at work. Silvia testified
that it takes between forty-five and fifty minutes at that time of day to get from the office to the school at the other
end of town.
P 3. Hans could have driven fast in order to be at the school by 8 pm. No matter how heavy the traffic, if one drives
aggressively enough, it is possible to shorten the journey time by a significant margin.
D 3. It was virtually impossible for Hans to drive from the office to the school, change his clothes on the way and
still be there by 8 pm. In evening rush hour traffic, it is extremely difficult to shorten one’s journey time even if one
drives aggressively.
4. The defendant’s recent conflict with his boss: A few months before the incident, Hans had been summoned by
his boss to discuss the payment of certain expenses claimed by Hans. The boss reproved Hans for claiming expenses
without justification. Hans argued that other construction managers had been claiming the same expenses and that
the boss was therefore challenging him unjustly. His boss disagreed and refused to reimburse the costs. He also
made clear to Hans that a promotion he had already been promised would fall through on account of these events.
Hans was deeply hurt by this incident. In the following weeks, he was frequently seen working late at the office.
P 4. Hans was angry about the sanctions imposed on him by his boss. Stealing the money from the safe was a way to
take revenge on the company. In general, one can assume that people who feel they have been unjustly treated have
the motive to do mean things.
D 4. Hans did not want to take revenge on the company for his unfair treatment; instead, he tried to work even
harder to prove himself to his boss. In general, one can assume that people who feel unjustly criticized in their work
tend to work harder in order to prove themselves.
5. Evidence on eyewitness-- strength of evidence has been manipulated
A technician who had been called to repair the photocopier testified that he had seen someone leave the accounts
office in great haste at about 7:15 pm. When questioned by the detective, the technician identified Hans as the
person he had seen.
In strong evidence condition:
P se. The eyewitness identification has been done one day after the incident, through a live line-up in which the
witness (technician) viewed personally six suspects including the defendant. The technician picked out the defendant
as the man who left the accounts office and when asked how sure he was about this, he said he was “at least 95%”
certain in his identification. He explained that he had seen Hans several times before in the office.
D se. We cannot assume that people correctly identify other people, even though they have seen them before. At
night time, it might be too dark to discern people accurately.
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In weak evidence condition:
P we. The eyewitness identification has been done through a photographic lineup in which the witness (technician)
viewed photos of six suspects including the defendant. The technician picked out the defendant as the man who left
the accounts office. He explained that he had seen Hans once or twice before in the office.
D we. The eyewitness identification has been done through a photographic lineup which might be less accurate
compared to live lineups. This identification was conducted a week after the incident, which makes it hard to believe
that the witness made correct identification. Moreover, when asked how sure he was about his identification, the
technician said he is only 65% certain due to that he had seen Hans only a few times in the office.
Judicial instruction
“The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
government’s proof must be more powerful than clear and convincing evidence, which must be persuasive enough
to cause you to believe it. The government’s proof in this case must be beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt’ is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. There are very few things in
this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes
every possible doubt. If you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must return a
verdict of guilty. If on the other hand you think there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant is not guilty, you
must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict of not guilty.”
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Appendix M
Importance and reliability of evidence (pilot)
Table M1
Mean ratings of importance of evidence
Evidence

P1. That only 6 % of cars in the area are white XY cars makes it likely that
the defendant actually committed the crime.
D1. Since a high 6 % of cars in the area are white XY cars, it is less likely
that it was the defendant who was filmed leaving the parking lot.
P2. He paid off his debts with the money he had stolen from the company
safe. It is doubtful that larger financial transactions in the floral business are
conducted in cash.
D2. The defendant paid back his debts with the money he received from his
sister-in-law. In the floral business, larger financial transactions are indeed
sometimes conducted in cash.
P3. The defendant could have driven fast in order to be at the school by 8
pm. No matter how heavy the traffic, if one drives aggressively enough, it is
possible to shorten the journey time.
D3. It was virtually impossible for the defendant to drive from the office to
the school by 8 pm. In evening rush hour traffic, it is extremely difficult to
shorten one’s journey time even if one drives aggressively.
P4. The defendant was angry about the sanctions unjustly imposed on him by
his boss. In this regard, he can have the motive to do mean things.
D4. The defendant did not want to take revenge on the company for his
unfair treatment. In general, one can assume that people who feel unjustly
criticized in their work tend to work harder in order to prove themselves.
PSE. The eyewitness identification has been done one day after the incident,
through a live line-up in which the witness viewed personally six suspects
including the defendant. The witness picked out the defendant with 95% of
confidence in his identification.
DSE. We cannot assume that people correctly identify other people, even
though they have seen them before. At night time, it might be too dark to
discern people accurately.
PWE. The witness viewed photos of six suspects and picked out the photo of
defendant. He explained that he had seen Hans once or twice before in the
office.
DWE. The eyewitness identification has been done a week after the incident
and through a photographic lineup which might be less accurate compared to
live lineups. The witness said he is only 65% certain in his identification due
to that he had seen the defendant only a few times in the office.

M

SD

N

46.50

29.77

304

49.10

28.02

304

57.87

25.92

304

52.74

24.57

304

46.23

28.36

304

63.59

25.39

304

43.82

27.82

304

46.12

26.34

304

65.56

27.66

152

54.46

26.73

152

57.01

28.15

152

65.10

22.36

152

Note. P = Prosecution, D = Defense, PSE = Prosecution in strong evidence condition, PWE = Prosecution in weak
evidence condition, DSE = Defense in strong evidence condition, DWE = Defense in weak evidence condition
Some of the Ns are 152 which is the number of participants assigned to only one of two conditions of evidence
(strong or weak evidence).
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Table M2
Mean ratings of reliability of evidence
Evidence

P1. That only 6 % of cars in the area are white XY cars makes it likely that
the defendant actually committed the crime.
D1. Since a high 6 % of cars in the area are white XY cars, it is less likely
that it was the defendant who was filmed leaving the parking lot.
P2. He paid off his debts with the money he had stolen from the company
safe. It is doubtful that larger financial transactions in the floral business are
conducted in cash.
D2. The defendant paid back his debts with the money he received from his
sister-in-law. In the floral business, larger financial transactions are indeed
sometimes conducted in cash.
P3. The defendant could have driven fast in order to be at the school by 8
pm. No matter how heavy the traffic, if one drives aggressively enough, it is
possible to shorten the journey time.
D3. It was virtually impossible for the defendant to drive from the office to
the school by 8 pm. In evening rush hour traffic, it is extremely difficult to
shorten one’s journey time even if one drives aggressively.
P4. The defendant was angry about the sanctions unjustly imposed on him by
his boss. In this regard, he can have the motive to do mean things.
D4. The defendant did not want to take revenge on the company for his
unfair treatment. In general, one can assume that people who feel unjustly
criticized in their work tend to work harder in order to prove themselves.
PSE. The eyewitness identification has been done one day after the incident,
through a live line-up in which the witness viewed personally six suspects
including the defendant. The witness picked out the defendant with 95% of
confidence in his identification.
DSE. We cannot assume that people correctly identify other people, even
though they have seen them before. At night time, it might be too dark to
discern people accurately.
PWE. The witness viewed photos of six suspects and picked out the photo of
defendant. He explained that he had seen Hans once or twice before in the
office.
DWE. The eyewitness identification has been done a week after the incident
and through a photographic lineup which might be less accurate compared to
live lineups. The witness said he is only 65% certain in his identification due
to that he had seen the defendant only a few times in the office.

M

SD

N

49.32

28.41

304

47.93

27.05

304

56.18

25.62

304

49.29

22.98

304

43.46

26.52

304

63.67

22.10

304

43.35

26.46

304

46.88

24.17

304

65.30

25.30

152

54.51

24.81

152

56.49

26.47

152

62.49

20.76

152

Note. P = Prosecution, D = Defense, PSE = Prosecution in strong evidence condition, PWE = Prosecution in weak
evidence condition, DSE = Defense in strong evidence condition, DWE = Defense in weak evidence condition
Some of the Ns are 152 which is the number of participants assigned to only one of two conditions of evidence
(strong or weak evidence).
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Appendix N
Verdict preference/judgment & Memory check

1) Probability of commission (PC):
“Given your prior beliefs and the evidence, what is the probability that the defendant in the trial actually committed
the crime that he is charged with?” Please respond on a percentage term – between 0% and 100%.
(

%)

2) Reasonable doubt (RD):
“At least to what extent, would you need to be certain that the defendant has committed crime, for conviction?”
Please respond on a percentage term – between 0% and 100%.
- “The defendant should be found guilty if there is at least a (

%) of chance that he committed the crime.”

3) Verdict:
“What is your verdict for the defendant?”
Guilty or Not guilty

4) Confidence in the verdict:
“How confident are you that your verdict is correct?” Please respond on a percentage term – between 0% and 100%.
(

%)

199
Memory check

(1) The prosecution argued that there is a high chance that Hans committed the crime given that the CCTV
camera showed the license plate of Hans’s car. (True or False) False
(2) The prosecution argued that Hans paid back his loan with the money he had stolen from the company’s
safe. (True or False) True
(3) The defense argued that it is less likely that it was Hans who was filmed leaving the parking lot, given that
a high percent (6 %) of cars in the area are white XY cars. (True or False) True
(4) The prosecution argued that Hans drove aggressively to be at the school by 8pm. (True or False) True
(5) The defense argued that, in the floral business, larger financial transactions are indeed sometimes conducted
in cash. (True or False) True
(6) The prosecution argued that Hans might wanted to revenge on the company by stealing the money from
the safe. (True or False) True
(7) The defense argued that Hans changed his clothes at the office and then drove to school. (True or False)
False
(8) The defense argued that Hans tried to work even harder even after he was treated unjustly from his boss.
(True or False) True
(9) The prosecution argued that given that Hans has a prior conviction history, he probably committed a crime
again. (True or False) False
(10) The prosecution argued that the witness (technician) expressed 100% confidence in his identification.
(True or False) False
(11) The defense argued that Hans tried to work hard because he had a criminal record. (True or False) False
(12) The defense argued that it is hard to assume that the witness made a correct identification. (True or False)
True

Appendix O
Factor structures (study 2 data)
Table O1
Results of original model fitted to study 2 data: Efficiency (n = 433)
Loadings
Police
CC1. Police officers can quickly identify the
correct suspect. (PL)
CC2. If police officers believe a suspect is
guilty, then that suspect probably committed the
crime. (PL)
CC3. Informal investigation and interrogation in
a police station are effective in criminal fact
findings. (PL)
CC7. Generally, prosecutors handle criminal
cases with speed and efficiency (PRC)
CC9. Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly
holding people accountable when they commit
crimes. (PRC, R)
CC13. Judges lack capacity to ensure swift
administration of justice for crime. (JG, R)
CC14. Judges dispose of criminal cases
quickly and efficiently. (JG)
CC19. Our criminal justice process is competent
in promptly carrying out the sentences of the
courts. (PRN)
CC20. There are often delays in carrying out
sentences. (PRN, R)
CC21. Our current system of criminal
punishment swiftly punishes people who violate
the law. (PRN)

Prosecutor

Judge

Prison

Forward

Unique
variances

R2

Backward

.64

.56

.27

.41

.49

.43

.58

.24

.53

.47

.50

.28

.80

.02

.34

.36

.83

.04

1.11

–.23

-

.74

.46

-

.06

.12

.88

.95

.04

.57

.34

.58
.19
.00
.00
.94
.20
.58

.11
.30

Covariances

200

Police * Prosecutor

–.09

Police * Judge

–57.89

Police * Prison

.08

Prosecutor * Judge

–34.58

Prosecutor * Prison

.79

Judge * Prison

431.29

Forward*Backward

.11

e.CC2 *e.CC14

.18

e.CC2*e.CC20
.03
Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
P values were not obtained due to the convergence failure.
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Table O2
Results of adjusted model fitted to study 2 data: Efficiency (n = 433)
Loadings
CC1. Police officers can quickly identify the correct
suspect. (PL)
CC2. If police officers believe a suspect is guilty, then
that suspect probably committed the crime. (PL)
CC3. Informal investigation and interrogation in a police
station are effective in criminal fact findings. (PL)
CC7. Generally, prosecutors handle criminal cases with
speed and efficiency (PRC)
CC9. Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly holding
people accountable when they commit crimes. (PRC, R)
CC13. Judges lack capacity to ensure swift
administration of justice for crime. (JG, R)
CC14. Judges dispose of criminal cases quickly and
efficiently. (JG)
CC19. Our criminal justice process is competent in
promptly carrying out the sentences of the courts. (PRN)
CC20. There are often delays in carrying out sentences.
(PRN, R)
CC21. Our current system of criminal punishment
swiftly punishes people who violate the law. (PRN)

Unique
variances

R2

Efficiency

Forward

Backward

.62**

.55*

.32

.38

.41

.56**

.52

.17

.50*

.51**

.49

.25

.65***

.05

.58

.42

.19

.70***

.47

.04

.20*

.51***

.70

.04

.67

.32

.43

.55

.93

.05

.42

.58

.57***

.12

.74***

.15

.13*

.23***
.76***

.02

Covariances
Forward*Backward

–.36*

e.CC9 *e.CC14

–.24*

e.CC7 *e.CC14

.44***

e.CC9 *e.CC21

–.24**
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Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table O3
Results of adjusted model fitted to study 1 data: Efficiency (n = 304)
Loadings
CC1. Police officers can quickly identify the correct
suspect. (PL)
CC2. If police officers believe a suspect is guilty, then
that suspect probably committed the crime. (PL)
CC3. Informal investigation and interrogation in a police
station are effective in criminal fact findings. (PL)
CC7. Generally, prosecutors handle criminal cases with
speed and efficiency (PRC)
CC9. Prosecutors are incompetent in swiftly holding
people accountable when they commit crimes. (PRC, R)
CC13. Judges lack capacity to ensure swift
administration of justice for crime. (JG, R)
CC14. Judges dispose of criminal cases quickly and
efficiently. (JG)
CC19. Our criminal justice process is competent in
promptly carrying out the sentences of the courts. (PRN)
CC20. There are often delays in carrying out sentences.
(PRN, R)
CC21. Our current system of criminal punishment
swiftly punishes people who violate the law. (PRN)

Unique
variances

R2

Efficiency

Forward

Backward

.30**

.66***

.47

.09

.09

.74***

.44

.01

.32**

.61***

.53

.10

.52***

.44***

.54

.27

.27**

.65***

.50

.07

.37***

.46**

.64

.14

.59

.25

.35

.58

.70

.30

.66

.22

.50***

.40***

.76***

.28*

.07

.55***
.47***

.34***

Covariances
Forward*Backward

–.28*

e.CC9 *e.CC14

–.15

e.CC7 *e.CC14

.21*

e.CC14 *e.CC21

.27***
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Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table O4
Results of original model fitted to study 2 data: Finality (n = 433)
Unique
variances

R2

0 (fixed)

-

.67***

.43

.12

.83***

.32

-

.68***

.54

-

.69***

.52

-

.31

.64

.75

.11

.60

.31

Loadings
Sanction
CC4. Police officers lack capacity to control criminal conduct that
threatens public safety. (PL, R)
CC5. Police officers are competent in apprehending a high
proportion of offenders who commit a crime against the public
order. (PL)
CC6. Generally, police activities are effective in getting as many
criminals as possible punished. (PL)
CC12. Prosecutors are doing a good job in getting as many
criminals as possible convicted. (PRC)
CC17. Judges are doing a good job in convicting a large
proportion of offenders. (JG)
CC22. Criminal punishment is too lenient to deter crimes in our
society. (PRN, R)
CC23. Generally, our current system of punishment is harsh
enough in protecting the public from being victimized by crime.
(PRN)
CC24. Many dangerous criminals are released without being fully
punished for committing crimes. (PRN, R)

Forward

Backward
1.00***

–.35***

.80***

.22***

.337***

.38***

.56***

.29***

Covariances
Forward*Backward

.13**

e.CC22 *e.CC6

–.55***

e.CC24 *e.CC17

–.26***

e.CC22 *e.CC17

–.50***

e.CC22 *e.CC12

–.32***

e.CC6*e.CC17

–.33**
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Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table O5
Results of original model fitted to study 2 data: Fairness (n = 433)
Unique
variances

R2

.42

.37

0 (fixed)

.99

.45**

.58

.22

.40***

.60***

..48

.16

.22**

.70***

.47

.05

.16

.83

-

-

-

-

-

-

.22

.28

.61

.28

.27

.72

Loadings
Police
DP1. Generally, police officers treat all different
groups of people in a fair manner. (PL)
DP2. Police officers treat minority groups
unfairly. (PL, R)
DP3. Generally, police decisions to search and
arrest someone are unaffected by the suspect’s
race and social class. (PL)
DP7. Generally, prosecutors are as fair as
possible in handling cases. (PRC)
DP8. In general, prosecutors are impartial in
deciding to charge a suspect with a crime. (PRC)
DP9. Prosecutors treat underprivileged groups of
people unfairly. (PRC, R)
DP13. Generally, judges treat all different groups
of people with dignity and respect. (JG)
DP14. Judges lack ability to ensure that everyone
who comes to court gets a fair trial. (JG, R)
DP15. Judges are impartial in assessing the
arguments of the parties. (JG)
DP19. Our current system of criminal
punishment is just and fair. (PRN)
DP20. The rich receive a lesser sentence than the
poor for the same charge. (PRN, R)
DP21. Minority defendants receive unfair
criminal punishments. (PRN, R)

Prosecut
or

Prison

.61***

Forwar
d

Backwar
d

.47***

.99***

.17

.47***

.91***

–.06

.53***
.53***
.85***

.71***
–.34*
–.14

Covariances
Police * Prosecutor

.87***

Police * Prison

.95***
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Prosecutor * Prison

.96***

Forward*Backward

–.34*

e.DP1*e.DP3

.43***

e.DP8*e.DP19

–.41**

Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table O6
Results of original model fitted to study 2 data: Strictness (n = 433)

Loadings
Police
DP4. Confessions by people in police custody are often
obtained through illegal interrogation techniques. (PL, R)
DP5. Police officers usually arrest people based on legally
sufficient grounds. (PL)
DP6. Police investigation often violates the norms of
privacy protected by the law. (PL, R)
DP10. Prosecutors perform their responsibilities in
accordance with rules of criminal law. (PRC)
DP11. Prosecutors often make legally unjustified decisions
on whether or not to charge an offender. (PRC, R)
DP12. Prosecutors often disregard formal structure of the
law to win a case. (PRC, R)
DP16. Judges are concerned about following constitutional
principles. (JG)
DP17. Judges often ignore the legal rules of procedure and
evidence. (JG, R)
DP18. Judges process cases with consideration for
protecting the procedural due process rights of defendants.
(JG)
DP22. Generally, sentencing decisions strictly follow
formal rules of procedure. (PRN)
DP23. Sentencing and punishment follow the structure of
sentencing laws. (PRN)
DP24. Criminal punishment is sometimes arbitrary rather
than representing the rules of criminal law. (PRN, R)

Non-police

Forward

.38***
–.27

.52***

.52***
.72***

R2

.50

.14

.32

.61

.46

.27

.41

.52

Backward
.60***

.78***

Unique
variances

–.26

.32***

.68***

.44

.10

.38***

.70***

.37

.14

.46

.28

.49

.17

.54***

–.50*

.41***

.59***

.66***

–.40

.41

.44

.74***

–.02

.46

.55

.83***

.02

.31

.69

.59

.08

.28**

.57***

Covariances
Police * Non-police

.75***

Forward*Backward

–.37*
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e.DP5 *e.DP17

–.22**

Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, Forward = non-reverse coded, Backward = reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table O7
Results of original model fitted to study 2 data: Accuracy (n = 433)

Loadings
Nonpolice

Police
RE1. Generally, police practice is to focus on ascertaining factual
truth by collecting reliable evidence. (PL)
RE2. Most police officers are motivated to accurately identify and
apprehend the true perpetrator. (PL)
RE3. Police officers often investigate cases in a biased way that
compromises the accuracy of fact-findings. (PL, R)
RE7. Generally, prosecutors make charging decisions based on a
reliable account of the criminal event. (PRC)
RE8. Prosecutors generally care more about getting a conviction
than finding the truth. (PRC, R)
RE9. Prosecutors are open to considering evidence that counters
their own view of a case. (PRC)
RE13. Trial judges value precision in fact-finding above all
things. (JG)
RE14. Judges are sensitive to the possibility of error at factfinding. (JG)
RE19. Criminal punishment is based on an accurate conviction
most of the time. (PRN)
RE21. Criminal punishment is decided upon by an accurate and
complete account of criminal conduct. (PRN)

Unique
variances

R2

Forward

.44***

.61***

.43

.19

.51***

.61***

.37

.26

.46

.55

.44

.29

.73

.27

.74***
.54***

.53***

.52***
.43***

.46***

.60

.18

.45***

.60***

.44

.20

.30***

.55***

.61

.09

.57***

.52***

.40

.32

.61***

.56***

.32

.37

Covariances
Police*Non-police

.79***

e.RE2*e.RE19

.20**

e.RE14*e.RE19

–.16**
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Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, Forward = non-reverse coded Results of final model for transparency scale

R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table O8
Results of original model fitted to study 2 data: Transparency (n = 433)

Loadings
Police &
Prosecutor
RE4. Generally, the overall police investigation process is
transparent. (PL)
RE5. Police officers tend to conceal their investigative mistakes
that matter for trial outcome. (PL, R)
RE6. Police officers provide transparency in their record-keeping
practices. (PL)
RE10. Generally, prosecutorial practice and performance are
transparent. (PRC)
RE11. Prosecutors would not bring into the open evidence
favorable to the defendant case, even if they found it. (PRC, R)
RE12. Prosecutors are reluctant to let their decision-making
process be open to public scrutiny. (PRC, R)
RE16. Generally, a judge's deliberation and decision-making
process is transparent. (JG)
RE17. Judges' decisions are affected by their political and policy
views. (JG, R)
RE22. Generally, our current system of punishment is
transparent. (PRN)
RE23. Our current system of punishment is influenced by
political interests and media
coverage. (PRN, R)

Judge &
Prison

.46***

Unique
variances

R2

.39

.21

.34

.66

Forward
.63***

.81***
.55***

.51***

.43

.30

.46***

.76***

.21

.21

.47***

.78

.22

.65***

.58

.42

.45

.25

.61

.36

.24

.27

.67

.32

.50***

.55***

.60***
.52***
.57***

.71***

Covariances
Police & Prosecutor *Judge & Prison

.96***

e.RE4 *e.RE6

.41***

e.RE17 *e.RE23

.29***

e.RE5 *e.RE12

–.37***
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e.RE6 *e.RE11

–.13**

Note. All values are standardized.
R denotes reverse coded
PL= Police, PRC= Prosecutor, JG= Judge, PRN= Prison, Forward = non-reverse coded
R2 values are limited to the substantive (non-method) factors
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Appendix P
Results before and after including inattentive respondents (Study 2)
Table P1
Path model predicting cooperative behavior: assistance and compliance before and after including inattentive participants
Attentive participants only (N= 433)
Assistance

Include inattentive participants (N = 498)

Compliance

Assistance

Compliance

b (s.e.)

p

b

b (s.e.)

p

b

b (s.e.)

p

b

b (s.e.)

p

b

Efficiency

.00 (.04)

.965

.00

–.10 (.05)

.040

–.15

.00 (.04)

.990

.00

–11 (.05)

.024

–.15

Finality

–.10 (.04)

.016

–.13

–.03 (.06)

.569

–.03

–.09 (.04)

.028

–11

–.01 (.06)

.897

–.01

Fairness

.05 (.03)

.071

.16

–.05 (.04)

.186

–.13

.06 (.03)

.051

.16

–.06 (.04)

.162

–.12

Strictness

.04 (.03)

.190

.10

.27 (.04)

.000

.53

.06 (.03)

.042

.14

.30 (.04)

.000

.52

Accuracy

.17 (.04)

.000

.36

.03 (.06)

.656

.04

.15 (.04)

.000

.32

.05 (.05)

.322

.08

Transparency

.00 (.04)

.943

.01

–.15 (.05)

.003

–.28

–.01 (.04)

.861

–.01

–.22 (.05)

.000

–.36

Variance
e.Assistance

17.36 (1.18)

.72

17.04 (1.08)

.73

e.Compliance

30.56 (2.08)

.87

33.52 (2.12)

.83

.18

4.80 (1.09)

Covariance
e.Assistance*e.Compliance
R2

4.08 (1.12)

.000
.285

.135

.000
.270

.20
.173
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Table P2
Path model predicting assessments of probability of commission (PC) and reasonable doubt (RD) before and after including inattentive participants
Attentive participants only (N= 433)
PC

Include inattentive participants (N = 498)

RD

PC

RD

b (s.e.)

p

b

b (s.e.)

p

b

b (s.e.)

p

b

b (s.e.)

p

b

Efficiency

.08 (.22)

.707

.03

–.49 (.15)

.001

–.23

.13 (.21)

.519

.05

–.49 (.15)

.001

–.21

Finality

.01 (.24)

.982

.00

.19 (.16)

.239

.07

–.06 (.23)

.793

–.02

.15 (.17)

.382

.05

Fairness

.19 (.18)

.296

.10

–.15 (.13)

.243

–.11

.11 (.17)

.506

.06

–.14 (.13)

.258

–.10

Strictness

–.36 (.18)

.049

–.16

.21 (.12)

.089

.13

–.31 (.17)

.068

–.14

.30 (.13)

.016

.17

Accuracy

1.12 (.24)

.000

.46

.29 (.20)

.144

.16

.97 (.22)

.000

.40

.39 (.19)

.035

.20

Transparency

–.47 (.24)

.052

–.20

–.26 (.17)

.122

–.15

–.32 (.21)

.139

–.13

–.50 (.17)

.003

–.26

Variance
e.PC

593.90 (33.69)

.91

577.44 (31.14)

.92

e.RD

326.44 (37.95)

.94

368.90 (34.85)

.91

.12

74.47 (25.02)

Covariance
e.PC*e.RD
R2

51.71 (24.85)

.037
.09

.06

.003
.08

.16
.09
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Table P3
Path model predicting assessments of probability of PC minus RD before and after including inattentive participants
Attentive participants only (N= 433)

Include inattentive participants (N = 498)

PC minus RD

PC minus RD

b (Robust s.e.)

p

b

b (Robust s.e.)

p

b

Efficiency

.58 (.27)

.033

.17

.62 (.36)

.016

.18

Finality

–.19 (.30)

.536

–.04

–.21 (.29)

.465

–.04

Fairness

.33 (.23)

.141

.16

.26 (.22)

.245

.12

Strictness

–.57 (.21)

.007

–.22

–.62 (.20)

.002

–.23

Accuracy

.83 (.31)

.007

.29

.58 (.29)

.045

.20

Transparency

–.21 (.28)

.455

–.08

.18 (.26)

.488

.06

.89

797.39 (52.23)

Variance
e.PCminusRD
R2

816.92 (55.70)
.11

.88
.12

216

Table P4
Logistic regression model predicting verdict before and after including inattentive participants
Attentive participants only (N= 433)

Include inattentive participants (N = 498)

Verdict

Verdict

b (s.e.)

p

!""# %&'() (!%)

b (s.e.)

p

!""# %&'() (!%)

Efficiency

.03 (.20)

.109

1.03

.04 (.02)

.022

1.04

Finality

–.01 (.02)

.558

.99

–.02 (.02)

.353

.98

Fairness

.01 (.02)

.325

1.01

.02 (.01)

.219

1.02

Strictness

–.05 (.02)

.002

.95

–.06 (.02)

.000

9.44

Accuracy

.07 (.02)

.003

1.07

.05 (.02)

.020

1.05

Transparency

.00 (.02)

.938

1.00

.02 (.02)

.217

1.02

Strength of evidence (strong)

.03 (.21)

.893

1.03

.01 (.19)

.949

1.01

–2.09 (.64)

.001

.12

–1.76 (.61)

.004

.17

Constant

c2 (7) = 46.40, p = .000, R2 = .08

c2 (7) = 65.31, p = .000, R2 = .09

Hosmer-Lemeshow c2 (8) = 8.97, p = .345

Hosmer-Lemeshow c2 (8) = 7.32, p = .503

Correctly classified = 63.05%

Correctly classified = 65.66%

217

218
References
Abramson, P. R. (1983). Political attitudes in America: Formation and change. San
Francisco, CA: Freeman.
American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association &
National Council on Measurement in Education (2014). Standards for educational and
psychological testing. Washington, DC: AERA.
Arenella, supra note 21, at 187.
Acock, A. C. (2013). Discovering structural equation modeling using Stata. Stata Press
books. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.
Ardener, S. (1964). The comparative study of rotating credit associations. The Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 94, 201–229.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2844382
Bandalos, D. L. (2018). Measurement theory and applications for the social sciences. New York,
NY: Guilford Publications.
Benesh, S. C., & Howell, S. E. (2001). Confidence in the courts: A comparison of users and nonusers. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 19, 199–214. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.437
Bennett, W. L., & Feldman, M. S. (1981). Reconstructing reality in the courtroom: Justice and
judgment in American culture. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Berinsky, A. J., Margolis, M. F., & Sances, M. W. (2014). Separating the shirkers from the
workers? Making sure respondents pay attention on self‐administered surveys. American
Journal of Political Science, 58, 739-753. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12081

219
Biderman, M. D. (2007). Method variance and big-five correlations. Paper presented at the 7th
Annual Conference of the Association for Research in Personality, Memphis, TN, 2007,
January 24, 2007.
Baumgartner, H., & Steenkamp, J. B. E. (2001). Response styles in marketing research: A crossnational investigation. Journal of marketing research, 38, 143-156.
https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.2.143.18840
Brooks, R. R., & Jeon-Slaughter, H. (2001). Race, income, and perceptions of the US court
system. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 19, 249–264. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.442
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A new source
of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 3–5.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610393980
Byrne, D. (1974). An introduction to personality: Research, theory, and applications.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Carlson, K. A., & Russo, J. E. (2001). Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 7, 91. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.7.2.91
Chandler, J., Mueller, P., & Paolacci, G. (2014). Nonnaivete among Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers: Consequences and solutions for behavioral researchers. Behavioral Research
Methods, 46, 112-130. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-013-0365-7
Chapdelaine, A., & Griffin, S. F. (1997). Beliefs of guilt and recommended sentence as a
function of juror bias in the OJ Simpson trial. Journal of Social Issues, 53, 477–485.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1997.tb02123.x

220
Chen, F. F., West, S. G., & Sousa, K. H. (2006). A comparison of bifactor and second-order
models of quality of life. Multivariate behavioral research, 41, 189-225.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr4102_5
Cook, T. E., & Gronke, P. (2005). The skeptical American: Revisiting the meanings of trust in
government and confidence in institutions. Journal of Politics, 67, 784–803.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00339.x
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349.
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0047358
Culhane, S. E., & Hosch, H. M. (2004). An aiibi witness' influence on mock jurors'
verdicts. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34, 1604-1616.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02789.x
Cutler, B. L., Moran, G., & Narby, D. J. (1992). Jury selection in insanity defense cases. Journal
of Research in Personality, 26, 165–182. https://doi.org/10.1016/0092-6566(92)90052-6
D’amico, L. C. (2003, October). Examining determinants of managerial trust: Evidence from a
laboratory experiment. In National Public Management research Conference,
Washington DC.
Dai, M., Frank, J., & Sun, I. (2011). Procedural justice during police-citizen encounters: The
effects of process-based policing on citizen compliance and demeanor. Journal of
Criminal Justice, 39, 159-168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2011.01.004
De La Fuente, L., De La Fuente, E. I., & García, J. (2003). Effects of pretrial juror bias, strength
of evidence and deliberation process on juror decisions: New validity evidence of the

221
Juror Bias Scale scores. Psychology, Crime & Law, 9, 197–209.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316031000116283
DeVellis, R. F. (2003). Scale development: Theory and applications. Applied social research
methods series. Bickman, L and DJ Rog. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Devine, D. J. (2012). Jury decision making: The state of the science. New York, NY: NYU
Press.
Devine, D. J., & Caughlin, D. E. (2014). Do they matter? A meta-analytic investigation of
individual characteristics and guilt judgments. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 20,
109-134. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000006
Devine, D. J., Clayton, L. D., Dunford, B. B., Seying, R., & Pryce, J. (2001). Jury decision
making: 45 years of empirical research on deliberating groups. Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law, 7, 622. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.7.3.622
Dexter, H. R., Cutler, B. L., & Moran, G. (1992). A test of voir dire as a remedy for the
prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22, 819–
832. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1992.tb00926.x
DeYoung, C. G. (2006). Higher-order factors of the Big Five in a multi-informant sample.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 1138-1151.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.6.1138
Diamond, S. S., & Casper, J. D. (1992). Blindfolding the jury to verdict consequences:
Damages, experts, and the civil jury. Law and Society Review, 26, 513-564.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3053737
Dwyer, J., Neufeld, P. J., & Scheck, B. (2000). Actual innocence: Five days to execution and
other dispatches from the wrongly convicted. New York, NY: Doubleday.

222
Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York, NY: Norton.
Findley, K. A. (2008). Toward a new paradigm of criminal justice: how the innocence
movement mergers crime control and due process. Texas Tech Law. Review, 41, 133.
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/text41&div=10&id=&pa
ge=
Furr, M. (2011). Scale construction and psychometrics for social and personality psychology.
London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd. doi: 10.4135/9781446287866
Geertz, C. (1962). The rotating credit association: A" middle rung" in development.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 10, 241–263.
https://doi.org/10.1086/449960
Gibson, J. L., Caldeira, G. A., & Spence, L. K. (2003). Measuring attitudes toward the United
States supreme court. American Journal of Political Science, 47, 354–367.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00025
Glöckner, A., & Engel, C. (2013). Can We Trust Intuitive Jurors? Standards of Proof and the
Probative Value of Evidence in Coherence‐Based Reasoning. Journal of Empirical legal
Studies, 10, 230-252. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12009
Goodman, J. K., Cryder, C. E., & Cheema, A. (2012). Data collection in a flat world: The
strengths and weaknesses of Mechanical Turk samples. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 26, 213-224. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1753
Hastie, R., Penrod, S., & Pennington, N. (2013). Inside the jury. Union: NJ: Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd.
Hamm, J. A., Wylie, L. E., & Brank, E. (2016). Measuring Older Adult Confidence in the

223
Courts and Law Enforcement. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 16.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403415623034
Hamm, J. A., PytlikZillig, L. M., Tomkins, A. J., Herian, M. N., Bornstein, B. H., & Neeley,
E. M. (2011). Exploring separable components of institutional confidence. Behavioral Sciences
& the Law, 29, 95–115. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.965
Hardin, R. (2002). Trust and trustworthiness. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (1995). Congress as public enemy: Public attitudes
toward American political institutions. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Hooper, D., Coughlan, J., & Mullen, M. R. (2008). Structural equation modelling: Guidelines
for determining model fit. The Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, 6, 5360. http://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/6596/
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (2009). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A
Multidisciplinary Journal, 6, 1-55. https://doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118
Huang, J. L., Curran, P. G., Keeney, J., Poposki, E. M., & DeShon, R. P. (2012). Detecting
and deterring insufficient effort responding to surveys. Journal of Business and
Psychology, 27, 99-114. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-011-9231-8
Huang, J. L., Liu, M., & Bowling, N. A. (2015). Insufficient effort responding: Examining an
insidious confound in survey data. Journal of Applied Psychology, 100, 828-845.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038510
Indermaur, D., & Roberts, L. (2009). Confidence in the criminal justice system. Trends and
Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 387, 1-6.
https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=924054552376003;res=IELAPA

224
Jackson, J., & Bradford, B. (2010). What is trust and confidence in the police? Policing: A
Journal of Policy and Practice, 4, 241–248. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paq020
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hough, M., Myhill, A., Quinton, P., & Tyler, T. R. (2012). Why do
people comply with the law? Legitimacy and the influence of legal institutions. British journal of
criminology, 52, 1051-1071. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azs032
Kassin, S. M., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1983). The construction and validation of a juror bias
scale. Journal of Research in Personality, 17, 423–442. https://doi.org/10.1016/00926566(83)90070-3
Kerstetter, W. A., & Rasinski, K. A. (1994). Opening a window into police internal affairs:
Impact of procedural justice reform on third-party attitudes. Social Justice Research, 7,
107–127. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02337294
Kline, R. B. (2016). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling (4th ed). New York,
NY: Guilford publications.
Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring
questions. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 569–598.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.50.1.569
Kravitz, D. A., Cutler, B. L., & Brock, P. (1993). Reliability and validity of the original and
revised Legal Attitudes Questionnaire. Law and Human Behavior, 17, 661.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044688
Kristina, M. (2009). Public satisfaction with police: The importance of procedural justice and
police performance in police-citizen encounters. Australian & New Zealand Journal of
Criminology, 42, 159–178. https://doi.org/10.1375/acri.42.2.159
Krosnick, J. A. (1991). Response strategies for coping with the cognitive demands of attitude

225
measures in surveys. Applied cognitive psychology, 5, 213-236.
https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2350050305
Lecci, L., & Myers, B. (2002). Examining the construct validity of the original and revised
JBS: A cross-validation of sample and method. Law and Human Behavior, 26, 455.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016335422706
Lecci, L., & Myers, B. (2008). Individual differences in attitudes relevant to juror decision
making: Development and validation of the Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire
(PJAQ). Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38, 2010–2038.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2008.00378.x
Lillquist, E. (2008). Balancing Errors in the Criminal Justice System. Texas Tech Law Review,
41, 175.
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/text41&div=11&id=&pa
ge=
Markus, K. A. (2014). Theory, Observation, and Validation: Commentary on Almond, Kim,
Velasquez, & Shute. Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research & Perspectives, 12, 4750. https://doi.org/10.1080/15366367.2014.921033
Markus, K. A. (2018). Three conceptual impediments to developing scale theory for
formative scales. Methodology, 14, 156-163. https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-2241/a000154
Martin, T. A., & Cohn, E. S. (2004). Attitudes toward the criminal legal system: Scale
development and predictors. Psychology, Crime & Law, 10, 367–391.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10683160310001629265
Mastrofski, S. D., Snipes, J. B., & Supina, A. E. (1996). Compliance on demand: The public's

226
response to specific police requests. Journal of research in Crime and delinquency, 33,
269-305. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427896033003001
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational
trust. Academy of Management Review, 20, 709–734.
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1995.9508080335
Mazerolle, L., Antrobus, E., Bennett, S., & Tyler, T. R. (2013). Shaping citizen perceptions
of police legitimacy: A randomized field trial of procedural justice. Criminology, 51, 3363. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2012.00289.x
Nannestad, P. (2008). What have we learned about generalized trust, if anything? Annual Review
of Political Behavior Science, 11, 413–436.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135412
Narby, D. J., & Cutler, B. L. (1994). Effectiveness of voir dire as a safeguard in eyewitness
cases. Journal of Applied Psychology, 79, 724. https://doi.org/10.1037/00219010.79.5.724
Newton, K. (1999). Social and political trust. In E. M. Uslaner (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of
Social and Political Trust (pp. 37-56). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions. In S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam
(Eds), Disaffected Democracies. What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691186849-007
Noar, S. M. (2003). The role of structural equation modeling in scale development. Structural
Equation Modeling, 10, 622–647. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15328007SEM1004_8
Nunnally, J., & Bernstein, I. (1994). Psychometric Theory (3rd ed). New York, NY: McGrawHill.

227
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1978). Psychometric theory (2nd ed). New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill.
Oppenheimer, D., Meyvis T., & Davidenko N. (2009). Instructional manipulation checks:
Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 45, 867–872. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.009
Packer, H. L. (1964). Two models of the criminal process. University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, 113, 1–68. https://doi.org/10.2307/3310562
Packer, H. (1968). The limits of the criminal sanction. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Park, K., Seong, Y., Kim, M., & Kim, J. (2016). Juror adjustments to the reasonable doubt
standard of proof. Psychology, Crime & Law, 22, 599-618.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2016.1168427
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1992). Explaining the evidence: Tests of the Story Model for juror
decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 189.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1993). The story model for juror decision making. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method
biases in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and recommended
remedies. Journal of applied psychology, 88, 879-903. https://doi.org/10.1037/00219010.88.5.879
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2012). Sources of method bias in social
science research and recommendations on how to control it. Annual review of
psychology, 63, 539-569. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100452

228
Pyo, J. & Maxfield, M. G. (2020). Improving the quality of responses from Mechanical Turk:
Screeners for inattentive responding. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Ren, L., Cao, L., Lovrich, N., & Gaffney, M. (2005). Linking confidence in the police with the
performance of the police: Community policing can make a difference. Journal of
Criminal Justice, 33, 55–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2004.10.003
Rotter, J. B. (1980). Interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and gullibility. American Psychologist,
35, 1. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.35.1.1
Sheehan, K. B., & Pittman, M. (2016). Amazon's Mechanical Turk for academics: The HIT
handbook for social science research. Irvine, CA: Melvin & Leigh, Publishers.
Sherman, L. W. (2002). Trust and confidence in criminal justice. National Institute of Justice
Journal, 248, 22–31. https://doi.org/10.1037/e527842006-004
Simon, D. (2012). In doubt: The psychology of the criminal justice process. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Simon, D., Krawczyk, D. C., & Holyoak, K. J. (2004). Construction of preferences by constraint
satisfaction. Psychological Science, 15, 331-336. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.09567976.2004.00678.x
Simon, D. (2004). A third view of the black box: Cognitive coherence in legal decision
making. The University of Chicago Law Review, 71, 511-586.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1600674
Simon, D., Snow, C. J., & Read, S. J. (2004). The redux of cognitive consistency theories:
evidence judgments by constraint satisfaction. Journal of personality and social
psychology, 86, 814. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.6.814
Steelman, Z. R., Hammer, B. I., & Limayem, M. (2014). Data collection in the digital age:

229
Innovative alternatives to student samples. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 23, 212219. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26634930?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Stöber, J. (2001). The Social Desirability Scale-17 (SDS-17): Convergent validity, discriminant
validity, and relationship with age. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 17,
222. https://doi.org/10.1027//1015-5759.17.3.222
Sun, I. Y., & Wu, Y. (2006). Citizens’ perceptions of the courts: The impact of race, gender, and
recent experience. Journal of Criminal Justice, 34, 457-467.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2006.09.001
Sun, I. Y., Wu, Y., Hu, R., & Farmer, A. K. (2017). Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Public
Cooperation with Police: Does Western Wisdom Hold in China? Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency, 54, 454–478. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427816638705
Sunshine, J., & Tyler, T. R. (2003). The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping
public support for policing. Law & Society Review, 37, 513–548.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5893.3703002
Tang, C. M., & Nunez, N. (2003). Effects of defendant age and juror bias on judgment of
culpability: What happens when a juvenile is tried as an adult? American Journal of
Criminal Justice, 28, 37–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02885751
Tankebe, J. (2009). Public cooperation with the police in Ghana: Does procedural fairness
matter? Criminology, 47, 1265–1293. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2009.00175.x
Tehseen, S., Ramayah, T., & Sajilan, S. (2017). Testing and controlling for common method
variance: A review of available methods. Journal of Management Sciences, 4, 142-168.
https://doi.org/10.20547/jms.2014.1704202
Thomas, K. A., & Clifford, S. (2017). Validity and Mechanical Turk: An assessment of

230
exclusion methods and interactive experiments. Computers in Human Behavior, 77, 184197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2017.08.038
Trinkner, R., Jackson, J., & Tyler, T. R. (2018). Bounded authority: Expanding “appropriate”
police behavior beyond procedural justice. Law and Human Behavior, 42, 280.
https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000285
Tuffin, R., Morris, J., Poole, A., Groot-Brittannië. Home Office. Research, D., & Directorate,
S. (2006). An evaluation of the impact of the National Reassurance Policing
Programme. London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate.
Tyler, T. R. (1990). Why people obey the law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tyler, T. R. (2001). Public trust and confidence in legal authorities: What do majority and
minority group members want from the law and legal institutions? Behavioral Sciences
& the Law, 19, 215–235. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.438
Tyler, T. R. (2006). Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation. Annual Review of
Psychology, 57, 375–400. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190038
Tyler, T. R., & Darley, J. M. (1999). Building a law-abiding society: Taking public views about
morality and the legitimacy of legal authorities into account when formulating
substantive law. Hofstra Law Review, 28, 707-739.
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/hoflr28&div=31&id=&p
age=
Tyler, T. R., & Fagan, J. (2008). Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police
Fight Crime in Their Communities Symposium - Legitimacy and Criminal Justice. Ohio
State Journal of Criminal Law, 6, 231–276.

231
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/osjcl6&div=11&g_sent=1&casa
_token=
Tyler, T. R., & Trinker, R. (2017). Why children follow rules: Legal socialization and the
development of legitimacy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
U.S. Census Bureau (2019). Demographic and Housing Estimates, 2018 American Community
Survey (ASC) 1-year estimates. Retrieved from
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=United%20States&table=DP05&tid=ACSDP1Y2
018.DP05&g=0100000US&lastDisplayedRow=29&vintage=2017&layer=state&cid=DP
05_0001E.
Warling, D., & Peterson-Badali, M. (2003). The verdict on jury trials for juveniles: The effects
of defendant’s age on trial outcomes. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 21, 63–82.
https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.517
Wenzel, J. P., Bowler, S., & Lanoue, D. J. (2003). The sources of public confidence in state
courts: Experience and institutions. American Politics Research, 31, 191–211.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02250295
Weijters, B., Geuens, M., & Schillewaert, N. (2010). The individual consistency of acquiescence
and extreme response style in self-report questionnaires. Applied Psychological
Measurement, 34, 105-121. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146621609338593
Williams, L. J., Cote, J. A., & Buckley, M. R. (1989). Lack of method variance in self
reported affect and perceptions at work: reality or artifact? Journal of applied
psychology, 74, 462-468. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.74.3.462
Woods, C. M. (2006). Careless responding to reverse-worded items: Implications for
confirmatory factor analysis. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral

232
Assessment, 28, 186-191. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10862-005-9004-7

